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KIM, NYON CHUN 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 9 NO. 1498 1950-09-25
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1498 29 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (521 - MISD - 0062) 27 September 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: KIM, NYON CHUN (金龍春)
PW NO: #2086
RANK: Pvt
AGE: 33
ORGANIZATION: 1st Inf Bn, 1st Co, 3rd Platn, 2nd Sqd. (25th Brigade)
DUTIES: Rifle man
EDUCATION: Primary School Graduate
OCCUPATION: Tailer
ADDRESS: GENZAN SHI, YOCHIRI #24.
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 25 Sep, 50 at SHINGHON.
UNIT MAKING CAPTURE: 5 Marine Regt
INTERROGATOR: Cpl. TANAKA


2. ASSESSMENT:
Subject was cooperative and taled freely. He deserted and surrendered to the UN Troops. Information hers-in reliable.

3. MILITARY HISTORY:
Inducted 20 Aug, 50 at CHOR WON and attached to 25th Brigade, 1st Bn, 1st Co. No weapons were issued. Received basic training until unit left CHOR WON 15 Sep 50. Arrived SEOUL at 0300 21 Sep 50 via rail and marching, traveling at night. Subject deserted his unit near SEOUL due to heavy firing and stated that half of his Co was killed. Subject believes that his Bn commander, a Major (name unk), as also killed.

4. FOREIGN ELEMENTS:
While subject was receiving basic training at CHOR WON, there were approx 10 Russian officers, ranging from Sr Lt. to Col., acting as technical advisers to this 25th Brigade. These officers did not cross the 38th parallel.
The code number for the brigade was “PAK TU SAN” (the highest mt. in korea) while his Bn (1st Inf) code was “CHONG CHONG GAN” (name of a river), and the 1st Co code was “OWOL” (The fifth month).

5. WEAPONS AND PERSONNEL:
Strength of brigade: Estimated at 2,000. Ages ranged from 16-37. The great majority were forcibly inducted the same day as PW.
Strength of 1st Inf Bn: 700 men, 65 officers, Commanding officer was a Major. They were armed with 60 PPSH Tommy guns, 15 light machine guns and MOSIN M-1891/30 rifles. Only 400 men were issued rifles and each received 100 rounds of ammunition. These weapons were of Russian make and old. The tommy guns were new.
Strength of Engineer Bn: 200 men. CO was a Major. Armed only with MOSISN 1891/30 rifles, 100 rounds of ammunition each.
Strength of Machine Gun Bns (2): 400 men. CO was a Major. Armed with MOSSIN 1891/30 rifles and 100 rounds of ammo. Only 2 maxim HMGs were observed by PW.
Strength of Tank Bn: 150 men. Heard that there were only 3~4 tanks attached to this unit. They were destroyed in the battle of SHIN CHON.
Strength of Arty Bn: 150-200 men, 7-8 cannons, 10-12 mortars. These weapons were not in use due to insufficient ammo and at present are stored in an open space adjacent to “LIKKA” university in SEOUL. Subject observed these weapons while marching through the city.
Strength of Reconnaissance Co: 70 men CO---1st Lt.
PW believes that half of the Brigade unit was killed in action at SEOUL.

6. FOOD & AMMO SUPPLIES:
Rice was hand carried from CHOR WON. Ammo was brought in trucks from SEOUL, depending on air attacks. The ammo dump was located in SEOUL at a place called “KYONG KI CHUNG HAK”, a middle school.
The 25th Brigade was originally activated for guard duty but was called to active duty to the NKAs need for troops.

7. MORALE:
Morale was low. The men were threatened by the officers. 2/3 of the men were South Korean sympathizers. One-two meals (salt & rice) every 3 days. Subject observed a surrender leaflet on 25 Sep 50 at SHIN CHON. Due to heavy US attack subject could not surrender til 15:00 hour.

8. CAPTURE EQUIPMENT:
10% of the units’ rifles were US M-1 rifles in poor condition.

9. US PWs:
Subject observed 300 UN PWs at CHOR WON o/a 21 Aug 50. The PWs were boarding a train headed north. They were dressed in fatigues and subject observed 5 stretcher cases. They looked weary and hungry.

10. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
There were only 3 medics attached to the 25 Brigade. They were Red Cross brassards. Various industrial plants have been bombed and nothing is being produced.
Subject states that the 8th Route Army is now engaged in battle in the south. Also heard that elements of the CCF are in HAEJU.
Subject states that at present the majority of the soldiers in North Korea have no military training.

For the AC of S, G-2:

SHORT

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