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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 4069　21 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1702)　18 March 1951

The PW, a Korean, had been a resident of CHINA and volunteered in CCF for financial reasons.

PW was afraid and attempted to hide his identity at first, but upon realizing that he was not going to be beaten, he cooperated and spoke freely. He was alert and offered precise answers.

The information seems reliable.

PW volunteered into CCF, at TUNGHUA HSIEN LIN TZU TOU (通化縣林子頭) June 47. Received 3 months of infantry training and assigned to 42d Army, 125th Division, 374th Regt, HMG Company. Transferred to present unit Nov 47.

42d Army marched to MEI HO KOU (梅河口) Dec 47 and engaged in an 11-month battle in this area.

Marched to LINCHIANG (臨江) Jan 48 and engaged in regrouping and reorganization.

Marched to CH'AOYANG CHUAN (朝陽川) and arrived May 48.

Then marched to KAIYUAN (開原) arriving June 48, engaging in a 15-day battle.

Marched to CHINCHOU (銱州), arriving Sep 48, and battled for approx 20 days. It then marched and entered TUNJOU (phonetic), North CHINA, Nov 48, and engaged in training for approx 2 months.

Marched to KWANGTUNG SHENG (廣東省), arriving Jun 49, from where the Army boarded a train (after approx 2 months of rest) arrived HOPEI SHENG (河北省) July 49.

Here, 42d Army was engaged in regrouping and reorganization for approx 3 months.

374th Regiment departed by train and arrived MUKDEN Nov 49.

Departed by train and arrived ANTUNG (安東) Feb 50 and was engaged in further training until 18 Sep 50, when they departed for KOREA.

Feb 49, all divisions of 42d Army rejoined 42d Army at ANTUNG.

Between Feb 49 to 16 Sep 50, 42d Army (124th, 125th, and 126th Divisions) was at Mt CHIKUANSHAN (鷄冠山) (vicinity of ANTUNG) undergoing mountain warfare and infiltration training.

16 Sep 50, 125th Division departed for ANTUNG, followed by 124th and 126th Divisions on 17 Sep and 18 Sep 50.

At ANTUNG 125th Division remained at SSUMA LU (四馬路) for 24 days, where Division was issued 3 day ration, additional small arms, and ammo. PW was told that 42d Army was ordered to proceed to KOREA as volunteer unit 18 Sep 50.

20 Sep 50, 126th Division began to move across the YALU into SINUIJU at 1900 hours.

374th Rifle Regt was in the lead to followed by 373d and 375th Rifle Regiments. An unknown interval of marching time was maintained between Regiments, and the division completed its crossing by 210200 Sep 50.

21 Sep 50, 124th Division completed its crossing with 372d Rifle Regt in the lead, followed by 371st and 370th Rifle Regiments.

22 Sep 50, 126th Division crossed the YALU with 376th Regiment as advance unit, followed by 377th and 378th Rifle Regiments.

19 Sep 50, 374th Rifle Regt spent the day at UIJU (XE3051), and continued its march, passing through YONGSAN SI (XE5345). KUSONG (XE9033), and arrived TAECHON (YE1321) 23 Sep 50. The 373d and 375th Regiments followed the route taken by 374th Regt, maintaining an interval of 1 day march between regiments.

From TAECH'ON, 374th Regt marched to YONGBYON (YE4110). 125th Div, prior to entering combat, consolidated its 3 regiments in vicinity South of YONGBYON 27 Sep 50.

27 Sep 50, patrols of 125th Division made contact with US force in vicinity South of YONGBYON, and since they were outnumbered, 125th Division retreated Northward to Mt SANGGUDONG (YE4423), awaiting arrival of 40th Army to reinforce the 42d. 1 Nov 50, 40th Army's 119th Division arrived 4 km North of Mt SANGGUDONG.

23 Nov 50, 374th Regt marched southward with KAECH'ON as its objective. 375th Regt marched to SINUIJU and 373d Regt was in reserve.

29 Nov 50, 374th Regt made contact with US forces in vicinity of KAECH'ON (YD4898), resulting in withdrawal of US forces after a brief fire fight.

From KAECH'ON 374th Regt marched to SUNCH'ON (YD5388), without making contact with US forces.

3 Dec 50, 373d and 375th Regiments joined 374th Regiment at SUNCHON.

From SUNCH'ON, 125th Division marched south with 373d Regt in the lead (the interval between Regiments at that time was 4 km), passing through YULI (BU7305), SUAN (BT7187), SINGYE (BT8564), SIBYONNI (BT9942), and arrived MAJON NI (CT2311) 22 Dec 50 without making contact with UN forces enroute.

At SUAN, 1 Dec 50, 374th Regt came in contact with elements of 38th, 39th and 40th Armies.

Between 22 Dec 50 and 30 Dec 50, 125th Division and 350th Regt of 119th Division, 40th Army, were in MAJON NI, preparing to cross 38th Parallel.

31 Dec 50, 125th Division received orders for an all-out attack across 38th Parallel.

40th Army was located east of 42d Army, and the 39th on the west.

119th Div (40th Army) was west of 125th Div (42d Army), and 126th and 124th Divisions (42d Army) were on east flank of 125th Div.

1 Jan 51, CCF launched an all-out offensive along 38th Parallel. 125th Division crossed IMJIN River south of MAJON NI, under cover of darkness and advanced to TONGDUCHON (CS2999), arriving 2 Jan 51. During the offensive across 38th Parallel, a division sector was approximately 12 km in width.

Between 2 Jan 51 and 4 Jan 51, 3 Regiments of 125th Division reorganized at TONGDUCHON, prior to advancing further south.

4 Jan 51, 125th Division marched through UIJONGBU (CS2878) and arrived CH'ONGYANG-NI (in SEOUL) without making contact with UN Forces.

5 Jan 51, 125th Division was ordered to return to TONGDUCHON for resting, regrouping, and equipping because UN Forces had retreated across HAN River. PW heard that 38th and 40th Armies were also placed in reserve.

PW was told by company Political Officer that most CCF forces were to be withdrawn to the area along 38th Parallel for rest, and reorganization. He was told that this period of rest was to extend one month from 6 Feb 51 (Chinese New Year). During rest, the PW Regimental Commander and other Regimental Commanders departed for MUKDEN for the purpose of planning an all-out offensive to drive UN forces out of KOREA. During the absence of Regimental Commanders, Asst Regt commanders were placed in charge. The Regt Commanders were called back from MUKDEN 9 Feb 51, because UN forces began to advance forcing CCF to retreat with heavy losses.

6 Feb 51, 374th Regt (124th Div) marched to KAPYONG (CS6988), arriving 9 Feb 51, the purpose of this movement was to help delay the advance of UN Forces.

The PW Regt Commander returned to 374th Regt 9 Feb 51 at KAPYONG.

From KAPYONG, 374th Regt marched to CHIPYONG (CS8048) where it was reinforced by 373d and 375th Rifle Regiments. 11 Feb 51, 126th Division enveloped 1 US Regt and an unidentified unit. 13 Feb 51, a US tank led column made a break-through and forced 126th Division to retreat with heavy losses to YONGDU RI (CS8556).

126th Division spent about 5 days at YONGDU RI, reorganizing until it was forced to retreat to YANGDOG WON (CS9164).

The division was at YANGDOG WON until 22 Feb 51 in reorganization. 23 Feb 51, marched to HAJO HO (DS0587). 27 Feb 51, 126th Division was forced to retreat to SINBANGGOK (CS8865). At SINBANGGOK, prepared defensive positions. 2 Mar 51, 126th Division was attacked by UN Forces. Between 2 Mar 51 and 11 Mar 51, the 126th held its ground.

11 Mar 51 126th Division retreated north. 8 Mar 51 PW was ordered to take his sqd east of SINBANGGOK to procure rice for the company. Instead of going eastward, PW took his squad southward to OTOCHAE (　　) because he felt this was his opportunity to desert.

After spending 3 days at OTOCHAE the PW squad made contact with a US tank unit which fired before they could surrender. (3 WIA, and 4 KIA). PW surrendered 11 Mar 51.

125th Division Hq was 4 km N of SINBANGGOK (CS8864), as of 9 Mar 51.

374th Regt Hq was in SINBANGGOK, as of 9 Mar 51. The regiment was in defense positions on nearby mountains.

38th Army, 11 Mar 51, was in vicinity north of HAN River and east of UIJONGBU, extending as far as the PUKHAN River. 38th Army was reorganizing for 5th Phase Offensive.

39th Army on 11 Mar 51, was at 12 km east of SINBANGGOK. 1 Bn of 39th Army was on front line and main body was is the rear along 38th Parallel, reorganizing for 5th Phase Offensive.

66th Army, on 11 Mar 51, was west of UIJONGBU and north of SEOUL.

50th Army, 11 Mar 51, was in SEOUL.

58th Army, 11 Mar 51, (hearsay from Platoon Leader) was at western outskirts of SEOUL.

9 Mar 51, all officers and NCO of 734th Regt were briefed by a Regt Staff Officer on the following:

(1) Approximately 200,000 replacement troops are in P'YONGYANG area. These replacements were to be integrated into 42d, 41st, 50th, 38th, 39th and 66th Armies within 15 days.

(2) The present CCF retreat is a delaying action to provide ample time for reorganization and integration of newly-arrived replacements.

(3) 1 Mechanized Army Group, consisting of 3 Mechanized (Tank) Armies is enroute to KOREA and will arrive in time for 5th Phase Offensive.

(4) 5th Phase Offensive is to begin 15 days after 9 Mar 51 (o/a 25 Mar 51). The 5th Phase Offensive will be an all-out drive to PUSAN.

(5) CCF will use a large number of aircraft in conjunction with tanks and ground forces in 5th Phase Offensive.

10 Jan 51, all regimental commanders of 42d Army went to MUKDEN for a conference concerning 5th Phase Offensive.

42d Army: 124th, 125th and 126th Divisions, Arty Regt, Guard Co, Supply Section and Medical Section.

125th Div: 373d, 374th and 375th Regiments, Arty Bn, Medical Section, Supply Section, Telephone Plat and Recon Company.

374th Regt: 3 Rifle Battalions, Mortar Co, Arty Co, Recon-Signal Company, Supply Section and Guard Company.

Each Rifle Bn: 3 Rifle Companies and HMG Company.

Each Rifle Co: 3 Rifle Platoons.

Each Rifle Plat: 3 Squads.

Each Rifle Sqd: 7 to 8 men

Strength (as of 11 Mar 51):

1st Bn strength approximately 800 troops prior to entering KOREA. Present strength estimated at 500 men.

374th Regiment strength approximately 3,000 men. It was estimated now at 2,000 troops.

125th Division strength was heard to be 12,000 men when it first entered KOREA. Estimated to be 8,000 to 9,000 troops presently.

The majority of casualties were caused by combat; secondly, aircraft; thirdly illnesses; and least, desertions.

YANG, (fnu) (楊), CG, 125th Division.

LI, (fnu) (李), CG, 374th Regiment.

TZU, (fnu) (裝), C/S, 374th Regiment.

WU, (fnu), (吳), CO, 1st Battalion.

KUO, (fnu) (郭), Bn CO, Political Officer, 1st Battalion.

WANG, (fnu) (王), Regt CO, Political Chief, 374th Regiment.

KUO, Shen (郭森), CO, 3d Company.

TZU, Hai Lin (裝海林), Plat Ldr, 3d Plat.

WANG, Chi Lu (王■律), Asst CO, 374th Regt.

42d Army received replacements from HONAN, HUPEI areas 2 Feb 51. Approximately 12 replacements to each company were distributed at TONGDUCHON.

When PW regiment crossed 38th Parallel 1 Jan 51, observed 2 guns, believed to be US 105's being pulled by 8 horses each. A truck loaded with shells was seen following.

During early part of war, food was received from MANCHURIA by truck. But due to intensive air attacks and difficulties involved in transporting, food was begun to be procured locally.

Heard that once, approx 500 trucks were transporting food supplies with 300 trucks being destroyed.

2 meals were received daily by troops in insufficient amounts.

Resupply of ammo received by 42d Army 7 Feb 51. (Approx 100 rd of rifle ammo per man).

Chinese manufactured winter shoes issued to entire 42d Army.

Reserve ammo, enough to supply entire regiment, was always carried by the regiment. This was usually transported by wagons.

Approx 70% of 374th Regiment consisted of former CNA soldiers, who, when and if, opportunity arises will surrender or desert. Many were afraid to surrender as they were imbued with the idea of being killed upon capture. Therefore, many were known to desert their units and escape to the rear.

PW company had 22 desertions up to the time PW was captured. Most of company's deserters were believed to have fled to the rear. PW heard that a commander of an unknown regiment had deserted his command, but was later captured in the rear.

Remaining 30% although, communists, did not like dying for a worthless cause, as so stated by many of them. Due to fear of their homes and families being affected by their actions, many are afraid to desert or surrender.

Men were heard to complain of the inadequate food and their inferior equipment being pitted against those of a modern army.

Morale became noticeably lower recently as promises of the officers were never kept. Promises such as the long awaited mechanized and air units have not as yet arrived. Men began losing confidence in their officers. Many cases of desertions during battle were known.

Many were suspicious of their being the dupes of RUSSIA and MAO TseTung. Occasional conversations of RUSSIA stripping MANCHURIA industries and of her acquiring DAIREN were heard. There were suspicions among the men that something was brewing.

Due to publication in newspapers that the South Koreans had invaded North KOREA 25 Jan 50, the troops have no idea that it was the other way, and all are under the impression that the publications were true.

Runners were employed at company level.

Battalions and above used telephones.

Approximately 150 US PW were seen in YONGDU-RI (CS8556) area 28 Feb 51 captured by 40th Army.

It was heard that they would be sent to CHINA.

Mar 51, 3 US PW were seen driving 3 of 12 trucks that had hauled food, clothing and ammo supplies to 374th Regt. Two guards, 1 interpreter and 1 assistant driver were on each of American-driven trucks. These 3 US PW were forcefully made to drive due to lack of drivers in truck regiment. The 3 US PW were seen driving US 2½ ton trucks.

Surrendered voluntarily as he was a Korean and was sick of seeing Korean civilians being deprived of their food supplies and suffering due to CCF being in KOREA.

Leaflets were seen strewn in many places in YONGDU-RI area.

Upon reading leaflets, PW was in doubt as to the truth of contents. Upon hearing a loudspeaker broadcast in YONGDU-RI area during March 51, PW was convinced of good treatment in store for him upon surrendering.

Approx 30% of troops were definite that leaflets were all lies.

The remaining 70% were not convinced of being treated well even after reading the leaflets.

During rainy weather, troops were confident of no planes flying and usually remained in nearby houses. An average-sized house usually consisted of 1 platoon of men during bad weather.

Just at daybreak, troops cooked their meals and ate in the houses, before departing.

Due to absence of air attacks in early morning hours, troops confidently cooked their meals; with smoke of the fires visible to planes if they fly low.

At dusk daily the troops repeated this.

During the day, planes were seen attacking houses, but they usually contained no troops.

For the AC of S, G-2: