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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 733　25 August 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - EUSAK PIR NO. 42)　22 August 1950

This is a preliminary interrogation of a NORTH KOREAN field grade officer who claimed to have deserted his unit because of his ideological differences with the present NORTH KOREAN Regime. Report of detailed interrogation will follow as soon as available.

The 13th Division is commanded by Major General CHOE YONG CHIN. The II Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General MU, CHONG, is located in the vicinity of MUNGYONG (1108-1543). The I Corps, commanded by Major General KIM, UNG, is located at CHONJU (1015-1431). The corps are subordinated to the NORTH KOREAN Army commanded by General KIM, CHIK.

The 13th Rifle Division, subordinate to the II Corps, is composed of the 19th, 21st and 23rd Infantry Regiments, the 13th Artillery Regiment, a 76mm self-propelled gun battalion, and engineer battalion, and other organic service units. The present effective strength of the division is estimated at three thousand (3,000) troops; total division infantry strength believed to be not more than one thousand (1,000). The original division strength was assertedly twelve thousand (12,000) troops. As of 210400K Aug, the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments were deployed abreast generally the line (1147-1462.5)-(1150-1463). The 23d Infantry, deployed on line to the extreme left flank was forced to withdraw five thousand (5,000) yards to the rear as a result of United Nations attacks.

The 13th Artillery Regiment was positioned in vicinity (1147.5-1468.5). The regiment now has nine (9) 122mm howitzers (truck drawn) of which two (2) were rendered inoperable by friendly air, and thirteen (13) 76mm guns (truck drawn) -- the original number was twelve (12) 122mm howitzers and twenty four (24) 76mm guns. The artillery pieces were emplaced in an apple orchard situated at the above location. Each artillery piece was camouflaged during the daylight hours with straw mats covered with sand and/or soil. An estimated total of seven hundred (700) rounds of artillery ammunition was on hand 22 Aug 50. Approximately one hundred (100) rounds were delivered nightly since commitment of the division. Of the original total of sixteen (16) 76mm self-propelled guns in the self-propelled gun battalion (not under control of the Divarty Regiment) only seven (7) guns are remaining. These weapons are frequently employed as close infantry support and may be confused with tanks. An unidentified armored regiment, 105th Armored Division, was attached to the 13th Division at the time of the crossing of the NAKTONG RIVER 14 days ago. At the time of attachment, the regiment had fourteen (14) T-34/85 tanks, however, eleven (11) were lost following the NAKTONG RIVER crossing. Most of the losses were inflicted by friendly air.

The 15th Rifle Division consists of the 45th, 50th and 56th Infantry Regiments, according to the source. The 45th Infantry was attached and deployed ot the right of the 13th Rifle Division. The present effective strength of the 45th Regiment is estimated at one thousand (1,000) troops -- original strength two thousand (2,000). (Subject presumes that previously reported designations “48” “49” and “50” Infantry Regiments, 15th Rifle Division were given by uninformed prisoners of war. However, in view of the large number of prisoners who have given those identification, subject’s statement should not be accepted without further confirmation from other sources.)

Subject stated that NORTH KOREAN forces have very little mechanical trouble with tanks. If a tank is KO’D, it is recovered another tank, no retreivers being used. Spare parts are available and repairs are made and parts replaced at night. One tank carries about 30 rounds of ammunition and, while tank fuel is not plentiful, enough to go about 125 miles is available. Muzzle velocity of tank ammo is 750/800 inches per second? AT guns are .45 and 76 type. NORTH KOREAN forces usually emplace AT guns on low hills (30 degree) and level ground. Subject does no think our WP ammo is very effective but states 75mm are effective on the sides and rear of NORTH KOREAN tanks.

On about 16 Aug, the subject heard that the 2d Rifle Division was to enter the lines to the right of the 15th Division. (It must be assumed that the 2d Rifle Division will make its next appearance at full organizational strength.

The 1st Rifle Division, composed of the 14th, 2d and 3d Infantry Regiments, and other organic units, is now at or near complete organizational strength. 1st Infantry, 1st Rifle Division, was transferred to the 6th Rifle Division and replaced by the 14th Infantry, 6th Rifle Division (in order to provide a cadre of Koreans with combat experience from CHINA). (This information may be true in view of numerous conflicting reports obtained thru prisoners captured from the 6th Rifle Division.)

Subject heard that the 7th Rifle Division was redesignated as the 12th Rifle Division recently. (A total of three (3) hearsay reports with similar statements have also been received through other PWs.)

Subject stated that he believed that one of the greatest single factors which may weaken the will of the common soldier to resist is the employment of psychological warfare measures; some units have not had sufficient contact with US forces to realize the extent of the UN effort (the officers, however, are cognizant).

Subject stated that the 1st, 2d, 13th, and 15th and possible the 3d Divisions had been ordered to take TAEJU by the 15th of Aug and are still trying daily attacks.

Vicinity of HAMCHANG one Russian (presumed to be an officer, but in civilian clothes) was seen about 11 Aug, 20 miles from the front. This is the first reported instance of a Russian this far south.

Subject stated that Army artillery consists of 1 Regiment of 122mm guns (3 battalions of 12 guns each); a small tractor is the prime move. Regiment is believed to be in the southwest sector, location unknown-was actually seen at SEOUL on approximately 29 June and was informed that it was headed south.