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WANG, Chih 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 40 NO. 3626 1951-01-02
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3626 27 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS S.R. 022) 15 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: WANG, Chih (王支)
PW NUMBER: 63 NK 700 406
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 21
DUTY: Rifleman
UNIT: CCF 4th Field Army, 39th Army, 116th Div, 347th Regt, 1st Bn, 2nd Co, 1st Plat, 2nd Sqd
EDUCATION: 3½ years Primary School
OCCUPATION: Farmer
PLACE OF CAPTURE: SEOUL
DATE OF CAPTURE: 2 Jan 51
PLACE OF BIRTH: MANCHURIA, HEILUNGCHIANG-SHENG, HAILUN-HSIEN, PAIHSIANG-CHU, MINI-HSIANG (滿洲 黑龍江省 求倫縣 白■區民■郷)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: T/Sgt LEE (FEAF)

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW fairly intelligent; sincere and cooperative. Reliability - Good.

3. MARCHES:
a. PW unit never marched during the day. All troop movements took place at night between the hours of 1800 - 0600. When moving at night unit moved out in column of two's.
b. When under ground attack, unit takes cover on both sides of the road bank.
c. When under tank attack, the Co in column of two's would turn facing the tanks and deploy on both sides. Each platoon has a "dynamite unit" consisting of four men except the mortar platoon. The riflemen would then fire on the tank led troops and leave the dynamites to take care of the tanks. Tactics used is as follows: When under attack by two tanks stationed on the road, the leading tank is strictly left alone, while concentrating on the rear tank. Sticks of dynamite is thrown at the sprockets and when disabled, would create a roadblock, preventing the lead tank from retreating. When under attacks by three tanks, the first and last tank is concentrated on. When on the march; trails, main roads are used, and at times cross country. Messengers were used between columns. Ten minutes on the hour for rest is given troops on the march. No security measures taken during halts, except when approaching the combat area. Guards are posted on both flanks about 300m out.

4. BIVOUACS:
Troops dig foxholes accommodating 2 - 3 soldiers. Trench is dug in areas most likely for tank penetration. The trench is 80cm wide x 80cm deep. Length depends on the terrain. For ground attack prepared positions is established in area closest to the enemy. Defenses consist of trenches dug in a staggered manner with two guards placed about 200m out front. Men sleep and eat in the dugouts after receiving food from the kitchen. Dugouts are braced with logs and covered with dirt and leaves, including branches and grass for camouflage.

5. ASSEMBLY FOR THE ATTACK:
Assembly areas are used and troops move out in single file about 1m apart. Assembly areas are about 500 - 600m from the front line and 30 minutes walk from bivouac area towards the rear. (Note: PW combat experience has been mostly in mountain areas. Therefore, assembly areas and bivouac areas are in relation to one mountain or hill to another. The distance of a given objective must be taken into consideration and according to terrain features). Units move out to assembly areas from 1 - 2 hours before H-Hour after receiving reports from the Rcn unit, sent from Regt level. Orders are never changed once given from assembly areas.

6. ASSAULT:
a. Depth of objective for Co and Bn about 40 - 50m. For Regt about 150m. For Div, 150m.
b. After reaching the objective, the unit digs in because of aircraft attack. If the casualty list is too great for pursuit of the enemy, then a new fresh unit takes over the assignment. If the attack fails, troops retreat out of range, dig in, and wait for another attempt the following night. If the attack fails again, then reinforcements are brought up.

7. OBSERVATION:
a. Observation posts are set up around assembly areas about 50m to each side.
b. CP's are set up in front of defense positions about 50 - 60m on both sides. Each post consists of two men with whistles for signalling.

8. DEFENSIVE TACTICS:
a. Trenches dug in staggered formation facing the enemy.
b. Shovels and pick axes are used in erecting fortifications by the troops.

9. ANTI-TANK TACTICS:
a. Bangalore torpedo, “MOLOTOV cocktail,” dynamite and armor piercing mine were used.
b. PW Co has a 12-men “tank-killer” team.

10. SUPPLY:
a. Corn, rice, millet. Meal is prepared by a mess section. PW states that meals was sufficient.
b. Sufficient ammunition. Each Co has an officer who looks after the ammunition supply. If ammunition is needed, Bn Hq is notified, then up to Div level. Ammunition is then transported directly to the requesting unit. Ammunition is hand carried because of destruction of motor vehicles by UN aircrafts.
c. PW has a cotton padded winter uniform; claims that it is adequate.

11. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. Radio in each Regt.
b. Runners are used as messengers. Messages are coded. Runners are used up to Regimental level.
c. Bugles, whistles and flares are used.
(1) Bugles are used when attacking.
(2) Whistles for signalling.
(3) Flares are used also for signalling.

12. TRAINING:
a. PW received seven months training.
b. Training consisted of dry run firing, close order drill.
c. Lack of ammunition prevented PW unit from firing live ammunition while in training.

13. MEDICAL:
PW last received immunization prior to entering KOREA August 1950. Reason unknown.

14. DISCIPLINE:
Punishments are given by calling a meeting of the rest of the guilty members unit by admonition. PW heard one of his officers comment that if any member of his unit refused to obey an order in time of battle, he personally would shoot him on the spot.

15. RELATIONS WITH KOREANS:
a. PW states that North Korean civilians weren't afraid of CCF.
b. Korean civilians were used as guides.
c. PW hasn't heard of any CCF officers and NCO being assigned to NK units.
d. No CCF advisors with NK Army.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROBINSON

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