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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 791　28 August 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0592)　26 August 1950

Information limited but reliable.

Squad - 10 men - Squad leader and asst, PPsh 1941 Submachine gun. 3 magazines each (140 rounds).

1 x DP LMG 300 round each.

4 x M1891/30 rifles, 100 rounds each.

Platoon - 40 men - 4 x squads in a platoon.

8 x PPsh 1941 Submachine guns (140 rounds each).

4 x DP LMG, 300 round each.

16 x M1891/30 rifles, 100 rounds each.

Company - 3 rifles platoons, 1 HMG squad, 1 medic squad - 139 men

35 x PPsh 1941 Submachine guns, 140 rounds each.

12 x DP LMG, 300 round each.

48 x M1891/30 rifles, 100 rounds each.

3 x M1910 HMG, amount of ammunition ?.

Squad leaders and asst squad leaders, 2 hand grenades each, others 1.

Platoon Leader, Submachine guns.

Company Commander - TT-1933 pistols.

Battalion - 3 rifle companies, 1 HMG Co, 1 x 82-mm Mortar Co. - about 500 men.

661 Unit (661 is believed to be the code number for regt) 3 rifle battalions - about 2,000 troops.

Inducted 7 Jul 50, at SEOUL, together with 2,000 S. Koreans. Trained 2 days at CHONG Primary School and sent to 6th Div as a replacement. Left SEOUL 10 Jul 50, with 2,000 replacements, arrived KIMP’OJANG 12 Jul 50. Regt, 10 hours and marched to SUWON, arrived 13 Jul 50. Regt 12 hours and marched at night to SONGHWAN, arrived 14 Jul 50. 12 hours rest, marched at night to SONJONGNI, arrived 15 Jul 50. Rest 12 hours, marched at night through mountain 6 kms south of SONJONGNI. Rest in mountains 12 hours and marched at night to KONGJU, arrived 17 Jul 50. Rest 3 days, marched at night arrived 28 kms south of KONGJU (place unknown). Regt, 12 hours, marched at night, arrived NONSAN 21 Jul 50. Rest 12 hours, marched at night, arrived TONGSEN-Ni 22 Jul 50. Rest 12 hours, marched at night, arrived CHONGJU, 23 Jul 50. Regt 2 days, marched at night, arrived IMSIL 26 Jul 50. Rest 12 hours, marched at night, arrived NAMWON 27 Jul 50. Informant was separated from his unit. He was left behind because off illness. Route taken by his unit unknown. 3 Aug 50, informant (alone) hitched a ride on an ammunition truck and rejoined his unit at KURYE, 4 Aug 50. Rest 2 days, replacements travelled by trucks at night, arrived HADONG, 6 Aug 50. Rest 2 days, marched at night arrived 4 kms N of CHINJU, 9 Aug 50. Between 10 to 18 Aug 50, the informant’s unit was broken up and the troops were distributed among the elements of 6th Div as replacements. 18 Aug 50, the informant, 50 others were sent to the 2nd Bn of 661 Unit. On 18 Aug 50, 2nd Bn marched at night arrived Mt SOBOK, 19 Aug 50. 2nd Bn was at Mt SOBUK up to the informants capture 21 Aug 50. Informant was taken prisoner after deserting his unit.

Not available because the informant was a new replacement.

No information.

No information.

6th Div lived off the land. 2nd Bn has had no food and water since 22 Aug 50, because they were completely surrounded by American troops. Ammunition was running low.

The 2nd Bn until encirclement was using S. Korean farmers to haul ammunition from a village 8 kms S of Mt SOBUK. The ammunition was carried on “A” frames and brought to the battalion at night.

The informant believes that the above village is the main ammunition supply point for the 661 unit (ammunition route from north u/k).

Informant was one of the 2,000 replacements that arrived at the 6th Div on 18 Aug 50. On 17 Jul 50, the officer in charge of the informants company told the troops that the NKPA was going to conscript 450,000 S. Koreans (no date for conscriptions) from the SEOUL Area between the ages of 18 to 40.

Replacements did not have military training and weapons were issued to them when they reached the front. The replacement until arriving at the front line were under guard. The replacement when sent to the front line units were guarded by special troops that follow them to make sure that none of the replacements desert the unit or retreated during battle. The replacements were not held in reserve. As soon as replacements reached the Div they were distributed to the front line units.

The NKPA troops did not have medical supplies or facilities except for bandages. Wounded troops were left on the field. Evacuation of wounded was made only when their units advanced, The evacuated were usually sent to villages to the rear. After recovery the troops were ordered back to their original unit. Many wounded died from the lack of medical attention.

Prior to battle, the troops were told to regroup at a certain area in case of separation from parent organization.

The 2nd Bn was to go to MASAN using trails from Mt SOBUK. The troops were told several times a day not to surrender because if they did, US Forces were going to shoot them.

The troops of the 2nd Bn have high morale with the exception of the replacements. Morale is the same during advance or retreat because the troops know they will be killed and do not fear death.

Captured M-1 Rifles and Carbines were issued to replacements.

The informant saw 300 US PWs at P’YONGTAEK and 90 at NAMWON. The US PWs are believed have been sent to SEOUL.

Of the 90 PWs sent to NAMWON, 12 were women believed to be US Army nurses.

The people of the newly conquered across on the average do not know what side to be on. They are afraid to go against the NKPA and they are afraid to side with them because they fear capture by ROK Forces who will treat them as traitors.