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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 4071　16 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1667)　7 March 1951

Cooperative during interrogation. Prior experience as an officer in the CNA plus several months as member of CCF failed to assist him in disclosing information.

Portions of the report may be considered fairly reliable, whereas, other portions must be accepted with qualifications.

Inducted into CNA 92d Army, Artillery Battalion, 2d Co, at HUNAN SHENG, TAO YUAN HSIEN during Apr 45. Assigned to the CNA 92d Army, 56th Div, Arty Bn at HOPEI SHENG, SANHO HSIEN (河北省 三河縣) Nov 46. Received a course on artillery observation until Jan 47.

Apr 47 to Oct 47 received basic artillery training at HOPEI SHENG, T'ANG SHEN SHIH (河北省 唐山市).

Mar - Oct 48, attended the CNA No. 1 Military Training School (北平市 第一軍官訓鍊班) at PEIPING. Basic Infantry courses were studied and upon graduation became a 2d Lt and assigned as an artillery range calculator for the 1st Btry, Arty Bn, 56th Div (CNA).

Nov 48, detailed as a supply officer to the Arty Bn, 56th Div.

Dec 48, transferred to the 2d Btry, Artillery Battalion, 56th Division as Executive Officer.

Jan 49 at PEIPING General FU, TSO I (侍作儀), CG of the CNA 92nd Army, defected with his command to CCF.

Feb 49, 56th Div absorbed into CCF 66th Army. PW assigned as a supply officer (1st Lt) to be 2nd Bn, Arty Regt, 66th Army.

Army departed PEIPING on foot Feb 49 and arrived at HOPEI SHENG, SHUN-I SHIEN (河北省 順義縣) 1 March 49.

Departed SHUN-I SHIEN on foot 31 Mar 49. Arrived and immediately departed SHAN HSI SHENG, TAI YUAN by train and arrived at TIEN CHIN (天津) May 49.

Next four months, 66th Army assisted in farming and conducted artillery practice. During this period PW transferred to the 6th Btry, 2d Bn, Artillery Regiment as Executive Officer.

10 Mar 50, while the unit was still at TIENCHIN, PW deserted and returned to PEIPING, only to be apprehended and sent back for confinement at the 66th Army Hq. He was released, and placed in a Training Battalion for indoctrination, to which he took very little interest.

15 Jul 50, reassigned to the 9th Btry, 3d Bn, Arty Regt, 66th Army as a Training Officer. (Claims that being assigned in this position made him equivalent to a plat ldr which was a reduction in rank).

Aug 50, again placed under confinement for planning to desert.

66th Army then proceeded to ANTUNG, arriving there 22 Sep 50. He was escorted under guard to rejoin his unit but discovered 196th Division had already entered KOREA Sep 50, and 197th and 198th Divisions entered Oct 50.

Dec 50, he was taken as far as KUMHWA (CT6039), where again caught plotting an escape; this time condemned to death. Believes he is alive because the CG who came from his province took pity on him.

3 Feb 51, in South KOREA, he was assigned to 1st Plat, 1st Co, 1st Bn, 591st Regt, 197th Div, 66th Army as a rifleman.

PW deserted and voluntarily surrendered to 1st Marine Division 2 Mar 51 at TOKCH'ON NI (DS1252).

1st and 3d Companies, 1st Battalion Headquarters of 591st Regiment were located in Vicinity of TOKCH'ON NI (DS 1252). 3d Battalion of 591st Regiment reported to have been annihilated SSW of TOKCH'ON NI.

2d Battalion of 589th Regiment located east of TOKCH'ON NI. Further east, 590th Regt and the 198th Division were located.

589th Regiment located west of TOKCH'ON NI. Further west were the 196th Division, 38th Army and the 42d Army.

East of the 198th Division was the III NK Corps.

Engineer Battalion of 39th Army constructed MG positions and trenches for 1st Co, of 1st Bn, 591st Regiment at above location.

Mission was to defend their present position. All units listed above will defend their position regardless of odds against them until reinforcements arrive.

Attack would commence as soon as reinforcements arrived.

Company deployed in a hill in vicinity of TOKCH'ON NI in following manner. On the highest level were the HMG, on the next lower ridge in front of them were the LMG. Then the infantry was dug in to the front of the LMG positions.

Could not give any specific location of any weapons but there is no specific distance between the various positions. With the automatic weapons behind them the infantry would be reluctant to retreat.

c. T/O & E and Strength of Units Of: HUAPEI CHUN CHU (HUAPEI ARMY DISTRICT) 20th Army Group, 66th Army, 197th Div, 591st Regt, 1st Bn, 1st Co, 1st Plat, 3d Sqd. (2 Mar 51)

CODE NAMES (In KOREA)

66th Army: FENGHUA PU (奉化部)

196th Division: 41 PU (部)

197th Division: 42 PU (部)

198th Division: 43 PU (部)

Artillery Regt: 7 TA TUI (七大隊)

OP Section (指揮部): 1 TA TUI (一大隊)

196th Division:

586th Regiment - 21 PU (部)

587th Regiment - 22 PU (部)

588th Regiment - 23 PU (部)

197th Division:

589th Regiment - 24 PU (部)

590th Regiment - 25 PU (部)

591st Regiment - 26 PU (部)

198th Division:

592d Regiment - 27 PU (部)

593d Regiment - 28 PU (部)

594th Regiment - 29 PU (部)

Before crossing YALU River there were 3 Army Groups in HUAPEI CHUN CHU, (18th, 19th, 20th). At present 18th and 19th Army Groups are in 4th Field Army.

Believed that of the 20th Army Group only the 66th Army was engaged in KOREA. 67th Army Headquarters located at TANG SHAN SHIH (唐山市), CHINA; the 68th Army Headquarters located at CHANG CHIA KOU (張家口), CHINA.

66th Army: 196th, 197th, 198th Divisions Engineer Battalion, Signal Battalion, Cav Unit, Supply Section, Political Section, Security Guard Battalion, Artillery Regiment.

197th Division: 589th, 590th, 591st Regiments, Artillery Battalion, Engineer Battalion, Signal Battalion, Cav Unit, Supply Section, Political Section, Security Guard Battalion.

591st Regiment: 1st, 2d and 3d Rifle Battalions, Political Section, Supply Section, Signal Company, Guard Company, Mortar Company, Recon Company, Engineer Platoon.

1st Battalion: 1st, 2d and 3d Rifle Companies, Heavy Weapons Company. Signal Squad.

1st Company: 1st, 2d and 3d Rifle Platoons 60mm Mortar Platoon.

1st Platoon: 3 or 4 Rifle Squads.

SHAO Hsin Huai (肖新槐)

CG, 66th Army

CHEN (fnu)(陳)

Ass't CG, 66th Army

WANG' Tzu Peng (王朱逢)

Political Officer, 66th Army

CHANG Lien Kuei (張連奉)

Ass't Political Officer, 66th Army

LIU Su (劉蘚)

Chief of Staff, 66th Army

LO I Ching (羅一■)

Political Section Chief, 66th Army

PAI (fnu) (白)

Defense Section Chief, 66th Army

JEN Fu Kang (仁福康)

CO, Arty Regt, 66th Army

YUAN Tao (連導)

Ass't CO also Staff Officer, Arty Regt, 66th Army

LI Kai (李開)

Political Officer, Arty, Regt, 66th Army

TANG I (唐衣)

Political Section Officer, Arty Regt, 66th Army

SUNG Yuan Liang (宗圓亮)

Ass't Staff Officer, Arty Regt, 66th Army

LI Tih Wu (李■亞)

Ass't Battalion CO, also temporary Battalion CO, 2d Bn.

SHEN Fu Sheng (申福生)

Ass't Training Officer, 2d Battalion

TAN Hsien Cheng (譚星誠)

Company Commander, 6th Co, 2d Bn

LIU Chen Hai (劉振海)

Political Officer, 2d Company

CHOU Yun Sheng (周運生)

Plat Ldr, 1st Platoon

CHANG Ming Te (張明德)

Plat Ldr, 2d Plat

PAN Te Chih (潘德志)

Plat Ldr, 3d Plat

Replacements, although rumored, were not observed in PW unit since he came into KOREA.

PW issued a SMG and 1,500 rd of ammo Feb 51 when he joined 1st Co.

Received shoes three times while in KOREA, twice at KUMHWA in Dec 50, and once after crossing 38th Parallel.

While confined at KAMNONG NI (CT 6839) Dec - Feb 51, he observed trucks (believed from ANTUNG) arriving with 60mm, 81mm, 82mm Mortar shells, small arms ammo, and SMG ammo. These believed to be stored in tunnels in the vicinity.

Did not see any food arriving from CHINA. The food problem solved by stripping the various villages in the vicinity.

Runners were used for communication between company and battalion, and telephones to Regiment. For documents, messengers, from the Cavalry units were used. Ratio used between higher echelons.

PW once saw a white sign while marching (■). This sign was probably a route marker using the code number of the 591st Regt.

Morale in his Battalion low for the following reasons:

(1) The men did not know why they were fighting in KOREA.

(2) Lack of food.

(3) 65% of men in 66th Army former CNA troops.

Saw 7 or 8 UN prisoners night of 20 Feb 51. Although he was not definitely certain, he believed that these men were Americans and that they would probably be sent to PEIPING.

There were no epidemics, nor any immunizations or other precautions taken by the CCF since its arrival in KOREA.

About 2/3 of the men in the PW Company had frost bitten feet but no treatment administered.

Frostbite cases were forced to march regardless of their condition.

Voluntarily surrendered because disgusted with Communism and wanted to return home. Tried to desert the CCF Army three times.

Saw UN leaflets Feb 51 at TOKCH'ON NI.

UN leaflets said:

(1) “Chinese soldiers and officers, do you think you can fight against our planes and artillery with your body?”

(2) “Surrender and we will guarantee your safety”.

(3) “Your officers do not treat your frost bitten feet and hands; if you surrender we will apply medicine, place you in a hospital and give you warm food and clothing”.

(4) “Soldiers and officers, are you not former CNA soldiers? Although you are fighting for Communism, the communists themselves do not trust or believe in you”.

These four statements had a deep effect on most of the men. Believed in the leaflets, and after discussing leaflets with three others, decided it was the truth and that it was best to surrender.

(IN: The following information compiled thru the PW knowledge and experience as an artillery officer prior to his entry into KOREA).

66th Army, Artillery Regiment has the following types of artillery pieces:

25mm Mountain Gun, Model 94 (Japanese)

25mm Mountain Gun, Model 41 (Japanese)

75mm Mountain Gun, Model 38 (Chinese)

Model 38 (Chinese weapons) is slightly inferior to the others. The maximum range of these guns is 6,400 meters.

Artillery battery normally has 4 guns. Eighteen men usually had one gun. Although the basic load is 120 rounds of various types of ammunition, the quantity varies somewhat. Occasionally, trucks utilized to haul ammunitions.

Firing angles from 45 degrees to 75 degrees. Guns usually placed about 3000 meters behind front lines, the distance between guns varied according to the terrain.

They were dug in normally only just enough to make the foundation firm. Camouflage depended on the material at hand.

Machine guns usually placed on the perimeter of gun positions for security.

The guns usually fired at a vital sector of the enemy prior to an infantry attack.

PW could not definitely say whether primarily used on the defensive or offensive.

OP were near front lines with the Infantry, and recon units assisting in spotting targets. Runners were chiefly utilized for liaison.

Although artillery units had range finders and other fire control equipment, they seldom used them.

Heard rumors in Dec 50, some officers from all CCF Armies in KOREA (no political officers) went to SHENYANG (奉天) to be trained for a month on air-ground coordination. These officers said to have already returned to KOREA.

The defense of the present position is based on the promise that the 19th Army Group, which is composed of 3 Mechanized Armies (tanks) will be committed with CCF airplanes. All Armies in KOREA are supposed to hold their present positions until this additional support and reinforcement arrives.

Heard 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42d, 43d, 66th, 50th Armies and the 27th, 28th, 29th Armies of the 3d Field Army now engaged in KOREA.

For the AC of S, G-2: