ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1419 27 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0889) 24 September 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | O Sung Yol (吳承烈) (오승열) |
| PW NUMBER: | 63 NK 4658 |
| RANK: | Sgt (中士) |
| AGE: | 18 |
| DUTY: | Radio operator |
| UNIT: | Ind AT Bn (Code No 849), Signal Platoon |
| EDUCATION: | Agriculture College (3 yrs) |
| OCCUPATION: | Student |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 1 1/2 km NW of WAENGWAN (倭館) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 20 Sep 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | P'YONGAN NANDO, NAMP'O Civy, SINHUNG NI, #106 (平安南道 南浦市 新興里 一0六) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | P'YONGAN NAMDO, NAMP'O City, HUP'O RI, #50 (平安南道 南浦市 后浦里 五0) |
| INTERROGATOR: | TAKESAKO (FEAF) |
The PW, in good physical condition and above average intelligence, was highly cooperative. The information can be considered reliable.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:Chronology:
| 19 Jul 50: | Inducted into a newly formed unit, the Ind AT Bn (Code No 849) at P'YONGYANG. Until the time of departure, the men of this unit did odd details such as digging gun emplacements in the hills of P'YONGYANG, constructing homes, etc. |
| 8 Aug 50: | Ind AT Bn departed P'YONGYANG by train for ANDONG, travelling only by night. |
| 29 Aug 50: | Arrived ANDONG. The route of this unit, of 30 officers and 182 EM, was through SARIWON (沙里院), KUMCH'ON (金川), KAESONG (開城), SEOUL (서울), CH'UNGJU (忠州). |
| 3 Sep 50: | The unit moved by truck to a point 6 km North of KUMCH'ON (金泉) (at the time KUMCH'ON was under air attack). |
| 8 Sep 50: | The unit dug in at a point 1 km NW of the NAKTONG River and prepared to repel enemy attacks (Their order were to hold this line). |
| 12 Sep 50: | The unit experienced their first enemy air attack. From that day until the PW's capture the unit was subjected to almost daily air attacks. A count of pieces and trucks just prior to the PW's capture showed ten (10) guns (from a total of 12) and seven (7) trucks (originally 15) remaining. |
| 20 1000 K Sep 50: | PW, sent out as a forward observer, noted through field glasses some enemy activities across the NAKTONG River. He immediately reported back and the unit made preparations for their first engagement. Late that night it was learned that more wire, necessary to maintain contact between batteries in the event of a battle, was needed. Around 2400 hrs the same night, the PW took a group of four to obtain some wire hidden in a RR tunnel just 500 meters west of the NAKTONG River. On the way to the tunnel this group encountered a large American element which had crossed the NAKTONG River during the night and immediately surrendered. |
Unit organization & strength:
1. Actual battle organization and strength of Ind Arty Bn prior to enemy air attack as follows:
1st Btry - 50 officers & 28 EM
2nd Btry - Same as above
3rd Btry - Same as above
Bn Hqs - 10 officers & 12 EM, including radio plt and Recon plt
Services - Ammo and Supply Plt, Intendence Plt, Maintenance Plt
2. Last known composition of unit: Up to the time of PW's surrender, the unit strength decreased from its original 182 to 120-odd men due to casualties sustained in air raids and desertions (because of propaganda leaflets).
Equipment:
4 × 57mm AT guns in each battery for a total of 12 pieces at time of original organization. All NCO's armed with submachine guns, total of 25. All EM of the lower two grades armed with rifles. At the time of PW's capture, two (2) 57mm AT guns had been destroyed by air strikes so ten (10) guns remained.
Ind At Bn was first organized 19 Jul 50. This unit received all its AT guns and submachine guns on 1 Aug 50. Every gun was brand new and bore Soviet markings. Even shells bore Soviet markings (a star). The unit's radio equipment consisted of five “ASEMA” (아세마) and three “ERUBEMU” (애루배무). This unit had no telephones.
Intentions:
The only order, to the PW's knowledge, was to hold the line 1 km NW of the NAKTONG River.
Personalities:
Ind AT Bn Commander was Major KIM Kyu Sik (金圭植).
Exec Officer was Captain CHANG Hak Kyu (張學奎) (장학규).
Signal Officer was Sr Lt LEE Hyon Ch'ol (李현哲) (리현철).
1st Btry, 1st Plt ldr was Jr Lt IM (fnu) ( 林 ).
Morale & Propaganda:
The morale of the individual soldier of the unit was extremely low due to the constant air attacks. About one week before the PW's surrender, two platoon leaders and two NCO's deserted.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
