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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 4167　23 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (521 MISDI 0537)　14 March 1951

Since conscripted in YONGDOK, wanted to desert and return home. Prior to desertion, suffered from bruises received from Brig beater and influenza. Remained in the village of SONGGOL (DS 3462) on 4 Mar 51 while his unit departed northward and later surrendered to UN Forces.

Cooperative and expressed his happiness at being under UN hands. Although the beatings he received from the guerrilla beater (See personalities) bothered him immensely, he readily replied to questions and voluntarily gave information.

Length of Service: 5 3/4 mos

Education: Primary School (6 yrs)

Physical Condition: Suffering from bruises.

Reliability: Good

(1) 1st Guerrilla Brig: (1,100 men)

1st, 2d, and 3d Bn, Recon Co, and Liaison Plat

(2) Brig Staff:

CG, C/S, G-2, G-3, Political Officer & Liaison Officer (6 officers)

(3) Becon Co: (30 men)

(4) Liaison Plat: (15 men)

(1) Ammo: Very scarce; no resupply observed

(2) Clothes: No issue.

(3) Medicine: None. Wounded guerrillas were left in care of villages.

(4) Food: Limited. Since guerrillas were propagandists, they were extremely careful with their language and attitude towards civilians. Members do not pillage or demand food. The usual procedure of procuring food is; first, they will ask if villagers have any food to sell; but farmers always reply with a negative answer.

Farmers yield to their requests, however, because of fright.

1st Guerrilla Brig: “PTAEBAEY. SAN”

1st Bn: #982

2d 〃　#120

3d 〃　#450

(1) LEE, Jong Myun

30, 5’8”, CG, 1st Guerrilla Brig

YOU, Man Su

25, 5’7½”, Liaison Officer

(2) Beaters (3 men):

These men are charged with punishing the troops whenever disciplinary action should be taken. They are temper-mental, rough and will not take any back-talk from anyone. Usually during movement, they follow the column and push and hustle men to move faster. If men do not comply, even if they are sick, beaters would mercilessly hit and strike the men with anything he ca pick up (preferring poles or rocks).

(3) Propaganda Instructors

A designated instructor is placed in each platoon. He indoctrinates and maintains sharp surveillance over his men.

(4) Propaganda Leaders

Propaganda leaders, working directly under the brigade officer, are charged with supervising the battalion mission of spreading propaganda to local civilians.

(5) Female Guerrillas

Girls (Age 17 to 25) are charged with handling the female civilians, with same duties as the propagandists.

Guerrilla primary mission is to follow front-line units and spread propaganda to every sizeable village. They keep close contact with combat divisions and conduct the following functions:

(1) To organize the People’s Committees (Communist)

(2) To select and designate leaders who are instructed to carry out the dissemination of propaganda. Propaganda was: UN Forces are your enemy; hinder their operations; don’t be cooperative.

Whenever a newly organized committee begins to function smoothly and no further guidance is needed, these guerrilla units will leave for new areas. Guerrillas are not committed into action except when reconnaissance patrols are sent. In order to secure maximum results, guerrillas are extremely careful in their behavior and language; never commit atrocities.

Their clothes do not differ from local civilians except the fact that some of them wear US “Ike” jackets, fatigue jackets, or field jackets, over their normal clothing. Officers and EM dress alike.

Their movements commence after darkness and never during daylight. They march in a single file with no interval between man. The order of movement is as follows:

(1) Reconnaissance Company

(2) 1st Battalion

(3) Brig Hq with Service Troops and another battalion

(4) Last Battalion

(5) Beaters

Because of the beaters at the rear of column and the close surveillance by the propaganda leaders, there was no chance of escaping during movement. Even during the act of discharging human waste, these leaders stood beside the men and watched them.

Five guards were posted in front of each battalion and two near the brig headquarters on a 24 hour basis. Each day, one company took the charge of being the guard company for that day, and was relieved around sunset by the following company. By numerical order, e.g., 1st, 2d, 31 Co followed by the next company of next battalion, the guard company was rotated. Each day the company commander chose 33 men from his company with exception of sick and reported, together with the present guard company, to the Brig CG. These guard mounts were brief: CG would assign the responsibility to the new Guard Co and release the old.

When the new guard company assumed its duties, reliefs would be designated and guards posted on two hours shifts. When the weather was extremely cold, there were one hour reliefs. During challenges at night, two types of signs and counter-signs were used. One was place names. Sentry would shout, “SEOUL!”; replied with “KIMPO” and so on. The other was numerals, used in such a manner that the total would come to 20 or 30, which-ever the case may be. Guard “10”; challenged person “15”; when total of 25 is used. When civilians were caught, they were held over-night in the guard room and released in the morning without questioning. If their own men replied with a false counter-sign, or do not know it, then a careful check would be made to clarify identity, e.g., the culprit will be taken to his own unit to be identified by his commander. When the NK soldier had a US weapon and not the ordinary Russian weapon, then he would be detained until his identity was verified. However, NK troops were judged by their appearance, weapons, and dialect.

Because majority of guerrillas (like PW) are former South Koreans who were forcibly recruited into this organization, morale was very low. Their conscience bothered them; their every day life as a guerrilla was hateful; their principles were entirely different; and they were constantly subjected to beatings by the beaters.

Since leaving North KOREA no replacements were received, and no one recruited since entering South KOREA.

No one in the brigade, not even the brig CG had a map. Their directions were found through using local civilians as guide from one location to another. In every movement or when information was needed pertaining to a certain area, they asked local people for the directions.

No matter how often their locale changed, close communications with various divisions and corps headquarters were maintained through runners. Whenever Corps Hq contemplated moving, word was received through runners (from Corp Hq) to send 5 runners from the Guerrilla Brig, and they will in turn report to Corps Hq and remain with them until Hq moves to new location, then, they will string-out at various points so as to make the tracks easier to find. Because they had no wireless or any type of communication equipment, such practical methods were enforced.

Ordinarily, simple oral messages were dispatched to subordinate units of the brigade, e.g., designated time of departure; where breaks during march would be held, etc.

For the AC of S, G-2: