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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 2758　27 Dec 1950

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI-1273)　29 Nov 1950

(Ref to ATIS Rpt Nos 2745 and 2737)

Cooperative. PW appeared in good physical condition. PW is unusually alert and excellent memory for details. As he is well educated by ordinary standards in the Orient and has had a great deal of military training and experience, he is able to comprehend the many military activities that he had an opportunity to participate in.

Information is considered to be very accurate and reliable.

66th Army is composed of the 196th, 197th and 198th Divisions plus Mountain Arty Regt, Guard Bn, Combat Engineer Bn (no heavy equipment), Signal and Recon Co, and Medical Bn.

There is a Transportation Regiment made up entirely of horses and wagons attached to the 66th Army which is available to all divisions under the 66th Army upon demand.

A schematic diagram of the 66th Army organization is as follows:

196th Div is composed of the 586th, 587th and 588th Regts plus Mountain Artillery Bn, Guard Bn, Signal Co, Recon Co.

197th Div is composed of the 589th, 590th and 591st Regts plus Mountain Arty Bn, Guard Bn, Signal Co, Recon Co.

198th Div is composed of the 592nd, 593rd and 594th Regts plus Mountain Arty Bn, Guard Bn, Signal Co, Recon Co.

Each Mountain Arty Bn is composed of 2 Mt Arty Batteries and Heavy Mortar Battery.

Each Mt Arty Btry is composed of 3 Platoons with 2 Mt Arty pieces in each platoon.

Each Heavy Mortar Btry is composed of 3 platoons with 2 to 3 mortars in each platoon.

590th Regt is composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Rifle Bns, plus 1 x 82mm Mortar Co, AT Co, Guard Co, and Communications - Recon - Military Police Platoon. Each Rifle Bn is composed of 3 Rifle Companies and Heavy Weapons Co.

The 197th Div has a total of 80 Koreans. These Koreans serve as interpreters and joined the division from both the North Korean civilian populace and the NKA after the division entered Korea.

The 197th Div has one Japanese who has the CCF rank of Captain and served as an instructor on (heavy mortar) conduct of fire.

PW is positive that the 66th Army is intact and under the same chain of command now as it was prior to crossing the YALU River into KOREA because he frequently saw data on the activities of the Army since he was stationed at 590th Regt Hq.

No parts of the 66th Army have been integrated into Korean units.

The 66th Army was part of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, Hwapei (North China) Army, 20th Army Group (中國人民解放軍野戰二十兵團) until the 66th Army departed from T’IENCHING (TIENTSIN) on 22 Oct 50 for ANTUNG. The 20th Army Group was composed of the 66th, 67th, and 68th Armies until that time. After the 66th Army entered Korea it became subordinate to the Korea Support Army which is in turn subordinate to the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army. At present it is planned that the 66th Army will return to the 20th Army Group when the war against the ROK and UN Forces in Korea is over.

The 197th Div is astride the road leading north from TAECHON (YE1322). The main body is about 8 km north of TAECHON.

The 196th Div is approx 4 Km northeast of TAECHON.

The 198th Div is approx 9 Km north of TAECHON.

The 66th Army CP is located in an unidentified village approx 12 Km northeast of TAECHON.

The 66th Army intends to use tactics of enveloping the three sides of the US Force opposing it. The 66th Army plans to cut off the rear of the US Force, then complete the encirclement of the US force, thereby opening the way for the destruction of the US force from four sides.

The north boundary of the 66th Army is 15 Km north of TAECHON. Immediately north of the 66th Army is the 39th Army whose northern boundary is 18 to 20 Km north of TAECHON. The 38th and 40th Armies are spread out over an unknown distance west of the RR running from KUJANG-DONG (YE 5627) to KANGGYE. Many of the 38th and 40th Army personnel are concentrated in the general vicinity of KUNU-RI (YD 5098). The 50th and 42nd Armies are probably located along and on the flanks of the RR from SINUIJU to the point of contact with UN forces.

The 66th Army is making no immediate preparations for attack but is waiting to seize any opportunity if the Americans proceed into the trap.

Personnel of the 197th Div are entrenched in a series of trenches on both sides of the roads leading north of TAECHON. Below the shoulders of the roads on both sides, are demolition groups with bangalore torpedoes and TNT. Personnel have dug 2 meter deep foxholes and trenches which are carefully camouflaged with shrubs from the local terrain. These foxholes and trenches have been dug deep in order to afford better protection against UN air attacks. AT guns have been placed at strategic locations near road bends, junctions and intersections. The mountain artillery pieces are scattered over hills covering terrain corridors.

Entered the Chinese Nationalist Military Army on 15 Aug 42 at ANHWEI SHENG, FU-YANG (安徽省■■■■■■) and transferred to the CNA’s # 8 Military Academy at HUPEH SHENG, CHUN HSIEN (湖北■■■■) in Dec 43 because the school at FU-YANG was over-crowded.

Transferred to the # 7 Military Academy (because # 8 Academy was deactivated) at SHI-AN (西安) in Aug 44, and graduated on 18 Sep 46 at which time PW was commissioned as a 2nd lt, Inf, CNA.

Appointed instructor of sqd tactics for a battalion of the 92nd Army (CNA) at PEIPING (PEKING) on 10 Oct 46.

Transferred to garrison duty as a Plat Ldr (in the 92nd Army) at TIENCHING (TIENTSIN).

Transferred to the position of Plat Ldr in a Transportation Bn at TIENCHING during May 48.

Appointed as a 92nd Army (CNA) Communications Staff Officer and transferred to PEIPING (PEKING) during Jul 48.

In Jan 49, when all CNA forces at PEIPING “surrendered” to the CCF by joining the CCF, PW was inducted into the CCF (197th Div) and appointed as Education Staff Officer for the 590th Regt. At that time the majority of the personnel in the 66th Army were composed largely of guerrillas from HOPEH SHENG (河北省北京) and SHANSI SHENG ING-HSIEN (山西省■縣).

Departed from PEIPING (PEKING) in March 49, marched with the entire 66th Army, and arrived at TAI-YUAN (山■大原) during April 49. There, the 20 th Army Group fought the CNA. By May 49, the 20th Army Group had defeated the CNA forces at TAI-YUAN.

Departed from TAI-YUAN during May 49, marched with the entire 20th Army Group, and arrived at SHANSI-SHENG, TA-TUNG (山西大同) during May 49.

Departed from TA-TUNG during June 49, by train with the entire 20th Army Group, and arrived at TIENCHING (TIENTSIN) during Jun 49.)

From Aug 49 to Dec 49 all personnel in the 20th Army group were required to take basic training. This training consisted chiefly of close order drill and instruction in the manual of arms.

From Dec 49 until March 50, all personnel received training in marksmanship and service of the piece with small arms. Each soldier fired a total of 15 rounds on the rifle range.

From March 50 until Aug 50, the majority of the 20th Army Group personnel farmed the land in the vicinity of T’IENCHING (TIENTSIN).

In Aug 50, after the harvesting of 20th Army Group crops, the 20th Army weeded out its personnel by discharging all EM over 35 yrs of age.

In Sep 50, personnel and equipment were transferred from CCF units all over CHINA from units that were over strength to units that were under T/O & E strength.

The PW claims that this was not in preparation for war but merely a redistribution of uniformity of the armed forces.

Departed from TIENCHING (TIENTSIN) on 22 Oct 50, by train with the entire 66th Army and arrived at ANTUNG on 24 Oct 50.

Departed from ANTUNG on 24 Oct 50, marched with the 197th Div over the automobile bridge across the YALU River, and arrived at SINUIJU during the night of 24 Oct 50.

Departed from SINUIJU on 24 Oct 50, marched (at night only) with the 197th Div and traveled via the following places:

Departed from KUMKOK-TONG during the night of 24 Nov 50, marched with the 589th Regt (PW did not march with his own regt, because the 589th Regt had the same objective but was taking a more direct route), and arrived at a point approx 2½ Km North of TAECHON whereupon PW decided to desert from the CCF and surrender to the UN forces on the chance that he might be sent by them to rejoin the CNA. After deserting, he walked about 5 Km directly south and surrendered to ROK troops at 250600 1 Nov 50.

As of 25 Nov 50, the 66th Army had received no replacements of men or equipment, but needed none as it had not yet been engaged in a major battle. As far as PW knows, replacements would only be sent in the event that the 66th Army falls in danger of being driven back across the Manchurian - Korean border.

LIN, Piao (林彪), CG, 4th Field Army.

NIEH, Yung Chen (聶榮■), CG, North China Area (HQ PEI-PING).

SU, Ching Huai (肅慶槐), CG, 66th Army.

LIU, Su (劉蘇), Chief of Staff, 66th Army.

WANG, Chai Feng (王枈鋒), Political Officer, 66th Army.

CHANG, (Fnu) (張), Asst Political Officer, 66th Army.

FAN, (Fnu) (范), Political Chairman, 66th Army.

CHUNG, Shao Fu (成少浦), CG, 197th Division.

CHANG, I Po (張一波), Asst CG, 197th Division.

CHUNG, Ping Chang (鐘炳昌), Political Chairman, 197th Division.

CHAO, Pei-Chang (趙沛章), C.O., 589th Inf Regt.

WANG, Cheng (王誠), C.O., 590th Inf Regt.

LIU, San-Hsiao (劉三孝), Political Officer, 590th Inf Regt.

LIU, Si-Kun (劉西崑), C. O., 591st Inf Regt.

KANG, Hung Hsun (抗洪勛), C.O., 1st Bn, 590th Inf Regt.

WANG, Kuo-Tank (王國堂), Exec Officer, 1st Bn, 590th Inf Regt.

WANG, Kuei (王貴), C.O., 2nd Bn, 590th Regt.

MENG, Shuang-His (孟双喜), Exec Officer, 2nd Bn, 590th Inf Regt.

LIU, Chuan-Lu (劉全■), C.O., 3rd Bn, 590th Inf Regt.

CHI, (Fnu) (祁), Exec Officer, 3rd Bn, 590th Inf Regt.

The 66th Army has never had any Soviet advisors.

While in China, 66th Army personnel had adequate food.

In Korea 66th Army personnel ate twice daily. Rations consisted of rice, corn, or sweet potatoes plus white cabbage or turnips. These were collected from North Korean towns and villages as the 66th Army brough only three day supply of rations when it departed from ANTUNG.

The 66th Army’s rear Echelon Unit was responsible for collection of food from town and village chiefs and for the distribution of this food to 66th Army units.

PW stated that ANTUNG, Manchuria, and TAP-DONG (approx 20 km Northwest of KUSONG), Korea have ammunition supply dumps and are ammo, distribution points. PW stated that the 197th Division’s Rear Echelon Unit plans to receive ammo from TAP-DONG in the future.

In general, the morale of 66th Army personnel is low.

PW surrendered for the following reasons:

(1) Language difficulty in Korea

(2) Unfamiliar terrain

(3) Terrain is too mountainous for employment of troops on a large scale.

(4) Supply difficulties seemed insurmountable.

(5) Morale of 66th Army is hopelessly low.

Signal equipment used by the 66th Army is in good condition and is mostly of US manufacture.

Observed 3 US PsW on 8 Nov 50 being led through the streets of CHABOK-TONG (YE 0128) in a northward direction by two NKA soldiers.

PW read a report that the 38th Army had captured many (number unknown) in the vicinity of UNSAN (YE 3928).

PW does not know what policy the 66th Army has for the treatment of US PsW but supposes that they would be given fair treatment and sent to China or the USSR because the CCF has no place presently available in Korea to establish a large PW Camp.

The following are code numbers designating various officers positions in the 66th Army:

PW was tested with a lie-detector at G-2 office with the resulting reaction in his favor.

PW insisted that Communist Armies operate in pairs, i.e. the 66th and 39th, the 38th and 40th, and 42nd and 50th.

PW insists that the 66th Army is part of the North China Area Command with headquarters at PEKING. PW claims that he does not know who is the overall commander in Korea. However, he stated that prior to leaving for Korea, MAO, Tse Tung (毛澤東), CHOU, En Lai (周恩來), and CHU Teh (朱德), the three top Communists in China gave all orders effecting Military movements or actions.

PW insists that CHIH-Tui (支隊) is not the name of any particular unit, for example; “9 CHih - Tui (9支隊)” is not the name of a particular unit but the position of a unit in depth. For example:

No one in the communist army dares to complain in public or among friends as secret agents are always around.

Soldiers in the communist army are not allowed to congregate nor are they allowed to contact friends.

PW is not a volunteer for Korean service, but all CCF units are supposed to be volunteer units. PW was not instructed to appear to be a volunteer in the event of capture.

The 66th Army has not undergone amphibious training and did not participate in the invasion of HAINAN Island.

Pay grades in the 66th Army were as follows:

* Since inflation increases rapidly in China, pay varies in proportion to the rise and fall of prices.

Communist Party members usually receive a little higher pay than non-members of the same rank.

The CCF has no Japanese units according to PW.

PW knows of no CCF units with Soviet equipment.

The CCF has armored units. PW read about and saw pictures of an Armored Division that paraded through PEIPING (PEKING) on 1 Oct 50.

PW knows of no paratroops being in the CCF.

According to the PW, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister CHOU, En-lai stated o/a 15 Oct 50 that the CCF is in Korea for the following reasons:

(1) To obtain peace throughout the world.

(2) To return the favor that the NKA gave China when the NKA previously assisted in the “liberation of China.”

(3) To fight the “Imperialists Association” that is formed in the UN under U.S. leadership and to fight it by uniting into the “Democratic Association” consisting of all nations that are not suppressed by capitalistic imperialism.

CNA soldiers and equipment captured in Manchuria were integrated into the CCF units capturing them, then later, redistributed throughout the CCF in order to make all units have a uniform T/O & E.

PW insists that the CCF has no unit called the “Iron and Steel Brigade”.

PW stated that the 66th Army has no radar equipment.

FOR THE AC OF S, G-2: