ATIS-ALLIED TRANSLATOR & INTERPRETER SECTION-FEC
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2800 4 January 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - FWD #1 - 0283) 31 December 1950
| PW NAME: | WHA, Suawi Zyu (師志章) (Chinese) |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| AGE: | 31 |
| DUTY: | Ammo and supply bearer |
| UNIT: | 4th Field Army, 39th Army, 116th Div, 348th Regt, 1st Bn, 4th Co |
| EDUCATION: | None |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | KORANGPO, S KOREA (高梁) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 24 Dec 50 by ROK Army |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | SYZWAN SUNG GY SHI SHENG (中國 四川省 ■■■城外) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | Cpl SAKAI (ATIS) |
PW was talkative. He appeared nonchalant and indifferent. He was constantly eavesdropping on the interrogation of the other PsW. Information was thus limited, however it is considered reliable.
a. Chronology:
19 Oct 50: PW states that the 39th Army departed HAICHENG, LIAOTUNG Province on this date.
20 Oct 50: The 39th Army entered KOREA under cover of darkness on foot across a bridge from ANTUNG reaching an unk NK city.
o/a 1 Nov 50: The PW’s unit fought in the vicinity of UNSAN for five days. Thereafter the unit was withdrawn to the rear.
o/a 15 Nov 50: After regrouping and reorganizing the PW’s unit started its march southward. The PW did not recall the route of march or exact dates on which the unit reached the vicinity of PYONGYANG.
24 Dec 50: PW was captured by the ROK Army.
b. Unit Organization and Strength:
| Personnel | Original | Present (as of 24 Dec 50) |
| Officers | 7 | 7 |
| EM | 120 | 100 |
| Total | 127 | 107 |
c. Equipment:
| Original | Present | |
| HMGs | 6 (15,000 rds) | 5 (15,000 rds) |
| 82 mm Mortars | 3 (90 rds) | 3 (90 rds) |
| M 1938 Jap Rifles | 8 (800 rds) | 8 (800 rds) |
| US carbines M1 | 5 (150 rds) | 5 (150 rds) |
| US SMGs | 3 (300 rds) | 3 (300 rds) |
| Pistols | 3 (unknown) | 3 (unknown) |
d. Unit Duties:
The duties of the Heavy Weapons Co was to send one HMG squad each to the support of the attacking rifle Co of 108 men. One HMG squad had 8 men. The three mortar squads of 8 men each were kept behind the Bn and gave support to the infantry as required. The Bn kept three HMG squads and one rifle Co in reserve. The attacking infantry company called for mortar support by telephone and conducted the firing by using forward observer methods.
e. Communications:
Each Co had one telephone and three rolls of telephone wire. The telephone wire was that retrieved from the US Army lines.
f. Replacements:
For the replacement of casualties men were taken from other companies in the Bn, since there were no outside replacements.
g. Ammo:
Ammo was always on hand and it was drawn even as late as 24 Dec 50 upon arrival at KORANGPO. The method of transportation was unk to the PW, however PW states that Regt made the distribution.
h. Transportation:
PW heard one of his officers state that there were approx 1,500 vehicles in KOREA. That it was operated under a separate command and it was not attached to the army or lower echelon Hq as in the case of the US Army. Trucks were used far in the rear and carts and pack horses were used in the front line area. With the exception of a few US trucks, the majority were of Chinese origin.
Food was procured locally by the Co from the villages thru which it passed. Receipts were given to the village heads, who usually collected the rations for the CCF. Corn was received in most cases. During the last days prior to capture, the procuring of food became difficult due to the fleeing of the farmers. Emergency ration of 7 lbs of rice flour was carried by each man in addition to the approx 8 lbs of corn issued for three days march.
Although the men of the PW’s unit were physically fit, the morale has dropped considerably after its arrival in KOREA. The poor living conditions, lack of clothing, poor rations, no liquor, and no victory celebration parties were given as reasons. In addition, the PW stated the constant strafing by planes plus the unkept promise to return to CHINA after two months service in KOREA has impaired the troops’ morale. However, these men enter battle because there is no alternative under the close scrutiny and surveillance kept by the officers.
Did you surrender: Answer: No.
Did you see any UN leaflets or hear any loudspeaker broadcasts?
Answer: “I didn’t see any leaflets but heard the broadcast from the plane which was inaudible because of the roar of the planes’ engine.”
What was the effect on you?
Answer: “I was glad to hear Chinese spoken from the airplane.”
Did you hear any talk about leaflets or broadcasts?
Answer: No. We would be punished if caught talking about it.
PW states that he was told that their purpose of entering KOREA was to stop the UN and S Korean Army before they invaded MANCHURIA after they conquered N KOREA. Furthermore he was told that they were aiding the N Korean Army against the US Army which was giving material support to S KOREA and that if this was not done at this time, the Americans would channel this economic support to Nationalist CHINA. Thus, it was only for the survival of the CCF that they should face the Americans now. This was the gist of the orientation given the PW by his regimental CO. Furthermore he was told that they were (the unit) volunteers for KOREA.
For the Commanding Officer:
BATEMAN
