ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3853 7 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (521 LDI 0413) 9 February 1951
| NAME: | CHING Chun (鐘春) |
| AGE: | 34 |
| RANK: | Lt Col |
| DUTY: | Chief of Supply Section |
| UNIT: | CCF 50th Army, 150th Div |
| DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 070600 Feb 51, 4 km S of ■■■■ |
| INTERROGATOR: | Cpl TANIGUCHI |
Cooperative and talked freely. Education - 3 yr of high school and 1 yr of Officers’ Training School. Information may be considered reliable. Surrendered because he was anti Communist and wanted to rejoin the CNA.
a. Chronology:
Dec 37 - Entered Central Officers’ School (CNA).
Oct 38 - Graduated Officers School.
Oct 38 - Oct 48 - Fought against Japanese Army and CCF. Promoted to Lt Col.
Oct 48 - Entire 60th CNA surrendered to CCF at CHANGCHUN, MANCHURIA. Integrated into CCF with the position of supply section chief of 150th Div.
28 Oct 50 - 50th Army entered North KOREA from SINUIJU.
O/a 5 Nov 50 - Arrived PAKMA.
8 Nov 50 - Arrived CHOESAN.
13 Nov 50 - Withdrew to NAMSHI in order to set up defense line around SINUIJU
23 Nov 50 - Arrived CHONGJU.
O/a 15 Nov 50 - Arrived SINANJU.
O/a 5 Dec 50 - Left SINANJU.
O/a 8 Dec 50 - Arrived P’YONGYANG.
O/a 9 Dec 50 - Left P’YONGYANG, bypassed CHUNGWA, HWANGJU, SARIWON.
End of Dec 50 - Arrived KU■WARI. Remained here with Supply Section. Entire army moved on toward SEOUL.
11 Jan 51 - PW and section bypassed K■■IANDO, KOYANG and SEOUL.
17 Jan 51 - Arrived at KWANGMYON RI (8 km S of SEOUL) where 50th Army Eq was located.
20 Jan 51 - Arrived at HAPONGCEON (location of 150th Div).
23 Jan 51 - PW and section to KALKYON RI.
29 Jan 51 - Arrived at CHUNGGOK RI (8 km NE of KALKYON RI).
6 Feb 51 - Deserted unit to surrender.
7 Feb 51 - Captured.
b. Objective of 50th Army:
Army was to go into a general offense during spring 51. All Div were to reorganize and re-equip their units by spring in the rear of defense lines set up by 148th Div (between INCH’ON and SUWON), 149th Div (defense line 6 km N or SUWON) and 150th Div (between SUWON and ICH’ON) with an unk Div of 38th Army on the left flank of 150th Div.
c. Organization:
50th Army consisted of 148th, 149th, and 150th Div. Arty Regt had 3 Bn; wpn were 12x92mm Howitzers, 12 US 75mm guns, 6 Chinese mortars, ammo 70-80 rd to each piece.
Honor Guard Bn - strength 300 (3 Co) all armed with rifles and 100 rd of ammo. Bn also had 6 LMG (1,000 rd each). Recon Co strength 200.
Section within Army Hq:
Supply Dept, Political Dept, Med Dept, Operations.
150th Div consisted of 450th, 48th, 49th Regt. Honor Guard Co - 120-130 men. Sig Co - 130 men with one radio and transmitter set. Mortar Co - 170 men with 4x82mm mortars (40 rd each).
Sections within Div Hq:
Political Dept: 120 men
Organization Section:
Propaganda Section:
Personnel Section:
Defense Section:
Civil Affairs Section:
Supply Dept: 180 men
Fiscal Section:
Clothing Section:
Wpn Section:
Rations Section:
Med Dept: 170 men
Operations: 150 men
148th Div consisted of 42nd, 43rd, 44th Regt. 149th Div consisted of 45th, 46th, 47th Regt. At the time of PW capture, average regiments’ strength was 900 men all armed with rifles and 100 rd each. (Original strength 2,200-2,500 men per Regt)
d. Casualties:
Since entering KOREA, 150th Div has suffered 46% casualties (KIA, MIA, WIA and sick). PW heard that 3% of the patients in hospitals suffered from severe stomachaches and dishrrea, 5% from very high fever with chills.
e. Code Numbers and Names:
Code numbers and names were made out by the General Hq, Expeditionary Force in KOREA. After each campaign or offensive codes were changed. Codes used by units of the 50th Army (as of 6 Feb 51) are listed below:
50th Army: LIANG SHAN PU (梁山部)
148th Div: I TATUI (一大隊)
149th Div: ERH TATUI (二大隊)
150th Div: SAN TATUI (三大隊)
1st Bn: I CHUNG TUI (一中隊)
2nd Bn: ERH CHUNGTUI (二中隊)
3rd Bn: SAN CHUNGTUI (三中隊)
Above code names and numbers were used whenever referring to the units. Code numbers were given to Army, Div, and Regt commanders and to political advisors.
Army Commander: 71
Political Advisor (Army): 72
Div Commander: 610
Political Advisor (Div): 620
Regt Commander: 701
Political Advisor: (Regt) 702
Above codes were assigned by GHQ Expeditionary Force in KOREA and subject to change after each campaign or offensive. When referring to anyone in the positions mentioned above, numbers, and not names, were used at all times.
f. Personalities:
PENG, The Hwai, 50, CG, GHQ, Expeditionary Force.
CHUNG, Tsu Shong, 50, CG, 50th Army.
WANG, Chia Shan, 48, CG, 150th Div.
LONG, Yao, 45, CG, 149th Div.
PAE, Tsao Shieh, 47, CG, 148th Div.
CHOU, Ching Sam, 34, CO, 450th Regt.
HO, Er Show, 38, CO, 49th Regt.
SHO, Hung, 45, C/S, 50th Army.
HO, Wien Hung, 50, Chief of Political Dept, 150th Div.
SHUI, Won Li, 50, Political Advisor to CG 50th Army.
CHIN, Chon Chung, Political Advisor to CG 149th Div.
CHON, Yui Chun, 37, Political Advisor to CG 148th Div.
LI, Kwan Yuan, 36, Political Advisor to CG 150th Div.
g. Supply:
Food: Majority of CCF in KOREA obtained food thru confiscation in villages for there were no supplies from MANCHURIA since air bombings have knocked out vehicles and damaged lines of supply.
PW believes that CCF will, in about 10 days, from 9 Feb 51, be unable to confiscate food from Korean villages because there will be none to be found.
h. Psychological Warfare:
At present approx 1/3 of CCF officers are former CNA officers. Approx 2/3 of the officers of 50th Army are ex-CNA officers. These officers are dissatisfied and discontented due to discriminatory action, such as extra duty, severe punishment for mistakes or faults, and constant surveillance by political officers.
A political advisor once stated to an assemble of officers that close surveillance of ex-CNA officers was necessary so that in the event of World War III there would be no possibility of these officers inciting a revolution.
These former CNA officers were not permitted to join the Communist Party. Due to these circumstances, PW believes that psychological warfare should be directed more toward officers urging them to lead their discontented troops to surrender.
Up to the present, leaflets have been effective only on troops. If UN would put this proposal into effect, he thinks that friction between the ex-CNA and CCF officers could fanned into a revolution.
For the AC of S, G-2:
SINGLETON
