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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 4114　22 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (163-MISDI-0323)　9 March 1951

(Atchd 1st Mar Div)

Captured when American Forces attacked and overran company’s positions vicinity DS1352. Remained in his position while other troops withdrew. Cooperative, but military information limited.

PW was told by platoon leader that mission of 197th Div was to defend present line until reinforcement come from the rear. A large armored force was expected to come within 20 to 30 days, whereupon the offensive would be launched.

(1) Original Strength: When entered KOREA, Nov 50.

197th Div: approximately 8000

590th Regt: approximately 2500

(2) Present Strength: 8 Mar 51

590th Regt: approximately 1000

3d Bn: 260

8 Mar 51, majority of 3d Bn were deployed in vicinity of DS1358.

Code Names: 589th Regt - #24 unit

590th Regt - #25 unit

591st Regt - #26 unit

Served with CCF since 1948.

Nov 50 - 66th Corps entered KOREA.

Early Feb 51 - Arrived HWACHON, North KOREA. Spent two days before moving S across 39th Parallel. 196th Div departed first, followed by 198th and 197th Div.

21 Feb 51 - 590th Regt engaged American Forces for the first time. Regt passes through HOENGSONG, but was later forced to withdraw. PW platoon was then deployed in vicinity of DS1352 along with two other platoons for defense. Troops remained there until American Forces attached and overran their positions 8 Mar 51.

1 x 82mm mortar with 36 rd

6 x 60 mm mortars with 30 rd each

5 HMG with 5000 rd each

15 LMG with 1200 rd each

300 hand grenades per rifle company

30 anti-tank grenades per rifle company

Telephone communication utilized down to companies.

Flares were used, but PW had no knowledge of how or when.

Wireless transmitters possessed by each regt hq for communication only with higher hq.

Regt used horses for transporting supplies, while division used trucks.

Troops seldom had rice to eat. Flour and corn supplies come frequently.

Shelter is usually taken in deep foxholes in mountain which are camouflaged with dirt and grass.

Medical facilities are lacking. Wounded are treated with whatever medicine available and quickly taken to the rear.

No additional clothing supply since entering KOREA.

50% of troops do not care to fight but are helplessly doing so because of fear of their leaders.

Artillery barrage is most feared by troops. Recent artillery fire has been accurate and has taken heavy toll of troops.

UN propaganda leaflets were not so effective among the troops because about 50% cannot read them and even these able to read seldom have chance to desert their units.

For the AC of S, G-2: