ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3854 7 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (521 LDI - 0471) 23 February 1951
| NAME: | KIM, Un Son |
| AGE: | 23 |
| RANK: | Jr Sgt |
| UNIT: | III Corps, 1st Div, 3rd Regt, 1st Bn, 3rd Co, 3rd Plat (NKA) |
| DUTY: | Asst Sqd Ldr |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | WONDONG (DS5811) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 21 Feb 51 |
| INTERROGATOR: | Sgt TOKUSHIGE |
PW cooperative - talked very freely, reliability - good.
a. Chronology:
25 Jul 50 - Conscripted at CHORWON. After battle of SEOUL (Sep 50) PW returned to WONSAN where re-captured and assigned to 2nd Bn, 3rd Regt, 42nd Div in Oct 50 and received trng for 1 mo and retreated to MANPOJIN due to UN advances.
Late Nov 50 - 2nd Bn, 3rd Regt (300 men without wpn) arr MANPOJIN. 1st Div reorganized with strength of 10,000 and PW attached to 3rd Regt, 1st Bn, 3rd Co, 3rd Plat, 3rd Sqd. Received 1 mo trng.
Dec 50 - 1st Div dep MANPOJIN on foot, marched only at night in bn file.
2 Jan 51 - 1st Div arr KOTAERI, KUMSONGMYON (CT7952) via HAMHUNG, WONSAN, SINGOSAN. Received night patrol and dry run firing trng for 1 mo.
2 Feb 51 - Div dep KOTAERI.
17 Feb 51 - 3rd Regt arr WONDONG and immediately engaged by UN troops. 1st Bn withdrew and regrouped 2 km to rear. Heard that 6th Div had been dispersed at u/k vic.
18 Feb 51 - 1st Bn took previous position on hill.
21 Feb 51 - 1st Bn shelled by arty. Deserted and surrendered.
b. Organization, Strength & Weapons:
III Corps composed of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Div.
1st Div composed of 1st, 2nd, 3rd Regt, Med Bn, and Engr Bn.
Original strength of Div, 10,000, ea regt, 2,000, ea bn, 500.
3rd Regt - 1,500 as of 2 Feb 51.
1st Bn, 3rd Regt - 350 as of 2 Feb 51 with 1 telephone.
| Strength: | Wpn: |
| 1st Co - 80-90 | (equipment similar to 3rd Co) |
| 2nd Co - 80-90 | (equipment similar to 3rd Co) |
| 3rd Co - 84 | (3 x 7.62 DP LMG 250 rd ea) 9 PPSH SMG with 72-144 rd. Rest with Russ rifles 100 rd ea.) |
| Mortar Co: 40-50 | (3 x 82 mm mortars, others Russ rifles 100 rd ea.) |
| HMG Co: 40-50 | (3 x 7.62 Maxim HMG 7 cases of ammo ea, Russ rifles 100 rd ea.) |
| 45 mm Gun Plat: 20 | (Only Russ rifles 100 rd ea.) |
| AT Plat: 20 | (2-3 x 14.5 AT guns, Russ rifles 100 rd ea.) |
| Comm Plat: 20 | (Russ rifles 100 rd ea, 4-5 reels of 500m comm wire.) |
| 3rd Co: (84 men) | |
| 1st Plat: 23 | (Sqd Ldrs with PPSH SMG, Asst Sqd Ldr of 1st Sqd with LMG. Others Russ rifles. Plat Ldr with pistol) |
| 2nd Plat: 23 | (Same as 1st Plat) |
| 3rd Plat: 23 | (Same as 1st Plat) |
| HMG Plat: 12 | (2 Maxim MG 2 cases ammo ea.) |
Each plat of 3 sqds of 7-8 men each.
c. Casualties:
8 Jan 51 - Vic CHANGJIN - 2nd Regt received serial strafing and bombing. Heard that approx 100 men were killed. This attack took place at 0900-1000 hr during breakfast.
15 Jan 51 - 1st Plat, 3rd Co received similar attack at u/k location - 7 killed, 3 wounded.
17 Feb 51 - WONGDONG - 2 killed, 3 wounded in 3rd Co. Heard Bn suffered about 90 KIA.
Desertions - 1 man deserted from 3rd Plat, 3rd Co.
d. Personalities:
KAN, Pum Mo - Col 35 CO, 3rd Regt
CHONG, Won Pak - Maj 30 CO, 1st Bn
KIM, Pyong Ho - Lt 25 CO, 3rd Co
SONG, Sun Ken - Jr Lt 22 Plat Ldr, 3rd Plat
e. Code Names:
1st Bn - TAEGU (17 Feb 51)
3rd Co - CHAESAE (17 Feb 51)
Code names changed from time to time.
f. Foreign Elements:
10 Feb 51 - 8 km E of CHUNCHON - obs 15 CCF troops travelling S. Heard from plat ldr that CCF troops usually travelled in such small groups and assembled at predesignated area.
g. Food:
Food procured from villages. Meals twice a day, usually before departure from and upon arrival at rest area. Food was prepared in plat groups in open areas and in groups of 2 or 3 when in villages to minimize casualties in cases of air attacks. Upon dep for front lines, 3 days ration (3 kg) were carried. There was sufficient rice in the unit.
h. Ammo:
Troops issued 100 rd at MANPOJIN and thereafter no resupply.
i. Other Units:
10 Feb 51 - 8 km E of CHUNCHON - One bn of 15th Div obs resting at roadside. Heard they were heading South.
j. Communications:
Bn to higher echelons by telephone and runners.
By runners only below bn level.
Bn CO, Political Officer, Cosrations Officer and Labor Party Ldr had own runners.
k. Morale:
2/3 of troops are pre-ROK and do not have their hearts in performing their missions. There is much ill feeling between the pro-ROK and Reds and arguments and fist fights are quite frequent. The guilty ones are reprimanded and given extra duties.
Above 2/3 want to desert but were told by officers that they would be killed if captured by UN troops. Also kept under strict surveillance by political and labor party members. If troops knew of good treatment offered by UN troops others would desert. Obs c■■ leaflet printed in Chinese but could not read it.
l. Disease:
2 Jan 511 - ■■■REI - 2 cases of typhus; taken to hospital.
m. Night Bombing:
Did not receive any such bombings but heard of or noted after effects of such, as explained under paragraph - Casualties.
However, to minimize effect of such air attacks, units travelled by plat in single file each man about 2 or 3 m apart and plats about 15 m apart.
Troops did not receive any particular instructions concerning air attacks, but when planes came into sight or hearing, Co CO gave a blast on his whistle and after the plane had passed troops stood up and continued to march.
For the AC of S, G-2:
SINGLETON
