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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1650　4 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1000)　2 October 1950

(Ref to ATIS Rpt No. 1577)

PW was very cooperative and intelligent, was in good physical condition and did not show any signs of fear or cental depression. Reliability, good.

20 May 49: Inducted into the NKPA at KUMHWA.

20 May 49-20 Jul 49： Assigned to 5th Bn, 1st Border Constabulary Brigade as a truck driver with rank of private. Brigade Hqs was situated in CH'ORWON.

Sep 49: 2nd Bn, 1st Border Constabulary Brigade was activated in INJE.

Mar 50: With the organization of the Arty Bn and 6th Bn, the composite units of the brigade was as follows: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th (Rifle) Bn, Arty Bn, Sig CO, Med Co, Transportation Co, Recon Co and Engr Co. Deployment of units was as follows:

KANSONG: Hqs 1st Border Constabulary Brigade (approx figures only)

YANGYANG:

INJE:

YANGGU:

Each Bn with the exception of the units stationed in KANSONG had an areaof responsibility. 3rd Bn area extended between YONGDOK (寧德) and OSEK, 4th Bn, between PUSOCHI-RI and KOSAN PONG, others unknown.

Mar 50-10 Jun 50: PW was promoted to Jr Lt. There were no appreciable losses or gains in personnel. All units not on partol duty underwent training.

10 Jun 50-25 Jun 50: General preparations for combat were made. 14 days supply of food and ammunition arrived by rail at KANSONG and were distributed to the units. Roughly, 800 kilograms of rice were necessary to feed one battalion each day, since one ration during the first few weeks of the war was one kilogram. PW was assigned to the Transportation Co, 3rd Bn, and he was responsible for the transportation of 14,400 kg of rice (14 days supply), 9 tons of other staples, and 12 tons of ammunition. These quantities of supplies were considered necessary to keep the 3rd Bn in combat for the initial 14 days of the war.

o/a 10 Jul 50: 1st BC Brigade was deactivated at KANGNUNG. The troops of the brigade formed the nucleus of the newly activated 8th Division. The strength of the 1st BC Brigade was approx 5,000 men.

o/a 10 Jul 50-/a 14 Jul 50: Approx 7,000 trained reserves arrived at KANGNUNG bringing the strength of the division up to 12,000 men. Approx 60% of the new arrivals came unarmed. Consoquently, the trucks of each regiment were dispatched to the warehouses of the deactivated 1st Brigade in YANGYANG to obtain the necessary weapons. T/O & E arty pieces were shipped by rail to YANGYANG. With the exception of PPsh sub-machine guns and trucks, the division was up to T/O & E. At this time, the division had approx 60 trucks which were taken over from the 1st BC Brigade.

o/a 25 Aug50: 8th Div received 20 new ZIS-151 type trucks at ANDONG (安東). At this time, the strength of the 8th Div was approx 7,000 men, 70% of whom were volunteers recruited in South KOREA. The remaining 30% were the original members of the 8th Division who had been with the division since its activation o/a 10 Jul 50. Of this 30%, about 50% were former members of the 1st BC Brigade.

When the division received the 20 trucks o/a 25 Aug 50, there were 20 trucks remaining out of the original 60 trucks taken over from the 1st BC Brigade. The new trucks were driven from SEOUL. These were the first trucks the division had received since its activation.

Since the outbreak of the war, the troops have been fed an average of 800 grams of rice per man a day. On 25 Aug 50, the strength of 1st Regt, 8th Div was about 1,500 men. To feed the regt, approx 1,200 kg of rice was required each day. To feed the 8th Div o/a 25 Aug 50, it was necessary to transport roughly 5,600 kg of rice and a negligible quantity of other staples. PW estimates that aside from the rice, which the division obtained from the ANDONG supply depot, 99% of the food was locally procured by individuals or Bn level units.

The quantity of ammunition required varied with the military situation. However, o/a 25 Aug 50, the average requirement per day was about 2½tons per Regt as compared to the 7½ tons per day per Regt required in Jul 50. In Jul 50, the average gasoline consumption per truck per 24 hrs was about 90 liters as compared to the 36 liters per 24 hrs necessary o/a 25 Aug 50. This was because the trucks travelled day and night in Jul and only at nights during Aug 50. It was not the shortage of supplies but the air attacks in daylight hours which prevented the use of trucks.

o/a 5 Sep 50: At UISONG 8th Div received 10 new ZIS-151 type trucks from SEOUL. During the 10 days between o/a 25 Aug 50 to o/a 5 Sep 50, approx 10 trucks were lost through enemy air action. With the 10 new trucks received, the total number of trucks in the 8th Div was about 40. The strength of the division remained at about 7,000 men since replacements were received. No details available on replacements except that the men were untrained and arrived unarmed. There were sufficient weapons to arm the men.

20 Sep 50： Strength of the 8th Div was approx 3,500 men. The number of operating trucks was about 30. Between 5 Sep 50 and 20 Sep 50, about 6,000 kg of rice was issued per Regt per week. The strength of each Regt was about 900 men. On 20 Sep 50, there were about 7 liters of fuel were per truck and there were no indications that additional supplies were to arrive.

25 Sep 50: The Rifle Regts had no trucks. PW does not know whether Div Hqs had any vehicles. PW's Regt (1st Regt) had only one heavy weapon, a 120m mortar. No supplies were received by the division after 15 Sep 50.

Morale of the troops was extremely low because 99% of the troops of the 8th Div wore replacements received after 1 Aug 50, and to them disorganization and retreat meant defeat. Moreover, the majority of the company commanders were former NCOs of the original 8th Division. The constant air attacks, lack of supplies, inadequate training and heavy casualties have demoralized the unit to the extant that the commanders had little or no control over the men. Although the division was presently (As of 25 Sep 50) disorganized, the majority of the men would not surrender because they had been constantly warned that to surrender would mean death at the hands of the enemy. Moreover, since the majority of the men were South Koreans, they were afraid that they would be treated as traitors should they be captured.

PW states that he wanted to surrender after he read a surrender leaflet. He believes the majority of the men desired to surrender but they still have some doubt about the treatment they would receive. Since most of the lower unit commanders (Bn, Co, and Plt commanders) were men of low calibre and not in the fanatic category, PW believes that the majority of them could be induced to surrender. PW cannot give any suggestions as to what method could be employed.

Name: O Paek Yong (吳伯龍) (오백용)

Rank: Maj Gen

Age: 48

Position: CG, 8th Div

Remarks: Ex-CG, 1st Brigade, ex-CCF officer, ex-Russian agent in KOREA, hearsay.

Name: HAN Ch’ong (韓淸)

Rank: Sr Col

Age: 37

Positions C/S, 2nd Corps

Remarks: Ex C of S, 8th Div, transferred to 2nd Corps in Aug 50

Name: LEE Hang Nae (李学來) (이학래)

Ranlc: Col

Age: 30

Position: CO, 1st Regt

Remarks: Ex-CCF officer, Ex-CO, 5th Bn. 1st Brigade

Name: U Yang Gi (우양기)

Rank: Lt Col

Age: 30

Position: C/S, 1st Regt

Remarks: Ex-Asst CO, 5th Bn, 1st Brigade

Name: PAEK Ch‘ol Su (백철수)

Rank: Lt Col

Age: 35

Position: Cultural Off, 1st Regt

Remarks: Ex-Cultural officer, 5th Bn, 1st Brigade

Name: SA Saeng (史生) (사생)

Rank: Col

Age: 34

Position: CO, 2nd Regt

Remarks: Ex-CO. 1st Bn, 1st Brigade

Name: YUN Ki Gun (윤기군)

Rank: Col

Age: 32

Position: CO, 3rd Ragt

Remarks: Ex-CO, 4th Bn, 1st Brigade

Name: KIM Ch’ung Bae (김충백)

Rank: Lt Col

Age: 33

Position: Cultural Officer, 3rd Regt

Remarks: Ex-Cultural Officer, 3rd Bn, lst Brigade

1st Brigade (deactivated) - 6238

PW estimates that the 8th Div has lost all of its original members (approx 12,000 men) and about 3,000 replacements since its activation o/a 10 Jul 50 to date (as of 25 Sep 50). Of this total, approx 30% were killed in action. Among the original members the number of desertions was negligible, but among the replacements, approx 40% of the losses may be attributed to desertions.

NKPA hospital trucks had red cross insignias painted on both sides and on the rear doors. Aidmen wore red cross arm bands on the left arm. The soldiers had not been instructed against firing on UN vehicles or personnel with red cross insignias.

A Special Reconnaissance Bn was activated in INJE in Oct 49. This Bn was under the direct control of the Security Department of the Internal Affairs Ministry and operated independently from the border constabulary units. The primary mission of this unit was to infiltrate into ROK territory for intelligence purposes. Ordinarily, the members of this organization wore military uniforms but changed to civilian clothes when dispatched on a mission south of the 38° parallel. The total strength of the Bn was 500 men or less. Aside from the weapons necessary for the security of the unit area, the Bn had no arms.

The Military Intelligence Officer of this Bn was Maj SIN Pong Son (申鳳善) (신봉선), who was transferred from Hqs, 1st Border Constabulary Brigade when the Bn was organized. PW hoard that Maj SIN was awarded the Order of the National Flag (3rd Class) in Oct A9. Maj SIN was the Reconnaissance Company commander until his transfer to the Special Reconnaissance Bn. The Recon Co performed identical missions as the Special Reconnaissance Bn and was active even after the Special Reconnaissance Bn was organized.

The Recon Co was stationed in KANSONG (杆城). Strength of the unit was approx 120 men. PW does not know organizational details nor the operational methods of eithor of thoe reconnaissance units.

1. Rate of exchange: 1:8, 1 NK won to 8 ROK won. Others unknown.

2. Extent of usage: The NK people had faith in their currency and used it as a standard medium of exchange.

Truck driver : 600 won a month, with free quarters

Mechanic : 600 won a month, with free quarters

Primary School teacher: 1400 won a month

Lathe operator : 1300 won a month

5 SUNG (升) (9.5 quarts) rice - 50 won (ration price) 200 won (Open market)

1 SUNG (1,9 quarts) soy sauce - 10 won (ration price) 15 won (Open market)

1 pr leathor shoes - No ration 1200 won 〃 〃

1 veIvet slacks - No ration 10000 won 〃 〃

1 wool suit - No ration 13000 won 〃 〃

For the Commanding Officer: