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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3613　27 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report 022)　15 February 1951

Well educated, intelligent and exceedingly cooperative. Well versed in CCF strategy and tactics observed through several years of practical experience but lacking in academic background. Memory good.

a. Security

(1) As a security measure against air attacks, most marches were conducted at night whereas the troops dispersed into groups of 45 men to remain in hiding during daylight. Preferred forms of cover were natural caves or areas under trees. Should such places not exist shaded open ground was resorted to and areas receiving direct sunlight were avoided. If a daytime march became necessary the bugler (one per company) always with the point, was the air raid security man. It was his duty to be especially alert as to approaching enemy aircraft and to sound the alarm Whenever the noise of flying aircraft was heard. This, however, did not preclude every individual from the responsibility of being on constant alert. The first man audibly detecting approaching aircraft would yell out “air raid precaution!” ( ) and the command to disperse and take cover would come from the rear of the marching column. Such command was normally given by the company commander. Platoon commanders, however, were also authorized to issue the command when warranted by the urgency. PW was not able to identify the notes of the bugle call. During the CNA-CCF Civil War, twigs and leaves were used for camouflage but this method of concealment could not be adopted in KOREA because they were not available-having all withered. Reversible clothing was issued to the troops for winter camouflage. In daytime marches, the troops were placed at greater intervals to reduce density. In summary the basic doctrine of security measures against air attack was as follows:

(a) Camouflage

(b) Reduce troop density

(c) Disperse and take cover

(d) Open fire on the enemy aircraft using LMG and HMG but only as a last and drastic resort.

(2) As a security measure against ground attack, each battalion has an advance company and the latter has an advance platoon etc. Such sub-division is carried on until the point of the column consists of three men (the first carrying a SMG and the other two, rifles). (See Sketch No. 1). It is notable that flank and rear security was neglected except at crossroads where flank security was employed.

(3) No encounter of UN tanks was reported by PW. No security measures were taken in this respect.

b. Day marches were very rare. In fact, there was no day marches at all in his unit after arrival in KOREA. Night marches were conducted usually immediately after sundown and following supper, making sure that UN air activity had ceased in the area. Termination of the march depended on the distance to be covered. Normally the troops were halted before daybreak.

c. Non combat troop marches were made over the easiest route available, such as highways or open ground. While marching in combat, however, trails were used. In KOREA, only established routes were used. No attempt was made to prepare new ones.

d. Normally one column moved at a time. But as it happened very often, when several battalions were to converge at a single point troops were moved in multiple columns. Runners were used between the front and rear columns. Mounted messengers were used between battalion and regiment. No radio equipment was used. Hand signals, although taught in training, were not used in combat in PW unit.

e. Halts were made every 5 or 6km; each halt lasted about 15 minutes. No security measures were taken during halts. When the mission was important, however, halts became less frequent and of shorter duration.

a. Security

(1) If a bivouac was to last only one day, security measures taken consisted merely of concealment and each company maintained four sentries to warn approach of aircraft. In each company, 4 sentries were posted along the fringe of the bivouac, about 100 meters from the center. Their distance apart depended on the size of the troop concentration. Should the bivouac last 2 or 3 days, air raid shelters as shown in attached sketch (see sketch No. 2) were built. Type B was found most effective against strafing. Type C, however, was most commonly used and found to be the best protection against flying fragments.

(2) While in the rear, safe from possibility of enemy ground attack, only normal security of 3-4 guards per company was maintained, while the rest of the troops rested. In the forward areas, however, troops were on general alert and ready for immediate combat. The number of sentries were increased to 6 if the front was extended; forward probing also became more active.

(3) No security measures against tank attack were maintained.

b. Sentries are posted along the perimeter of the bivouac defense, about 100 meters from the center. In the rear areas, sentries are posted on 4 sides. In the forward areas, however, sentries are concentrated on the side facing the enemy. Commonly, only one sentry is posted at a point. But important points such as roadways or approaches usually have two sentries.

c. Men usually sleep in trenches or foxholes which are dug if the bivouac is to last more than one day. For one day bivouacs, defiles or wind-protected slopes are selected for sleeping. The troops sleep in the daytime. The men eat before daybreak and after sunset as it is feared that fire or smoke would attract enemy attention.

d. No specific camouflage measures are taken in bivouac areas. The 3rd Field Army did not issue raincoats to the troops except to officers of company grade (Captain) and above. The 4th Field Army however, did issue poncho-type raincoats which were used as shelter halves also. PW had seen only photographs of these and did not notice that they were color camouflaged.

a. Assembly areas are used and these are usually designated at favorable points surrounding the enemy position. In the CCF, where numerical superiority is inevitably resorted to, the smallest units to be assembled for an attack is usually of Army strength. Sub-units are ordered to the assembly area from outlying bivouacs generally about one night’s march away (approx 25 - 40km). The assembly is reached from both flanks.

b. Multiple columns are used, each of battalion strength.

c. Generally speaking the various units close in the assembly area prior to midnight, 24 hours preceding H Hour.

d. Immediately after arrival in the assembly area, the troops are rested. If the arrival is prior to midnight, no other activity takes place until next morning. If arrival is before dawn, the rest period extends through the first half of the next day. Then weapons and equipment are examined. Explosives and ammunition are checked; defects are repaired or shortages replenished. Everyone is informed of the impending battle. Missions are assigned, responsibilities delegated and objectives designated. The troops are also apprised of enemy intelligence. Advantages are pointed out for exploitation; disadvantages are also brought to the attention of the men so that the handicaps may be overcome.

c. In moving out of the assembly area, the same formation as used in marches is used. No appreciative increase of emphasis is made on flank security. However, the rate of advance is reduced to about half, about 2½km per hour. Even though the troops become more cautious no change in formation is made. Three scouts are used the same way as in a march. Scouts are within audible distance of the advance squad and generally 200 - 300 meters from the center of the column.

a. Prior to an assault being undertaken, enemy objective is carefully reconnoitered. When a weak point is discovered, that becomes the main target of assault. (See Sketch No. 3). An assault unit of three men is sent to demolish the fortifications of the weak point, under cover of fire support from both flanks. The initial assault, if successful, is sustained by the assault squad and assault platoon. When the point of breakthrough is secured, the attack company closes in to strengthen the newly gained position and street fighting ensues if the objective is a village or town.

b. Objectives for companies were about 100 meters deep. When they had been penetrated by the assault elements the company in force moved in to command the objectives gained. For battalion, regiment and division or higher the depth of the assault was determined in proportion to the size of the enemy holding the objective.

c. After reaching the objective, the enemy defenses in the area are destroyed by explosives and the point of breakthrough is expanded for advance by the main force. The assistant company commander, in charge of the assault platoon, takes command of the exploitation of the success and continues to advance without regrouping.

d. If the assault fails, all forward elements withdraw to the trenches about 100 meters to the rear (See Sketch No. 3) where the troops are reorganized, and new preparations are made. If there are still two or three hours of darkness before dawn, the assault is repeated. Otherwise, no assault is made again until the following night.

e. Troops dig individual foxholes whenever they stop.

a. Probing attack commonly called SHIH TAN HSING KUNG CHI (■探性攻擊).

b. Normally, if the enemy is of battalion strength, an attacking force of regimental strength is used but the initial probing is carried out by an attacking unit of company size.

c. Generally speaking, the probing forces return to their basic units upon completing their missions.

d. These missions take place ½ - 1 hour following intense pre-planned supporting fire.

a. Daylight patrols are used but less frequently than night patrols. Their strength is usually about one squad but never larger than a platoon. Mission is to detect enemy activity.

b. Night patrols are carried out by about a platoon and their mission is to secretly detect enemy activity without open engagement.

c. In day and night patrols, preparations depend on the nature of the patrol (i.e. whether in civilian clothes or uniformed). When the patrol is to be in civilian clothes, civilian clothing is obtained from the local people. The members of the patrol are armed with revolvers. The patrol is then oriented as to their mission. 1/50,000 map of KOREA (reprint of Japanese military edition) is used. Similar preparations are made for uniformed patrols.

(Note: PW states that plainclothesmen patrolling had not been used in his unit. Main difficulty encountered in patrolling in the Korean war is the language barrier. In the Civil War in CHINA the main handicap was unfamiliarity with local routes).

d. Inasmuch as patrols are secretive, the possibility of an ambush is considered remote. No specific instructions are given in this respect. However, should an ambush be encountered, the patrol is to fight only in its own defense but to withdraw rapidly. If the patrol is cut off, it is to find its way back by a devious route and to avoid contact with the enemy if possible.

e. In CHINA guerrilla forces were contacted but no guerrilla forces were contacted by PW unit KOREA. (In CHINA, it was the guerrillas that initiated any effort to contact the regular force).

a. Observation posts are set up along the perimeter of assembly area. In the case of a battalion, the CP and OP are the same. In the case of regiment, however, the OP is ahead of the CP and a regimental staff officer is in charge of the OP.

b. OP are not set up along lines of march.

c. OP are set up behind defense positions. When the situation demands, the OP may sometimes be located at the MLR. However, the CP is never in front of the latter.

a. There are two types of defense; mobile (運動 or ■性) and fixed (固定). The former type is used in forward positions which is usually highground or a bridge. When point A becomes untenable, the defending unit is to fall back in successive stages to predesignated alternates. In the main defense positions (D) relatively fixed defense fortifications are built. (See Sketch No. 5).

b. See Sketch No. 4 for detailed description of a typical defense organization of PW unit in KOT’ORI (古土里) (about 20km south of KUJIN-NI (田津里), KOREA). Also see sketch No. 5 for relative location of OP, OPLR and MLR. Patrols are of two kinds. Frontline reconnaissance is called SEHSO (■索). Patrolling away from the home unit is called CHENGCHA (偵茶) and this may be uniformed or plainclothed. Frontline reconnaissance is conducted by local elements of the advancing unit. Distant reconnoitering, however, is undertaken by the Reconnaissance Platoon of the regiment. Camouflage of defense positions is effected by covering the fortifications with snow. Anti-personnel mine fields are not used. (Explosives carried by the CCF are used mainly for destruction of material and equipment).

c. Picks or shovels (one per man) are used by the infantry for erection of fortifications. The Arty Co has hack-saws and axes in addition to the individual entrenching tools. Special engineer personnel are not used below divisional level.

d. Booby traps are used only against tanks. Anti-personnel booby traps were used, however, to a considerable extent by CCF guerrillas. Mines were not available for use in PW unit in KOREA. But PW states that this does not preclude the possibility of their being used when available because mines are items of issue in the CCF. Trip flares are used only in units having US made MG and their purpose is to assist other MG in finding their targets and for signaling to the rear either to commence an attack or other prearranged action. The manner in which the flares are to be fired and their significance are predetermined.

e. Screening or covering forces are not used.

f. In the battalion defense, one reserve company is always held in the rear, usually in a defiladed area for the purpose of counter-attack or to make a hasty reinforcement of the forward positions when necessary. Counter-attack is seldom frontal unless enemy firepower is not intense enough to make such action abortive. Usually the counter-attack is aimed at the enemy’s flanks. The reserve is therefore so situated as to facilitate such a maneuver with least delay.

g. Troops have orders not to fire when the enemy is too far away. When within range, however, the enemy is to be fired at whenever he becomes a good target. When an ambush is being staged, however, troops open fire only under direct orders so as to exploit the element of surprise.

a. Following anti-tank weapons are used:

(1) Anti-tank gun, US, 37mm

(2) Anti-tank gun, Japanese (type and calibre unknown)

(3) Anti-tank rifle (type and calibre unknown; very rare. PW has seen only two in the 27th Army, CCF 3rd Field Army while in CHINA).

(4) Dynamite tube. This is a CCF contraption made principally of four parts: tin or bamboo casing explosive charge, detonator and fuse. (See Sketch No. 7). It is generally placed in the track of a moving tank by a person who sneaks up from the rear or the side. The fuse cord is pulled and within 2 or 3 minutes the charge is detonated. Sometimes the dynamite is placed in the path of an advancing tank. (This weapon is said to be effective in 4th Field Army area).

(5) “Incendiary bottle.” (Not used in KOREA and PW had not seen this before; details not available).

(6) Dynamite package or bag, about the size of a hand grenade. It works on the same principle as dynamite tube mentioned above and is hand-thrown.

(7) “Bunched hand grenades.” (This is used in extreme cases only and requires considerable courage). The bundle is placed between the track wheels and on the inside of the lower track; then the grenades are detonated.

b. Anti-tank obstacles are of two types, as follows:

(1) Concealed pits (see sketch No. 8) measuring 2m wide X 3m long and 2 - 3m deep. These are then covered by boards and earth or grass is placed on top to conceal their presence.

(2) Fire. Combustible scrap or grass is heaped in front of the advancing tanks and this is kindled to obstruct them.

c. No “tank killer” teams are known to exist in the CCF.

d. PW had not seen mine fields used by his units. However, this method is known to the CCF.

a. Ambushes are organized by the division. The ambushing force is usually of division strength. Small forces, when used, are of regimental or battalion strength. They are located in areas favoring concealment, such as defiles or densely vegetated areas.

b. In the NE KOREA fighting, anti-tank weapons could not be used for ambush because these were mostly left in the rear. Each division has 8 or 9 anti-tank guns and their use for ambush is not made usually because their presence would easily betray the location of the ambush.

c. Encircling units are instructed to destroy the surrounded enemy. Before encirclement is undertaken, the enemy is to be outnumbered by numerically superior force of three-fold strength. A hole is left only when sufficient force is not available to complete the seal; however, such a hole is always covered by fire to deal with enemy elements trying to escape. Sometimes the hole is deliberately left to draw the enemy into a trap.

a. While in CHINA, PW had seen military aircraft of the CCF Air Forces as illustrated in sketch No. 9. PW had heard that there was also a four-engine bomber but had never seen one.

b. Defense measures against UN aircraft are mainly passive. Concealment, dug-outs and daylight inactivity are used to evade UN air attacks. Active counter fire is used only in extreme necessity.

c. There is practically no anti-aircraft weapons in the CCF Ground Forces. PW had not seen any below the regiment although he believes that the division or the Army might have some anti-aircraft weapons. No details are known.

a. At time of crossing YALU River, rice was brought from CHINA but this lasted only two days. Then kaoliang was the next staple for about three days. Later, potatoes (about 1½ inch diameter in size), corn and black beans were eaten. Boiling was the method of cooking. Salt was added when these were to be eaten plain, without pickle. Food was prepared about 5km behind the lines and transported to the combatants by porters. Salt-roasted beans or corn were sometimes used as dry staple. Food was inadequate.

b. Ammunition was sufficient because not much was expended. Replenishment of spent ammunition was made by the supply section of the regiment. These were brought up by bearers or animal transport. All ammunition is carried on the person in the case of small arms. MG ammunition is carried with the weapon, each supplied with 1,500 rounds per day. Reserve supply is stored in the rear.

c. Each CCF soldier has the following items of clothing:

(1) Spring, Summer and Autumn

(a) (i) Jacket, cotton (Fig. 1, Sketch No. 10) two each per EM

(ii) Jacket, cotton (Fig. 2, Sketch No. 10) two each per Officer

(b) Trousers, cotton - two pairs. (Officers and EM have same type except Officers’ has a right hip pocket)

(c) Cap, cotton one each

(d) Underwear when available (issued to 3rd Field Army units in 1950)

(2) Winter

(a) Quilted jacket (Fig. 3, Sketch No. 10) one each per officer

(b) Quilted jacket (Fig. 4, Sketch No. 10) one each per EM

(c) Cap, quilted, with ear flaps one each

(d) Overcoat one each

(3) Year round

Low quarter canvas shoes 1 pair every 2 months

(In 1950, each man was issued one pair leather shoes (similar to US service shoes) and one pair of similar type thick-soled canvas shoes).

Clothing is fairly adequate. For normal wear and tear, clothing is replace on a yearly basis. For lost clothing the individual has to replace at his own cost providing this is possible.

d. Civilian clothing used only by patrols.

a. Radio is used only by the division or larger unit. PW unable to furnish details as he had seen the equipment during training only.

b. Mostly US made field phones (Fig. 1, Sketch No. 11) are used. There are also a few US made desk phones (Fig. 2, Sketch No 11) used by the regiment. Both old and new US made wire used and it was reliable. The regiment and battalion has sufficient wire.

c. Runners used; there are three to each company and one squad to a battalion. Simple messages are delivered verbally whereas complex ones were written form. They were used for distances ranging 5 - 10km. For greater distances mounted messengers were used. Runners freely used to convey messages between company and battalion CP.

d. Bugles used for simple orders (to charge, withdraw or assemble) and when the troops are within hearing range. Used by the company or larger unit. Whistles are used in the platoon and squad. Significance of whistle blasts determined as the situation demands and changed from day to day. For instance, challenge of an unidentified unit would be indicated by two long and one short blasts. A friendly reply would be two short and one long. There is no fixed code, however, and several variations may be employed. Flares used to a great extent at night to signify a prearranged code, such as to commence an attack or to relay a message to the rear when an enemy position is captured. Its use made to substitute other audio signals, when the latter would attract enemy fire. By using flares, the troops could easily evade enemy detection by hastily departing from the position where the flare was lit.

e. Outstanding difficulties in communications are as follows:

(1) Failure of messengers in reaching their destination because they were either killed or wounded enroute.

(2) Cutting of wires by enemy fire.

(3) Failure of telephones due apparently to extreme cold.

a. PW had no academic training in the CCF except for basic amphibious training in CHIATING (嘉定) AND TSUNGMING (崇明島) area between Oct 49 and Oct 50 for projected invasion of FORMOSA. PW had observed training that was given the troops in his unit.

b. The normal training period is two to three months.

c. Training included problems requiring actual expending of ammunition only in the final phase. The preliminaries were mere dry runs. Overhead firing of support weapons was included.

d. No training in forward areas in KOREA was conducted by PW unit because of the urgency which sent the CCF to battle. (PW said that the troops had not even sufficiently recovered from the initial shock of learning about their mission when they entered into combat). Training in rear areas is normally conducted.

e. During training in rear areas, there was sufficient ammunition.

a. No notable disease was noted among the troops upon arrival in KOREA. During 1950, while PW was in SHANGHAI area, common diseases were malaria, vitamin B deficiency and Japanese encephalitis. Percentages affected were 20%, 30% and 70% respectively.

b. While in SHANGHAI area in Jan - Feb 50, PW was immunized against Japanese encephalitis. Cholera and small pox immunizations were given every summer. PW does not know of any other inoculations. Atahrin was administered for one month during July - August 1950.

c. Over 50% of the troops in PW unit were inflicted with frostbite and frozen feet. Serious cases were evacuated to the rear. Light cases were retained in the front. Treatment consisted of soaking in warm water, and wrapping the injury with cotton to keep it warm.

a. Discipline is maintained by the following methods:

(1) Person to person persuasion.

(2) Public persuasion.

(3) Person to person admonition.

(4) Public admonition (written and published in the case of officers).

(5) Confinement not to exceed 10 days to enable the culprit to repent.

(6) Reduction of “grade.” (This does not affect decrease in pay) coupled with hard labor.

(7) Dismissal from the service and subsequent penal servitude.

(8) Execution.

At first CNA elements would understand only force. It appeared that less harsh punishment for first offense was more effective in the long run, according to PW.

b. In 1950, there were 10 desertions in PW company. During the move from CHINA to KOREA, troops were so strictly limited in their movements that desertion was virtually impossible.

c. PW did not understand the Korean language. Judging from the natives’ facial expressions, however, PW thought they were very displeased when food was commandeered.

d. Korean civilians were used as road guides in troop movement and patrolling.

e. (1) PW did not see any CCF elements serving with NKA, which had disintegrated, so far as he could witness.

(2) PW had not seen any Chinese advisors with the NKA. However, he had heard that experienced officers of the CCF 4th Field Army, who were of Korean extraction, were “repatriated” to the NKA.

f. Narcotics or stimulants were not used to provoke fanaticism in CCF attacks.

For the Commanding Officer:

FORWARD SECURITY EMPHASIZED

SKETCH #1 MARCH FORMATION, CCF

NO FLANK AND REAR SECURITY, unless the route of march is crossed by another route; then flank security of road guard principle is used.

SKETCH #2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF AIRRAID SHELTERS

SKETCH #3 ASSAULT TACTICS

SKETCH #4 DEFENSE TACTICS, CCF

SKETCH #6 SKETCH SHOWING A TYPICAL CCF OP SET-UP

SKETCH #5 DEFENSE TACTICS, CCF

SKETCH #7 WEAPON USED FOR OBSTACLE DEMOLISION

SKETCH #7 WEAPON USED AGAINST TANKS

SKETCH #8 SKETCH OF ANTI-TANK TRAP

SKETCH #9 CCF AIRCRAFT

SKETCH #10 CCF UNIFORMS

SKETCH #11 CCF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

For the Commanding Officer: