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WANG, Chiang 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 40 NO. 3625 1951-01-13
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3625 27 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS S.R. 022) 15 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: WANG, Chiang (王江)
PW NUMBER: 63 NK 700399
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 19
DUTY: Bugler
UNIT: CCF 4th Field Army, 50th Army, 148th Div, 44th Regt, 1st Bn, MG Co
EDUCATION: None
OCCUPATION: Farmer
PLACE OF CAPTURE: SUWON (水原)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 13 Jan 51
PLACE OF BIRTH: MANCHURIA, LIAOHSI-SHENG, LISHU-HSIEN, TISHIHERH-CHU (東北 遼西省 梨樹縣 第十二區)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: T/Sgt LEE (FEAF)

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was sincere and intelligent; very cooperative in manner and speech. Reliability - Good.

3. MARCHES:
a. Security
PW unit marched in column of two's. When under aircraft attack, they deployed on both sides of the road and remained quiet. When under ground attack, PW unit usually retreated toward a hill or mountain side fighting a rear guard action. When under tank attack, and time is available, Bangalore torpedoes are buried across the road, one on each side. Length of tube about 1½m with firing mechanism attached to a length of cord about 20m long. When tank crosses the Bangalore torpedoes, the firing pin is jerked loose by hidden operators.
b. Marches took place only at night, 2000 - 0330 hours.
c. Main highways were used at night. Also trails and cross country when going into line.
d. PW unit moved in one column. Messengers were used for communications between columns.
e. PW unit took 20 minute breaks for every hour of marching. No security measures taken.

4. BIVOUACS:
a. Troops hid in dugouts. Each dugout accommodates two soldiers. Staggered trench 1m x 1m is dug across area closest to the front. No measures taken against tank attack.
b. One platoon of troops are stationed about 1/3 mile forward on the bivouac area toward the front. These troops dig individual foxhole about 10m apart in a staggered manner.
c. Troops sleep in dugouts during the day; also eat in their respective dugouts after food is received from the kitchen helps.
d. If possible troops use civilian houses for quarters.
e. Natural vegetation is used for camouflage.

5. ASSEMBLY FOR THE ATTACK:
a. Assembly areas are used. Reached by marching in column of two's. Assembly areas are usually about 300m to the rear of the front, with the bivouac area approx 500m to the rear of assembly area.
b. Troops move out in column of two's, never in multiple columns.
c. Troops move out to assembly areas ½ - 1 hour before H-Hour.
d. In the assembly area the mission is explained and orders issued to units as to its objectives.
e. Troops move out from assembly area in squads, wedge formation, strung out in a parallel line with the CO directly to the rear of the center of the line. Troops move out thus until fire is encountered, then automatically echelon right and left, forming a wedge with the CO in the center of the wedge. Once battle formation is decided, it is never changed, unless an order for retreat is issued.

6. ASSAULT:
a. Troops after receiving fire from the enemy automatically formed a wedge formation, with the whole line forming a huge wedge. From this point on, the assault is conducted in a "leap frog" manner. Short rushes of about 10 - 20m, with covering fire given from the rear line. The secondary line advances on the run with covering fire given from the forward element. This process is repeated until about 40 - 50m from the objective, then troops make a final charge to the objective.
b. Depth of Co about 50 - 100m. Further information on Bn, Regt, and Div unknown.
c. When objective has been reached, the attacking force estimates its overall loss then notifies its Bn or Regt Hq as to its strength. If the loss is too great then a new unit is immediately sent out to take over the assignment of pursuing the enemy, with the attacking force remaining behind and digging in.
d. If the attack fails, the unit retreats to a position far enough to be out of range of small arms fire and digs in and if the casualty list is not too great, resumes the attack the following night. Troops dig in because of aircraft retaliation.

7. OBSERVATION:
a. No observation posts around perimeter of assembly areas.
b. No OP set up along lines of march.
c. OP are set up in front of defense positions.

8. DEFENSIVE TACTICS:
a. If a Bn is defending a given position, one Co is sent out ahead about 200m and to dig foxholes in a staggered manner. The Co is split up into three platoons and uses the “defense in depth” method. The distance between platoon is about 50m. The distance between individual soldiers in a staggered parallel line of foxholes about 10m. The same method is used to the right and left of the defensive position. (See Sketch Below).
60 & 82mm mortars in HQ area
60 and 82mm mortars are kept in Hq area until an attack begins, then are dispatched to the battle area.
b. Picks and shovels are used by troops to build fortifications.
c. Defense position of a Bn (See Sketch Above).

9. ANTI-TANK TACTICS:
a. Bangalore torpedoes, dynamite, armor piercing mines are used.
b. PW platoon has a two-man “tank-killer” team.

10. SUPPLY:
a. Originally PW unit had corn and rice. Food was adequate. Prior to his capture, unit started to line off the land as best as possible. Lack of transportation is reason given - food inadequate.
b. Ammunition is rationed out. Lack of transportation.
c. PW had a cotton padded winter uniform. Claims that one issue was adequate. If torn, mended.
d. Civilian clothes were not used.

11. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. Radio is used from Regt level on up. Types, range unknown.
b. PW claims that telephone and wire for radio antennas were adequate. Wire reliable.
c. Runners used up to Regt level - carries coded messages.
d. Bugles are used for assembly calls, rest, attack and recall. Flares are also used for signalling; one red to attack, two green for unit identifications.

12. TRAINING:
a. PW received ten days of combat training prior to entering KOREA.
b. PW never fired a live round when in training.
c. PW never heard of any training being given in rear areas in North KOREA.
d. Sufficient ammunition while in training.

13. MEDICAL:
a. PW states there were three men in his Co with frozen feet, eight with malaria. No medical aid whatsoever.

14. DISCIPLINE:
Discipline good. Punishment given by admonition.
Seven men deserted PW platoon prior to entering KOREA.

15. RELATIONS WITH KOREANS:
Attitude of North Koreans to CCF fair.
North Koreans were used as guides and interpreters. PW states that he hasn't heard of any CCF officers, NCO, and advisors with North Korean units.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROBINSON

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