ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 3822 6 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (IX CORPS MIDI - 0292) 16 February 1951
| NAME: | LUNG Hai San (龍海山) (CCF) |
| AGE: | 30 yr |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| UNIT: | 39th Army, 116th Div, 346th Regt, 3rd Bn, 9th Co, 2nd Plat, 4th Sqd |
| DUTY: | Rifleman |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| EDUCATION: | None |
| DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 171500 Feb 51 surrendered at (CS8265363) |
Fairly cooperative and information considered fairly reliable. No education and information of tactical value. Not recommended for further interrogation.
a. Chronology:
NCO with 7 years experience in the CNA. Captured and conscripted into 39th CCF Army at KWANGSI Jan 50.
22 Oct 50, 116th Div crossed into KOREA at ANTUNG. Heard 39th Army was coming to KOREA and 116th Div was the advance element. 116th Div (346th, 347th, and 348th Regt) arrived at TAECHON (YE1322) 27 Oct 50.
Subsequent events that led to his capture.
1 Nov 50 Unit at UNSAN (YE3928)
4 Nov 50 Reinforced UNSAN after previously withdrawing. Rested here with approx 1000 others for several weeks
11 Feb 51 Unit arrived 20 km N of SEOUL
12 Feb 51 Unit arrived approx 4 km S of place of capture
16 Feb 51 PW deserted unit and was captured 17 Feb 51 at (CS826323).
16 Feb 51, observed troops and supply carts of 346th Regt moving in a NE direction, signal men were also observed taking up communications wire.
17 Feb 51 saw signposts indicating a NE direction for the 346th Regt.
b. Organization and Strength:
39th Army consisted of 115th, 116th and 117th Div.
116th Div had 346th, 347th and 348th Regt, Field Arty and a Mt Gun Bn.
346th Regt had approx 1200 men. Regt was broken down into 3 Bn. PW 3rd Bn consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th companies and a Hv Wpn Co with a total Bn strength of about 350 men.
PW 9th Co had only about 30 men, since during the attack they were hit the hardest and suffered more than 50% casualties.
c. Deployment of Other Units:
Saw elements of 42nd Army south of SEOUL but could not give exact location. 8 Feb 51, hearsay information from his platoon leader that 38th, 39th, 40th Armies were to attack central UN sector.
d. Status of Arms and Ammo, Supply, and Equipment:
16 Feb 51, 9th Co had 2 LMG with approx 750 rd, 4 SMG M-3 with 150 rd, 10 US M-1 Rifles and Carbines with 150 rd, one grenade to each man.
Hv Wpn Co had 4 x 81mm mortars, 4 LMG with 750 rd per weapon.
Other companies had approx the same number of weapons except that they had 4x60mm mortars, 6 LMG with 750 rd.
6 Feb 51, received 2 grenades and 2 LMG and about 200 rd.
e. Status of Clothing and Food:
6 Feb 51 all men of 116th Div received one pair of shoes and one pair summer trousers.
Food confiscated locally and consumed twice daily and deemed adequate. Food consisted mainly of Korean rice and pickled cabbage.
f. Mission and Intention:
Prior to crossing the HAN River troops were told by political officer that 38th, 39th and 40th Army would hit the central front UN forces. If successful they were to continue towards TAEJON and TAEGU. Other units were to hold the HAN River line.
g. Physical Condition of Troops:
Company had men suffering from forstbite who were evacuated to the rear.
h. Arty
During their battle at UNSAN, heard that an Arty Div of the 4th Field Army had participated. He saw 8 Field pieces of unk calibre at UNSAN.
i. Tactics:
Tactics employed in attacking UN forces is by using more manpower. An example of CCF methods to hit an enemy unit is to have a superiority of three to one.
j. Propaganda and/or Surrender Leaflets:
Heard broadcasts at TAECH’ON but were not clearly understood. Leaflets observed in four different occasions and most CCF men had some faith in them.
Feared the artillery more than air attacks. To escape air attacks, all that was necessary was to remain in the foxhole where as the artillery had a concentrated “pin point” effect.
For the AC of S, G-2:
YAMADA
