ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 4164 23 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (521 MISDI - 0534) 12 March 1951
| NAME: | KAN, Tae Bong |
| AGE: | 24 |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| UNIT: | 6th Div, 13th Regt, 2d Bn, Aid Sta (NKA) |
| DUTY: | Sqd Ldr, aidman |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 7 Mar 51, DS 275487 |
| CAPTURED BY: | 9th US RCT |
Attitude: PW seemed relieved and contented he is now safely in UN hands and spoke out frequently of how miserable the NK lived and expressed regrets when US places could not find the concentrated area of enemy (NKA) troops. Since and tried his best in answering the questions.
Length of Service: ROKA - 28 mo.
CCF - 28 days.
NKA - 77 days.
Education: 8 yr (Higher Primary School) - JAPAN.
Physical Condition: Good
Reliability: Good
Circumstance of Capture: 011500 Dec 50, in vic north of YONGWON NK the remnants of 2d Bn (30 men) including the CO and training officer were surrounded by a group of 12 CCF troops and captured. Earlier, 21st Regt was completely disorganized when CCF attacked through 8th ROK Div zone. Was turned over to NK 6th Div 20 Dec 50 at YONGWON.
Circumstance of Escape: Not entrusted with free movements unguarded, however, on this rare occasion when litter bearers were requested from co, PW was dispatched to the front lines in vic of Hill 630 (DS 2749) alone. During darkness he escaped 072200 Mar 51 and entered UN lines safely; surrendered to elements of 9th US RCT.
a. Organization & Strength: (as of 7 Mar 51)
| Unit: | Strength: |
| 2d Bn, 13th Regt: | Orig - 366 (30 Jan) Press - 263 (7 Mar) |
| 4th Co | 44 |
| 5th Co | 54 |
| 6th Co | 50 |
| HMG Co | 19 |
| Mortar Co | 22 |
| Bn Hq Trp: | |
| Bn Commander | Maj |
| Sr Ex Off (G-2) | Capt |
| Cultural Off | Capt |
| Mil Affairs Off | Capt |
| Army Sec Agents | 2 Capt - on DS from Div Hq. |
| Chief Clerk | M/Sgt |
| Clerk | M/Sgt |
| Runners | 2 Cpl |
| Bn Service Trp: | |
| Comm Plat | 21 (1 Sr Lt) |
| Supply Plat | 13 (1 Lt) |
| AT Plat | 26 (1 Sr Lt) |
| Bn Aid Station | 4 (2 M/Sgt & 2 litter bearers; aidmen) |
b. Weapons, Equipment & Duty:
| Unit: | Weapons: |
| Inf Co Troops: | Russ DP LMG, 94 rd ea, (2 drums) (1 or 2) Jap LMG. |
| EM | Russ M-1891 (30) rifles: 90% w/100 rd ea. |
| Russ 7.62mm carbine: 10% | |
| Sqd Ldr | PPSH SMG M-1941 |
| Plat Ldr | Russ M-1891 (30) rifles: 100% w/300 rd ea. |
| up | Russ TT-1933 pistols: 100% w/40 rd ea. (5 magazines) |
| F-1 Defensive grenades: 4-5 ea. | |
| HMG Co: | HMG, US Cal 30 water-cooled w/500 rd ea. (2 cases) LMG, w/500 rd (2 cases) |
| Mortar Co: | (4) 82mm M-1937 Bn Mortar w/30 shells. |
| This Co is the only line outfit which is part of Bn Hq Service Troops. Ordinarily mortars are used only when battle thickens because of very limited ammo supply. High ground, preferably the peaks of mt are used as positions where targets can be seen clearly. It is said for this reason, their mortar attacks are highly accurate and effective. Their operations are very smooth: Each crew em-places their mortars on crest of hills; fire every round; observe the effect; then withdraw to the rear immediately. | |
| UN counter-batteries are non-effective since their operations are done so swiftly. | |
| AT Plat: | 14.5mm Simonov AT rifle w/AP-incendiary bullets. |
| RPG-1943 Heat Hand grenade. | |
| (4-5) F-1 Defensive hand grenades. | |
| Tactics used by this group are to get as close as possible or await for on-coming tanks and hurl the heat grenades. Only in rare cases, their small arms are used. | |
| Comm Plat: | (3) US Field phones |
| Russ type field phone | |
| 1000 meters (ea man w/50 meters) comm lines. | |
| Responsibility of this platoon upon arrival to new location is to install comm lines between Bn CP and Co CP. Distance regardless of battle or normal conditions, is always 200 to 300 meters; never beyond that distance unless terrain conditions require it. EM are used as runners when wire communications are not available. Armed with US carbines with 100 rd of ammo; 5-6 F-1 Defensive hand grenades. | |
| Supply Plat: | This plat consists of the following sections: |
| Supply Sgt | |
| Ammo & Weapons Sec Sgt | |
| Mess Sec 2 Sgt (cooks) | |
| Barber Cpl | |
| Since supplies are not carried at Bn level, other than delivering ammunitions to the frontline troops, members of this platoon were mainly occupied in foraging food from the villages; whenever time committed, this was their primary job. | |
| The 2 Mess Sgt, who are cooks for the Bn CP personnel are exempted from this food-search. They are always in the immediate vic of the Bn CP preparing food. | |
| The Sgt in charge of the Weapons and Ammo Section has a very simple job: Most always, during combat or after retreat, requisitions are made from Co CO to Bn CO; the requisition is approved by the Ex Off and Supply Off immediately dispatches a crew to pick up requested amount (no excess) from the Regt Supply. This requisition through proper channels is done orally, therefore, Sgt in charge of ammo, reports to Regt Supply, receives the amount and delivers the ammunition directly to the Co, who asked for resupply. This process usually takes 5 to 6 hours from the time the requisition is initiated till it is delivered. When large supply is requested, then oxen or farmers are recruited to transport it to the consignee. | |
| En Aid Station: | (8C) Russ battle dressing |
| (2) Misc medicines in kits | |
| Here at Bn Aid Station, secondary aid is rendered to wounded troops. First aid is administered at front line by co corpsman or by comrades and if the wounded can walk, he walks back to Bn Aid Station. If litter cases are reported from Co, then this information is relayed to the Regt Aid by phone and a crew of litter bearers are dispatched from the Regt to evacuate them to the rear (Regt), after they (wounded) are processed at the Bn Aid Station. Processing includes redressing, log the name, rank, age, and unit of casualties with detail information of wound, then evacuation to the rear. Daily report of casualties submitted to Bn CO. (Time of submission not specified; usually at the end of day.) Until 2 Mar 51, there was a doctor’ (Sr Lt), who supervised this Aid Station. However, this doctor was wounded by UN arty on 2 Mar 51, and evacuated. Until 7 Mar 51, replacement has not been received. Crew of this Aid Station were not armed. The doctor originally had a Soviet TT-1933 TOKAREV pistol; it was given to one of the corpsmen when he was evacuated. | |
| Reconnaissance: | There was no reconnaissance until attached to Bn Hq. Whenever an offensive was contemplated, a squad (7-8 men) was released from the Regt or Div Hq. These squads, upon completion of their patrols would report to the Bn S-2 then return to their parent units. |
c. Casualties: (2d Bn)
30 Jan 51 to 7 Mar 51, 13th Regt was committed on 3 occasions; one counter-attack against ROK in vicinity of KOK SAN (Mt), 4 km SE of CHUDONG-NI (DS 1549) - engagement ensued through 301400 Jan 51 to 010700 Feb 51 - resulted with failure to recapture KOK SAN; A delay type defensive action with the 22d ROK Regt on the saddle of Hills 617 and 689 (DS 247437) to defend SAMSONGGAE(DS 2444), commencing around night of 1 Mar 51 fill 050200 Mar 51; and the last defense of areas N of Hill 630 (DS 2749) against US 9th RCT C61830 Mar 51 until time (072200 Mar 51) when source surrendered to elements of 9th US RCT at DS 275487.
Total casualties during above engagements were estimated to be:
KIA - 20-30
WIA - 70-80
MIA - 2-3
Majority of these casualties were inflicted by UN arty barrages with smaller percentage by air bombardments.
d. Personalities: (2d Bn)
Security Agents: (POI-BU 保衛部)
Their jurisdiction includes both military and civil affairs. Although there were 2 Captains attached to 2d Bn, its Hq was in Div level or higher. They are distinguished by their navy blue breeches with red pipings, wearing cotton-quilted winter coats as outer garments.
Agents investigate all subversive acts, discipline of troops, even empowered with authority to criticize unit commanders.
e. Code Name:
13th Regt - #482 (Formerly #657 - renumbered on 25 Feb 51)
u/i Regt - ? (Formerly #661 - renumbered on 25 Feb 51)
2d Bn - CHOLLA-DO (全羅道) * permanent code name.
f. Selection of Locale of Bn CP:
(1) During combat:
When conditions are favorable, the Bn CP will always be situated 200 to 300 meters to the rear of Co CP. Usually dense wooded area or crests of hills are chosen for location. When it is contemplated that a defense will be made large caves at foot of hills or large trenches (Square: 2½ x 1½ m; Depth: 1.2m) will be dug at crest of hills then covered with frame and dirt about a foot thick.
(2) During movement: (advance or retreat)
Bn movements are carried out in the following manner:
Movements are not started until darkness and ends before sunrise. Troops will walk in a single file with no intervals when marching through the hills and 2-3 meters in the open. When objective is reached troops will occupy every village house till dawn, have breakfast then take to the hills for cover. When objective is not reached by dawn, troops will first have breakfast then hide on wooded hills.
Loose defense perimeters are common during these periods.
Movements are not resumed until the following night unless their positions are detected by ground troops, or when they are subjected to air attacks.
g. Suggestions by PW:
(1) What to do during day-light in order to increase NK casualties:
If, concentrated arty barrage and air bombardments can be directed on every wooded area immediately to the rear of frontlines (NK side), casualty rates of NK would increase immensely because those are the places where NK troops are concentrated. If depth of concentrated barrages can be approx 10 km from the frontlines, it would be most effective.
(2) What to do during night in order to increase NK casualties:
Same as above except with all villages as targets. During darkness, troops will always descend from the hills for warmer shelter and also use the houses to prepare their meals.
For the AC of S, G-2:
MURANAKA
