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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3610　27 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report 022)　15 February 1951

Cooperative. Information furnished considered fairly reliable.

a. During a seven day march to the front, unit marched in single files at night along both sides of the highway. Vehicles were in the middle of the road. PW knew of no special air detection equipment. When enemy aircraft are operating locally, they stop marching and spread out on side of road and do not move. Vehicles extinguish lights and stop on the road. There was an incident when UN planes caught the unit while on the march at night by first dropping flares and then strafing them, resulting in ten reported casualties.

When a Bn was on the move along the highway, forward elements consisted of a platoon which was sent out to a distance of approx 500 meters ahead of column on both sides of the highway. 3 to 5 men, clad in civilian clothes, went as far as 1/3 mile ahead and would run back to make report upon making contact with hostile forces. In case of this report, unit would take up approach formation (See Sketch #1) and continue forward movement.

Tank Attack:

When an on coming tank is sighted, marching unit would spread out on both sides of road, unit bazooka team would take up position to fire while riflemen stand ready with hand-grenades.

b. Usually night marches were made after sunset and daylight halts an hour before sunrise.

c. Unit marches along main roads. Did not march over trails which were covered with 2 foot of thick snow and ice. Transportation animals were endangered when trails were used.

d. The main body of moving unit was moved in 3 columns. 2 columns on both sides of road, one column in center of road. Unit under Bn level used runner to keep in contact. Telephone used only in Bn and up. Radio used from Regt level up to Army level.

e. During march halts were made after marching about 10 miles. Each halt took 10 to 30 minutes depending largely on how much time was needed to rest transportation animals. During halt, sentries are posted on guard in distances of 30m.

a. When selecting bivouac areas, cities and villages are avoided but hills with woods are chiefly used.

They had an hour to dig their individual fox hole before sunrise. Fox holes were 4 m apart and were well concealed with trees and or snow. Animals were put in thick woods. Vehicles were parked on road side and camouflaged with trees. Observation posts were set up on hills and used red or white flag or bugle signal when on coming planes are sighted. For security against ground attacks, bivouacs were guarded by sentries. All troops were ordered not to remove field packs, arms, ammunition or shoes while sleeping or resting.

When there were tank attacks, they would let it pass and send out a bazooka team to attack it from behind. However, PW unit encountered no tanks while on marches.

b. Sentries were posted around bivouac areas, and maintained a distance of approx 50 m from perimeter. Sentries stayed in fox holes. Observation post with 2 to 3 men were set up on hills to give warning of planes and hostile forces. In each co bivouac area 4 to 8 guards would be posted. One or two at each point.

c. Men eat breakfast and go in to fox holes to sleep before sunrise. Eat own ration in fox hole at noon time. Get up from fox holes to eat supper at sunset and continued night marching.

d. Men used individual trench at shelter in the daytime.

e. Trees are obtained from nearby areas to camouflage individual trenches. If trees cannot be obtained, they used grass to cover trenches and further camouflaged with snow.

a. Assembly areas were used before attack. PW has attended one of them. Troop concentration in assembly area PW had seen, was a Bn. Assembly areas were reached by trails, and at all times avoided main roads when enroute to assembly points for fear that troop movement would be detected by hostile force and attacked by armored vehicles. It was often one mile from bivouac area to assembly point and took about 30 minutes to reach. The usual assembly time was 1900 hours.

b. Multiple columns were used to reach assembly area. When a Bn assembled, 3 columns of 1 Co each would be ordered to reach a designated area from different roads.

c. Troops reached assembly area at 1900 hours. There Co commanders were given instructions which took about 30 minutes. Then troops set out for their objectives. It took about 30 minutes walk before they reached their designated places. In PW case, they attacked convoy of ten vehicles which was coming along the highway.

d. When the Bn was ready to move out of the assembly area, each Co takes up its designated road of approach and moves out also in three columns. There were two to three squads in each Co preceding the Co approx 200m ahead and on both flanks. An infantry platoon follows up, and a machine gun platoon follows, and two infantry platoons behind. Each platoon maintains a distance of 30 m apart when at night. Same formation used at day time except that distance between platoons is 70 to 60 m apart. However, day light movements are resorted to only when unit is being attacked.

a. When a Bn was to assault an objective two Co will assault from the flank while the third attacks to the front. The Bn Co takes up position with a Co which is on the flank to conduct the whole assault. A runner is used for contact when giving instructions to other units. The Political Officer who is of same rank as Bn CO stays with the Co on the other flank to conduct its assault. Deputy Bn CO will conduct assault to the front. If the objective is a convoy on the highway, two Co wait on both side of road while one of the Co attacks convoy from behind.

b. The strength of force committed in making assault is determined by information obtained of strength of hostile force by civilian clothed scouts. If there is a force of 200 men, a Bn would be committed in assault. PW was told that a ratio of 3 against 1 is the tactic used to overcome the inferiority of fire power. If the hostile force has 2 machine guns, they will use 6.

c. When reaching the objective, unit would take useful material left by defeated force, but do not remain in same position least the position is already known by hostile force and would be shelled or attacked by artillery or planes. Unit establishes new fortification in own chosen ground. If a Co, after the assault has lost 1/3 of its men, the Co reorganizes the 1st and 2nd among remaining men, and drops the 3rd plat as a unit. If the casualty is over half or more of the original number, a fresh unit takes over the position. They do not pursue enemy after reaching their objective because hostile force usually retreat by vehicles.

d. If the first attack fails, reserve elements move up to continue attack immediately.

f. Troops dig in when conducting assault and also dig in during halts.

PW did not know of probing attacks in his experience, because CCF tactics are to find out what is the hostile force’s strength before they attack through the use of special agents and civilian clothed men.

a. When daylight patrols are conducted, they consisted of only 1 to 3 civilian clothed men sent by Regt to infiltrate behind hostile lines.

b. A Bn would send a patrolling plat and a Co would send a patrolling sqd. Types of missions are:

(1) Obtain information from natives.

(2) Familiarize themselves with terrain.

(3) To find out strength of hostile force.

c. Daylight patrol preparations:

(1) Glad in Korean civilian clothes or disguise themselves as vendors of some sorts.

(2) Received instructions from unit CO.

Night patrol preparations:

(1) A few interpreters go with the patrol.

(2) 4 to 5 civilians go with the patrolling plat; their duty is to bring wounded soldiers back by litters.

d. The patrolling unit has instruction that in case of ambush or cutoff, they will fight and try to come back to their unit in any possible way.

e. There was no contacting of guerrillas in PW own unit.

a. Observation posts are set up around the perimeter of assembly areas.

b. No observation post is set up along lines of march.

c. CP are set in defense positions.

a. Types of fortification area:

(1) Individual fox holes.

(2) Machine gun nest - large enough to accommodate three men.

(3) Antitank trench - 80 meters long, 4 to 5 meters wide. (See Sketch #2)

b. Types of weapons:

7.9 Generalissimo Model rifle

7.9 Canadian made light machine gun

7.9 CZECH (提克) LMG

7.9 HMG

9.2 HMG

60 mm mortar

82 mm mortar

M92 Jap Inf gun

75 mm (?) gun

PW Regt was located in HWANGCHORYONG (黃草嶺), the Regimental Hq was behind the mountain. One Bn was in the front facing the highway. OPLR was approx mile from the highway on bottom of mountain. MLR was set up about halfway up the mountain. The defense lines are set up using trees on the mountains as camouflage. PW stated that he did not know of any mine fields set up there. The whole strength was about a Regt of 2000 men. Two other Bn set up lines on the flanks.

c. Tools used to erect fortifications are shovels and picks. Types varied, American, Japanese and CCF. Unit personnel were employed to erect fortifications.

d. It is largely dependent on nature of terrain, but a normal depth of defense line was about 80 to 100 meters.

e. If a unit is being attacked other units on flanks counter-attack.

f. Reserves are 100 to 400 meters behind the defensive line depending on terrain. Its mission is to replace losses on defense line.

g. If unit is not discovered by offensive force, troops were not allowed to fire until the unit commander gives the order.

a. Bazooka and antitank guns were used against tanks. Bazookas are placed on roadside. Antitank guns are placed on high ground or roadside and well camouflaged. Hand grenades, dynamite sacks and straw are also used to burn tanks.

b. Trenches of 80 meters long and 5 meters wide and with a depth of approx 2 meters.

c. There was a “tank killer team” in PW Bn. However, PW was unable to state what instructions they received.

d. Dynamite sacks are used when approaching tanks are sighted.

a. OP set up on hill, when approaching hostile force is sighted. The report is made to unit CO and ambush is setup. However, in PW own case it was possible that the offensive force merely ran into the CCF defense line which had been dug in for sometime and ambush was not previously planned.

a. CCF individual soldiers carried their own field rations which consisted of corn, bread, dried vegetables, salted vegetable, peanuts and crackers. That ration is enough for 4 days.

Food was prepared in civilian houses if possible. However, during combat, they ate their own ration.

b. PW stated that ammo was sufficient in his unit and according to his own knowledge, ammo was transported by trucks to an ammo depot approx 3 miles behind the front line, and carried to the front by animals.

c. CCF individual soldier wears:

1 hat, fur lined

1 overcoat, double lined, with cotton padding inside

1 suit, double lined, with cotton padding inside

1 suit, cotton

1 underwear, cotton

1 combat boot - leather with rubber soles

Clothing carried in field pack:

1 shoes - sneaker

1 blanket - cotton

1 quilt - cotton

1 suit - cotton summer uniform

Clothing was sufficient to keep warm. Losses in combat replaced from casualties.

d. No civilian clothing was used except for scout.

a. Radio was used from Regt level and up, but could not give detailed description of type of radio used.

b. Runners are often used and carried both verbal and written messages to distances up to a mile.

c. Bugle signals are used in “banzai” charges, not used to call attention of other units; this precaution taken to avoid attention of hostile force. Whistle used in small units. Flares are used at night of red, white and green colors. Each color has a designated purpose but were often changed.

a. PW had a year and 3 months of training.

b. Live ammo was used in training. PW had 3 firing practices in the whole course, each practice fired 3 rounds only. Overhead firing of support weapons was used.

c. There was no training conducted in KOREA.

a. When PW unit was stationed in SHANGHAI (1950) he noted there were about 30 cases of malaria, 2 cases of TB and 1 case of typhus in his Co.

b. Each men had taken 3 injections in May 1949, but none since then.

c. PW noted there were over 50% of soldiers in his Co suffering from frozen feet while on march. They were treated by the only Medical Officer in the Co. They were instructed to use hot water to wash feet and wear two pairs of socks. However, when they reached the front, there was no facility to boil hot water. Troops suffering from frozen feet received no treatment.

a. There is a military court in regimental Headquarters to handle more serious offenses. If there is minor violation of orders, Co commander gather all soldiers in the unit, and requires the offender to explain. Other soldiers are allowed to express their opinion to justify the case. Capital punishment used in case of murder. Confinement and hard labor and public ridicule are examples of chief forms of punishment in most non-capital cases.

b. Two cases of desertion occurred in PW Co when unit departed SHANGHAI for MANCHURIA.

c. Korean civilians did not show good will toward Chinese soldiers when they arrived. Partly caused by the language barrier. However, they are cooperative if they can find an interpreter when their help is needed.

d. CCF used Koreans as road guide and to locate UN Forces.

a. PW stated that he knew of no CCF unit serving with NKA.

b. PW did not know of CCF advisors serving with NKA.

SKETCH #1

SKETCH #2

For the Commanding Officer: