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WU, Feng Low 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 40 NO. 3611 1951-12-24
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3611 27 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report 022) 15 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: WU, Feng Low (吳鳳樓)
PW NUMBER: 63 NK 700336
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 27
DUTY: Rifleman
UNIT: CCF 4th Field Army, 39th Army, 116th Div, 348th Regt, 1st Bn, 2nd Co, 1st Plat
EDUCATION: 2 yr Primary School
OCCUPATION: Farmer
PLACE OF CAPTURE: Unknown
DATE OF CAPTURE: 24 Dec 51
PLACE OF BIRTH: MANCHURIA, CHILLIN-SHENG, ITUNG-HSIEN, TOUTAO-CHUN (滿洲 吉林省 伊通縣 頭道村)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: Pvt WONG (ATIS)

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was cooperative but not well informed. Reliability fair to the extent of info given.

3. MARCHES:
a. The security measures against air attack were primarily to scatter the unit, and hide in the mountains, forests and houses whenever possible.
When ground attack occurred during marches, PW unit engaged in fire fight, provided enemy attack was not superior, in event of superior attack, unit withdrew.
PW unit used bazooka against tank attack. Each Bn had 3 bazookas.
b. Generally, PW unit marched at night and hid in mountains and houses during daylight hours for fear of air attack.
c. Generally, PW unit traveled over main roads while on marches. In the event of strong enemy elements along main roads, mountain trails or cross country trails were used.
d. PW unit moved in one column. Means of communication was foot messenger. In most cases, one Bn made one column; each Bn had 8 messengers.

4. BIVOUACS:
a. Whenever the unit stayed in one place, each soldier was ordered to dig a foxhole for himself as protection against air attack. They used slit trenches for protection against both ground and tank attacks.
b. Sentries mostly posted on high ground. Each Plat had two sentries to cover its own area.
c. Each soldier slept in fox-holes covered with dirt; mostly slept during day time. They ate in civilian houses at night and ate in the fox-holes during the day.
d. Used fox-hole for shelter; 4m long, 1m wide and 1m deep.
e. Used dirt and tree branches to camouflage the foxhole.

5. ASSAULT:
a. Used three directions to assault an objective. From the left and right flanks and center.
b. After the unit reached their objective, all elements scatter in the mountains or civilian houses. No reorganization.
c. If the attack fails, the element withdraws.
d. When the troops stop, it is always required to dig fox-holes.

6. PROBING ATTACKS:
In each Regt, there is a Reconnaissance Plat. Their mission is to test how strong the enemy element is, and report to Regt commander. Distance between the Regt Hq and the Plat is about 2 miles.

7. PATROLLING:
a. No daylight patrols are used.
b. Two platoons are used for night patrols. Their mission is to prevent enemy attacks.
c. When patrols are ambushed or out off by enemy, standing instructions are to give signal by firing rifle. Number of rounds are always changed.

8. DEFENSIVE TACTICS:
Used 3 defense lines. Each line had several fox-holes 1m deep, 4m long and 1m wide. Used two heavy machine guns and 6-7 light machine guns in the first line. Each machine gun controlled by 3-4 men who usually take cover together in a fox-hole 4m deep, 4m long and 2m wide. Fox-holes camouflaged with dirt and tree branches. The rifleman’s fox-hole about 10m apart. The machine gun fox-holes about 100m apart.
The second defense line is similar to the first.
The last defense line has heavy artillery support. PW believed each Regt had one artillery Bn and each Arty Bn had 5 mountain guns. How the artillery is emplaced unknown. PW observed each defense line was 100m apart and the number of troops per line are not fixed, depending on the situation. In most cases, one company to hold the line in a given sector. They used high ground for observation posts. The sentries take charge of all the observation duty. Each platoon had two sentries posted to keep guard and perform observation duty.
Each sqd had 2 picks and every soldier had one shovel for digging fox-holes. They had one engineer platoon per Regt to help build bridges and repair highways.
In Regt strength, the normal depth of a defensive line is 1-1 1/2 miles between the Regt Hq and the first defense line.
In Regt strength most had 3 battalions with one in reserve. The Reserve unit also ordered to dig in for protection. They also had the mission to attack if the situation became too critical. The reserve unit located 1 mile behind the last defense line.

9. ANTI-TANK TACTICS:
a. Each company had one bazooka for use against tanks. PW also heard the Regt had antitank guns but further details unknown. They also used demolition explosives for antitank use. Dimensions of the demolition explosive are: 3’ in length and 1 1/2’ diameter. The operation of the demolition explosive is the same as a grenade. When a tank is encountered, the demolition explosive is thrown at the tank.
b. Each company had 12 men assigned for antitank duty. Their mission is only to use the demolition tube against tanks. These 12 men had instructions to hide in fox-holes whenever they see a tank approaching, and to emerge from the fox-hole to throw the demolition explosive when tank is only a few feet away.

10. AMBUSH AND ENCIRCLING TACTICS:
a. At night, patrols of one squad are sent out 1-1 1/2 miles to the front. Each man takes cover upon encountering enemy. If enemy force is too large to attack, a rifle shot signal is given and patrol withdraws to own perimeter without engaging in a fire fight.
b. They use demolition explosive against tanks. Dimensions of the demolition explosive are: 3’ in length and 1 1/2’ diameter. The operation of the demolition explosive is the same as grenade.

11. SUPPLY:
a. Before PW unit entered KOREA, each soldier was issued 3 days ration consisting of 7 catties rice, 7 catties Chinese hardtack (a flour bread, salt flavored). After the unit entered KOREA, this supply was suspended due to lack of transportation. The only source of food was to live off the land they were over-running and confiscation of foodstuffs from local inhabitants.
b. Each soldier of the PW unit was issued 100 rd of ammo before entering KOREA. They were resupplied whenever ammunition ran out. They used 2 1/2 ton trucks to transport ammunitions. PW observed that, since his unit entered KOREA, troops always had enough ammunition supply. Where the ammunition was stored, PW did not know.
c. Before the unit entered KOREA, they issued each soldier one cotton padded uniform weighting about 4 catties and one cotton quilt weighting about 3 catties. Also one pair leather boots lined with dog fur. PW stated it was enough to keep warm. They were no replenishments in clothing.
d. No civilian clothing used in the PW unit.

12. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. Each Regt had only one radio. PW believed the radio was made in USA but he did not see the radio.
b. From Regt to Bn and Co, they used telephone. Each Regt had approx 16 telephones. PW believed the telephone system was reliable and adequate.
c. Information from company to platoon, used messenger runners. Each company had 4 messenger runners. In most cases, the runners carry verbal messages. Written messages are not used because most platoon leaders do not know how to write. From platoon to company, they use runners for distances of about 200m.
d. When PW company scattered in combat, they used bugle calls as signals as to their location. PW did not know further details but he knew each company had one bugler.
They used whistle signals to identify and locate squads. Signals were frequently changed.

13. TRAINING:
a. PW had 1 month’s military training in outskirts of PEIPING, HOPEI-SHENG (河北省).
b. Normal training period is 3 months.
c. During the training period, PW fired about 30 rounds in 7 days, using the model 38 Japanese rifle. PW did not train with overhead firing of support weapons.
d. After PW unit entered KOREA, no training received.

14. MEDICAL:
a. After PW unit entered KOREA, PW observed no disease in his unit.
b. PW unit received vaccination in June 1950 while in HONAN-SHENG (河南省). Vaccination was compulsory.
In the summer, PW received inoculation against cholera and typhoid but after his unit entered KOREA, no immunization or other countermeasures were taken.
c. PW stated his unit was equipped with dog fur lined boots and he observed no frostbite cases in his unit. PW himself was wounded on or about 24 Dec 50 and was not found to have been affected by frostbite upon admission to hospital.

15. MISCELLANEOUS:
a. PW stated only means of concealment from air attacks was marching at night and digging in during daylight hours.
b. Sometimes they reversed their cotton uniforms (white side out to conceal themselves in the snow covered mountains or snow fields when the troops are on the march.
c. Discipline was very strict while in CHINA but standards not maintained in KOREA. Confiscation of foodstuffs from civilians in KOREA were openly permitted. PW heard of only one rape case since coming to KOREA: the offender was executed.
Punishment of minor infractions of regulations was in the form of public denunciation before assembled troops, before whom the culprit was required to apologize.
d. PW observed about 3 - 4 men in his unit deserting. Reasons for desertion were:
(1) Tired of long marches after the unit entered KOREA.
(2) Homesick and fear of death is combat.
PW believed, however, most deserters were apprehended and sent back to their units.
e. Due to the language barrier between the PW and the Korean civilians, PW stated the attitude of Korean civilians toward them was not cooperative. In most cases, the Korean civilians deserted the town prior to the entry of PW unit.
f. PW observed no Korean civilians used in his unit.

16. CCF OPERATING WITH NKA:
PW believed no CCF units serving with the NKA.
PW believed about 1 - 2 CCF interpreters served in each NKA company for liaison duty.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROBINSON

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