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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3806　6 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1629)　1 March 1951

PW was conscripted by the North Korean Army while on leave from the PUSAN #1 area Teachers College.

Cooperative during the interrogation. Information obtained is believed to be reliable.

Conscripted for service 7 Jul 50 at SEOUL and assigned to a training Regt composed of South Korean conscripts. Between 7 Jul 50 to 29 Aug 50, received basic training with approximately 600 South Korean conscripts.

29 Aug 50, PW and 300 replacements departed for ANDONG for assignment in 8th North Korean Division.

7 Sep 50, PW and 300 replacements arrived at 8th Div Hq in ANDONG (DR7545).

Replacements were not assigned to front line units because orders to retreat had been issued by Division Commander, consequently, unit was continued to be called 8th Division Replacement Regt.

22 Sep 50, approximately 300 South Korean conscripts from the SEOUL area were integrated into 8th Division Replacement Regt, and on same night, they began their Northward retreat:

15 Nov 50, III NK Corps was activated at CHISANDONG and PW Replacement Regt was integrated into reorganized 3rd Division. Reorganization of 3rd Div took approximately three days.

During the period 18 to 25 Nov 50, while at CHISANDONG, 3rd Division was issued new weapons, equipment and ammo.

25 Nov 50, 3rd Div was ordered to proceed to CHEILBONG (XE3243) for training purposes because CHISANDONG was under constant UN air attacks.

3rd Div arrived at CHEILBONG o/a 3 Dec 50, where it exercised in small arms familiarization and target practice until 10 Dec 50. On 10 Dec 50, Division received orders from III Corps Hq to proceed South. Route taken is as follows:

10 Jan 51 3rd Div was ordered to return to HOEYANG for additional training. 2 Feb 51, transferred to III Corps Hq which was then located at CHANGDO (CT8362).

PW and another soldier walked to CHANGDO, but upon arrival, learned that Corps Hq had moved to KUMHWA. O/a 5 Feb 51, Corps Hq had moved to INJE. Followed route taken by Corps Hq and eventually joined them at HOENGSONG (DS1149) o/a 10 Feb 51.

Assigned to Political Bureau, Civil Affairs Section.

13 Feb 51, III Corps Hq moved to PANGNIM MYON (DS3446).

22 Feb 51, PW and 3 others dispatched by Political Bureau to CHANGPYONG (DS6846) to: check on local food supply; investigate activities of pro-communist youth organization; contact a guerrilla unit believed to be in area; organize guerrilla teams among villagers.

When PW arrived at CHANGPYONG, found village deserted except for five civilians.

Passed the night at CHANGPYONG, and on following day was on his way back to Corps Hq when he was captured and taken prisoner by an UN patrol at YOMAN-NI.

III Corps Hq located in SANGBANG NIM (DS4843) as of 22 Feb 51. Village composed of approximately 35 houses. Every house in this village was used as part of Corps Hq and that troops worked and slept in them.

7th Rifle Regt of 3rd NK Division, 23 Feb 51, was at HABANG NIM (DS4743). This village consisted of approximately 30 to 40 farm houses. Every house was used as a shelter for the 7th Regt.

23 Feb 51, a patrol of 7th Regt engaged a composite US and ROK patrol at YOMAN-NI.

Political Bureau and Civil Affairs Section of III Corps occupied village of CHUNGBANG NIM (DS4743).

Village government office of CHUNGBANG NIM was used as the Hq for Political Bureau and Civil Affairs Section. Approximately 6 houses surrounding this village office building were used as billets for the personnel of Political Bureau and Civil Affairs Section.

21 Feb 51, CHUNGBANG NIM was bombed and strafed by UN aircraft. The effects of this attack were negligible. As of 23 Feb 51, SANGBANG NIM and HABANG NIM had never been bombed or strafed by UN aircraft.

7th Regt was employed as the advance force of the 3rd Division.

8th and 9th Regiments together with 3rd Division Hq as of 23 Feb 51, were reported to be in the vicinity of INJE (DT2813) but were moving Southward to join the front line elements of III Corps.

23 Feb 51, PW heard a rumor that II Corps was to be pulled back for regrouping and rest (Basis of rumor: II Corps troops moving to the rear), while III Corps was to replace it. Strongly believes that this is true because he observed many II Corps personnel moving Northward.

22 Feb 51, while at PYONGCHANG, told by an officer of 15th Div that 15th Div was in the vicinity of HONGCH’ON. Also told that 15th Division was going to the rear for rest and regrouping and that 1st Division was to replace 15th Division.

As of 23 Feb 51, 1st Division was somewhere North of HONGCHON.

III Corps Hq: Political Security Bureau: Military Police and Counter Intelligence Sections.

Political Bureau: Political Training Section, Guerrilla Organization Section, Youth Organization Section, Women’s Organization Section, Propaganda Section, Civil Affairs Section.

Rear Service Bureau: Finance Section, Supply Section, Transportation Section.

Staff Bureau: Operation Section, Order of Battle Section, Training Section, Intelligence Section, etc.

Signal Bureau: Signal Supply Section, Signal Intelligence Section, Inter-command Liaison Section.

III Corps: 1st, 3rd and 15th Rifle Divisions.

1st Division: 1st, 2nd and 3rd Rifle Regiments.

3rd Division: 7th, 8th and 9th Regiments.

Remarks: Approximately 100 enlisted men from III Corps have been transfered to division units as replacements.

Within III Corps Hq, there were no known casualties except for a few cases of typhus.

III Corps: (including 1st, 3rd, and 15th Div)

Personnel　18,000　Approx 15,000

PW believes that 3,000 troops have been killed, wounded, or evacuated to the rear as non-battle casualties.

YANG Kun (양근), Lt Col, CO, III Corps, Political Bureau.

KANG Yong Sa (강영사), Sr Lt, CO, III Corps, Political Bureau, Civil Affairs Section.

Personalities in III Corps Hq are limited because PW was captured less than two weeks after being assigned to Corps.

PW had no knowledge concerning replacement troops.

Communist Youth Groups organized in newly occupied areas are indirect sources of replacements. Communist Youth Organizations are generally organized into guerilla units operating independently in the rear of UN Forces.

PW heard that III Corps Rear Service Unit draws the bulk of its ammunition supply from the supply dumps located at HWACH’ON and KUMHWA. When passed through KUMHWA (o/a 5 Feb 51), saw several trucks being loaded with small arms ammo.

Food was procured locally. Collection of food was made by Corps Civil Affairs Section, which, in turn, turned it over to III Corps Supply Bureau for distribution.

A reserve of 3 days ration was always kept on hand by III Corps for its lower units. This ration was to be used only when local procurement was not available.

Up to the date of capture (23 Feb 51) food was sufficient, although not plentiful.

III Corps receives resupply of ammo twice since Nov 50; once, while at CHISAN DONG, and once, at AMBYON enroute to KUMHWA.

Captured UN ammo and weapons were shipped to the rear for distribution to units other than III Corps units.

III Corps equipped with weapons of Russian origin only.

Estimates that about 10% of supplies flowing to III Corps are destroyed by UN aircraft.

Heard (rumored among newly arrived troops) that supply trains were operating as far as SIN’GOSAN (CU6303).

Supply route of III Corps passes through the following towns:

SIN’GOSAN (CU 6303)

HOEYANG (CT 7885)

KUMHWA (CT 6538)

CHUNCHON (CS 8894)

HONGCH’ON (DS 0372)

HOENGSONG (DS 1149)

PANGNIM MYON (DS 3446)

23 Feb 51, heard from his CO that new issues of clothing were to be made within a week. Present condition of clothing worn by troops was bad and in critical need of replacement.

Only types of communication equipment used by III Corps are field telephones and wireless sets.

Wireless is used as far down as Bn level.

Morale of troops in III Corps and its elements depends on whether the soldier is a:

(1) Communist Party member

(2) Officer

(3) youth or Labor Organization member

(4) South Korean Conscript

South Korean conscripts (between 50 - 60 % of the entire III Corps) have the lowest morale.

Greatest blow to morale of III Corps and its element was the NK Higher Commands’ promise of occupation duty in SEOUL which has failed to materialize.

Battle effectiveness of III Corps and its elements is considered to be low as compared to most North Korean units because of the following reasons:

(1) Between 50 to 60% of the troops are South Koreans who were conscripted in the SEOUL area during NK occupation.

(2) Most troops have never seen combat.

(3) Troops do not have confidence without artillery and armor support.

(4) Troops feel that when their present ammo supply is exhausted, flow of new supplies will be limited to such an extent that they will not be able to put up an effective fight.

(5) An increase of desertions after crossing the 38th Parallel.

US and UN PW other than ROK PW, if captured by North Koreans, are turned over to CCF for internment.

Captured ROK PW will be held in North KOREA and will be given political indoctrination, and, if converted, will be integrated into the NKA.

Typhus first struck III Corps and its elements o/a about 20 Jan 51. An average of 2 men from every Bn were ill due to typhus.

Lack of medical facilities and drugs prevented immunization and other measures to effectively control the disease.

To prevent spread of disease following counter measures have been taken:

Limited use of captured DDT for de-lousing.

Boiling of clothes and sleeping material.

Freezing of clothes and sleeping material.

Steam treatment of clothing and sleeping material.

PW was captured and had not seen UN leaflets.

Enemy psychological warfare is conducted by the Propaganda Section of the Political Bureau.

Leaflets distributed by the Propaganda Section are of two main types. First type is intended for UN troops and its contents are identical to the ones printed by UN Forces.

Second type is intended for distribution to civilians in newly occupied areas to incite the populace to revolt and wage organized guerrilla warfare.

For the AC of S, G-2: