포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3623　27 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report 022)　15 February 1951

Cooperative and fairly intelligent. Reliability - fair to poor on info furnished.

a. Security

(1) Against air attack - whoever spotted any enemy aircraft approaching reported to the unit commander, who ordered the bugler to sound a warning. Troops took cover. No defensive fire is put up against aircraft. However, at night, they did not bother to stop upon approach of aircraft but continued marching.

(2) Against ground attack - patrols preceded a main unit. Patrol troops were assigned as follows: One patrol company per Div; one Plat per Regt; a twelve men squad per Bn; 3 men per company.

(3) Against tank attack - upon encountering a hostile tank, if the tank was out of range, they took cover. If the tank was within grenade range, they attacked with hand grenades and small fire.

b. They began marching at dusk; halted two hours before dawn and dug fox holes. During the day, they remained in the fox holes.

c. Generally, they marched on the main roads. They reported to mountain trails when the tactical situation so demanded.

d. On a wide road, a 4 to 5 men abreast column formation was used. On a mountain trail, single file formation was adopted.

e. If it was necessary for them to cover a long distance in a specific period of time, the length of their halts were short. Normally, they halted for about 20 minutes every 12km.

No particular security measures were taken.

a. Against air attack - individual fox holes were dug. A group of 7 or 8 sentries was posted on top of each hill and 2 or 3 sentries each were posted at road junctions, bridges and other probable routes of enemy approach.

The distance from the Div Hq ranged from 1km to 5km according to terrain features. One man out of one platoon patrolled the camping area to provide security for those sleeping in fox holes. In case the hostile elements were located, 3 shots were fired to alert the unit.

One (sometimes two) line of individual fox holes were dug, each fox hole being about 10m apart. For details, refer to sketch.

b. Generally, only two meals per day. Approx 0400 hours - breakfast. Approx 1800 hours - supper.

To avoid being spotted by UN aircraft, meals were taken before sunrise and after sunset.

Day time movement was very restricted because of UN aircraft activities. They slept in fox holes during daylight hours.

c. The south sides of hills and mountains were considered to be the best bivouac sites. The direction of wind was taken into consideration. That is, the bivouac site should be protected by hills and mountains from cold winds.

The assault against a UN Regt required 2 CCF divisions. To illustrate, the following describes such an assault by 2 CCF divisions, one division of A, B, C Regt and the other D, E, F Regt as related by PW.

After the 1st Div reached a point about 300m from the UN forces, B Regt would dig in and attack from the front and support the advance of A and C Regt.

A and C Regt would begin encircling maneuvers from a point about 1km from the UN defense line.

2nd Div would be about 1km behind the 1st Div and acted as a reserve force in the event the 1st Div assault failed. Further, when 1st Div was advancing, the 2nd Div provides supporting fire by means of machine guns, mortars and artillery.

They dug in but did not take cover.

a. Day time patrols were used.

Strength: 1 Co in 1 Div.

1 Plat in 1 Regt.

12 men in 1 Bn.

3 men in 1 Co.

Mission: Reconnoitre communication network, to include condition of roads, location of bridges and terrain features. In addition, to determine the location, strength and movement of UN forces.

b. When UN forces were close by, they disguised themselves as NK civilians or as members of the UN forces by wearing UN uniforms. Normally, they wore black Chinese civilian clothes.

c. Patrols were instructed to return within a specific period of time. If this time requirement could not be complied with, members of the patrol were then considered captives or casualties.

Sentries posted on high ground functioned as CP.

a. First defense line consisted of one or two lines of individual fox holes forming a semi-circle and manned by LMG crews and riflemen.

A secondary lines was located 300m behind the first defense line and consisted of Bn Hq, HMG, light mortars and riflemen.

A third line was located 1.5km behind the secondary line and Regt Hq, HMG, heavy mortars and light artillery were placed on this line.

Fourth defense line was located 4 - 6km behind the third line. Div Hq, heavy artillery pieces and AA guns were placed on this line.

A supply storage was located 5 - 6km behind the 4th defense line within the area of the reserve division.

Approximately 10 men out of Co were deployed 50m front of the first defense line, acting as frontline security.

Patrols were dispatched from Hq to reconnoiter enemy activities.

A reserve division was located 5 - 6km behind the fourth Line.

Defense formation always formed the pattern of a triangle (apex to the rear) with two units functioning as active defense force in the front and one unit functioning as a reserve force in the rear.

Weapons:

1st line - LMG, Rifles.

2nd line - HMG, 60mm Mortars.

3rd line - HMG, 82mm Mortars, light Artillery (Details unk)

4th line - Heavy Artillery (Details unk), AA MG.

b. Hand tools, picks and shovels. 3 picks per Plat and a shovel for each man. No heavy equipments.

One Engr Bn was assigned to a Div. The principal mission of the Engr Bn was to build bridges, repair roads and transport ammunition during combat.

c. Depth of defense (Refer to sketch 3)

Div Strength - 6km

Regt Strength - 2km

Bn Strength - No fixed depth

d. Tin cans, 1m in length, 10cm in diameter filled with 6 - 7kg explosive (dynamite?) powder were used as mines. Maximum bursting radius was 60m diameter. Effective area of burst was 20m diameter.

These mines were mainly handled by engineers. However, because its mechanical system was not complicated, ordinary EM also handled them.

The effectiveness of a mine against a tank was sufficient to knock out the tank.

e. One third of a unit acted as a reserve force, while two thirds acted as an active defense force. (See sketch 4)

Army strength: About 12km behind the first defense line.

Div strength: About 6km behind the first defense line.

Bn strength: About 3km behind the first defense line.

Its mission was to act as a reserve force and to transport supplies to forward defense lines from the supply dump located close by a reserve unit.

f. Troops received orders not to fire until UN forces advance within range of about 50m of a defense line.

The Arty Bn had 5 x model 38 AT artillery pieces, US made (?) and sufficient quantity of the "tin can mines" mentioned previously.

In addition, they had antitank hand-grenades (7 or 8 per company). Purpose to kill tank personnel. Its construction is as follows:

The usual strength of an encircling unit was a Bn. Detailed info unknown.

PW unit had no air support.

a. Demands were met by purchasing all available foods from Korean farmers except kaoliang, which was shipped from CHINA. Therefore, there was no specific type of rations. Soybeans, corn, potatoes, rice and kaoliang constituted the main ration.

3 pots, 80cm in diameter and 60cm in depth were used in preparing meals for 1 company.

If farm houses were available, the meals were prepared there in order to avoid revealing unit's location. When farm houses were not available, the meals were prepared under a tree or some sort of cover.

Insufficient. They ate only two meals a day, none of which were adequate. This condition was particularly evident when they reached the 38th parallel because almost all of the rations had been exhausted.

Kaoliang was transported by trucks up to the supply dump, which was usually located 7 - 8km behind the front line (in the case of divisions) and thereafter, carried by bearers to each Co.

b. Personnel had 100 rd of rifle ammo each and 4 hand grenades each when they crossed the YALU River.

Sufficient ammunition was supplied. One Div had a Supply Bn having 30 head of horses but no trucks or carts. PW stated that since his unit fought in hills where there were no vehicular roads, no trucks and carts were used.

Ammunition was stored at the foot of hills and covered with tree branches and twigs.

c. Cap: One (1) made of leather with white cotton lining, one (1) made of thick cotton. (Two types)

Uniform: One set of winter, cotton padded uniform. (One type)

Shoes: Rubbershoes, Leather shoes, cotton shoes with rubber soles. (Three types)

Undershirts: Cotton undershirt. (One type)

Overcoat: Cotton padded overcoat.

d. Except for patrol purposes, no civilians were used. PW stated that when attacked by aircraft, they reversed their overcoats to camouflage themselves against the snow.

a. Radio was used at Div Hq (hearsay). Details unknown.

b. Field phones were used at Bn, Regt and Div. Telephone lines were sufficient to be laid up to a distance of 48km.

c. Generally, except in non-combat areas, written messages were not carried.

d. Bugle calls were used to signal the following: Attack, retreat, assemble, halt and roll call.

Whistles were used if the unit was platoon size or smaller.

Flares were used when seeking out the enemy at night and to signal their location to friendly troops.

a. One year and six months.

b. The majority received 3 months basic training as Provincial Military troops.

Men between 15 - 30 years of age were obliged to join the army due to public ridicule. Received 3 months military training. After completion of training, they were sent home. The government recalled them when necessary.

c. Training included firing with live ammunition but did not include overhead firing of support weapons.

a. 40% of PW unit suffered from frost bite of the hands and feet.

b. No immunizations were given.

c. Approx 3,500 men of PW Div suffered from frost bite of the hands and feet.

Unboiled water for drinking was prohibited to prevent disease.

(1) Dispersal of troops.

(2) Taking cover under trees or buildings.

(3) Lying flat on the ground.

(4) For camouflage, tree branches and twigs were usually used. On snow covered hills and fields, overcoats were reversed.

Discipline was fairly well maintained but not by means of fear of punishment but by means of appealing to reason and pride of man. Raping and desertion - death sentence. Disobedience - instructed by officers. Inhuman treatment war prisoners forbidden.

There were no desertion in KOREA.

One NK was assigned to one company. He was responsible for obtaining food and acted as guide for CO. PW stated he used Korean civilians to achieve his mission.

BIVOUACS, CCF (Sketch - 1)

ASSAULT POSITIONS, CCF (Sketch - 2)

DEFENSE FORMATION, CCF Note: Triangle method in notable (Sketch - 3)

DEFENSIVE TACTICS, CCF (Sketch - 4)

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER: