본문 바로가기주메뉴 바로가기하단 바로가기
sidemenu open/close

MIO Nai Shung│TAI Yu Shong 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 50 NO. 4104 1951-03-01
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 4104 21 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (163-MISDI-0304) 1 March 1951
(Atchd 1st Mar Div)

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: MIO Nai Shung (■乃相)
TAI Yu Shong (台雲生)
PW NO: 1st M-P-4649
1st M-P-4650
EDUCATION: None
RANK: Soldiers
DUTY: MG Ammo Carrier
UNIT: CCF, 20th Army Group, 66th Corps, 196th Div, 588th Regt, 3d Bn, HMG Co, 2d Plat, 4th Sqd
DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE: 010830 Mar 51 (DS0848)
CAPTURING UNIT: 3d Bn, 7th Marines
INTERROGATOR: Pfc MATSUSHITA

2. ASSESSMENT:
While sleeping in foxhole in vicinity DS0848 were attacked by UN force. At 010830 they were captured by 7th Marines. Not recommended for further interrogation.
Evaluation: F-3 cooperative, but information limited.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
a. Strength of Unit:
(1) Original Strength: (10 Nov 50 upon entering KOREA).
196th Div - 13,000 to 14,000 men
588th Regt - 3,000 men
3d Bn - 600 men
HMG Co - 130 men
2d Plat - 30 men
Following numbers were used by 193th Division:
196th Div - #41 (used as APO number)
588th Regt - #23 (unknown if code or APO number)
(2) Present Strength: (As of 1 March 1951)
196th Div - 2,000 to 3,000 men
3d Bn - 200 men
HMG Co - 50 to 60 men
2d Plat - 18 men

b. Chronology:
5 Nov 50 - 66th CCF Corps left vicinity of PEKING, by train enroute to North KOREA.
10 Nov 50 - Arrived ANTUNG, MANCHURIA and on same evening crossed into SINUIJU, North KOREA. Heard that 39th and 40th CCF Corps had already crossed into KOREA. 66th Corps followed 40th Corps as reserve. 40th Corps engaged in fights until arriving 38th Parallel.
20 Dec 50 - 66th and 40th Corps arrived near east coast on 38th. Parallel. Here 40th Corps separated from 66th Corps. 66th Corps headed south with 197th Div in lead followed by 196th, then 198th Div. Until 23 Feb 51, 196th Div received many air attacks but no casualties were seen or heard of. They headed south for a while then they were ordered north again, going around in circles in the mountains.
23 Feb 51 - Arrived west of HOENGSONG (DS1049). Upon arriving in HOENGSONG, PW heard that Regt of 196th Div were to deploy.
28 Feb 51 - 588th Regt arrived in vicinity of (DS0748) and set up CP in mountains. From here 1st, 2d, and 3d Bn left Regt CP and headed south approximately 1 km on top of bill and dug in. 1st Bn dug in on west flank of 3d Bn and 2d Bn on east flank. 3d Bn CP was set up in vicinity (DS0748), one mountain north of dug-in troops. 196th Div Hq CP was heard to be north of 588th Regt CP.
1 Mar 51 - 0630 they were attacked by UN Force and at 0830 hour PW were captured.

c. Personalities:
196th Div CO - CHIN (fnu)
HMG Co CO - TONG Shur Cheng

d. Weapons and Equipment:
588th Regt:
5 x 82mm Mortars (no ammo)
6 HMG (2000 rd per HMG)
Unknown amount LMG
Unknown amount of US M-1 rifles, carbines and Japanese rifles. (80 rd per man).
PW heard that Div Hq had Arty pieces. Type or amount unknown.
Telephone within Regt (amount or type unknown).
2 US trucks and 20 horses used for hauling supplies.

e. Status of Supply:
Route of Supply:
Ammo - PW heard there was resupply; but, at present only what the troops carried.
Food - Heard that food was supplied to Regt Hq but did not reach front line troops. Food was procured whenever possible from villages.
Clothing - Only what they were. If clothes of Koreans or US were procured, they were to wear it on the inside of their uniform.
Shelter - Take in foxholes dug in mountains. CCF were given orders from higher headquarters not to take shelter within villages.

f. Other Units:
Upon arriving HOENGSONG (DS1049), PW heard that elements of 39th Corps were south of 588th Regt lines.

g. Morale:
Morale of troops was getting low due to coldness, and mainly lack of food and ammunition. PW morale was low because they were former Nationalist Army conscripted into Communist Army.

h. Effectiveness of Weapons:
All troops feared air attack most duo to strafing and bombing.

i. Tactics of PW Unit:
588th Regt was ordered to set a defense line in vicinity of (DS0784) and guard the main road leading north. In case UN Force’s vehicles were heading north on road, they were to use guerrilla tactics and ambush vehicles with grenades. After the job was accomplished they were to return to their hill.

For the AC of S, G-2:

UYEDA

페이지 상단으로 이동하기