포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 4057　17 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1679)　10 March 1951

Cooperative and spoke freely. He was observant, alert, and familiar with the military service. Information seems reliable.

Conscripted in Oct 49 at CHILIN SHENG into the CCF, and was assigned to the 1st Bn, 450th Regt, 150th Div without training.

50th Army had several engagements during its movement to SSUCH’UAN SHENG (四川省) where it finally arrived in Jan 50.

Received 2 months of signal training at SSUCH’UAN SHENG.

During this period, 50th Army was engaged in capturing SSUCH’UAN SHENG area until Mar 50, at which time the 50th Army departed for HUPEI SHENG.

Departed HUPEI SHENG May 50 and arrived LIAO TUNG SHENG (遼東省) HAILUNG HSIEN (海龍縣) same month. Army engaged in reorganization and resting and until Oct 50, when they departed for ANTUNG, arriving same month.

Ammo and supplies were received at ANTUNG for 50th Army.

Div then departed ANTUNG 15 Oct 50 on foot and arrived SINUIJU (XE 1839) 20 Oct 50.

Engaged in battle at CH’OLSAN (XE 4303) and at NANSI (XE 3717).

Passed through the outskirts of PYONGYANG and thru KAESONG (BT 8505) o/a 30 Dec 50. Arrived 8 km N of SEOUL o/a 2 Jan 51.

The unit remained in the area for the next 10 days while staging for the next campaign.

Division, departed southward, crossed the HAN River over the ice, and arrived 28 km S of SEOUL where they entered battle o/a 20 Feb 51.

Division began withdrawing during the latter part of Feb 51 and went into defensive positions, North of the HAN River.

At this time (6 Mar 51), the PW and another soldier deserted and surrendered to UN unit.

38th Army was on the eastern flank of the 50th Army in defensive positions.

39th, 40th, 42d, and the 44th Armies were heard to be in that order respectively, to the rear of the 50th Army as reserves.

O/a 20 Feb 51 1st Bn commander informed the battalion that the 44th Army had already crossed the YALU River and was presently in reserve, south of the 38th Parallel.

1st Bn commander stated o/a 25 Feb 51 that an artillery division and a Tank Division were on its way and would be arriving in the SEOUL area, shortly.

O/a 28 Feb 51, 1st Battalion commander again told his troops that an Army Group of the 3d Field Army had crossed the YALU River o/a 28 Feb 51.

1st Bn commander told his troops that upon the arrival of these units to the front, no UN units or personnel at present North of HAN River will be able to retreat across the river after the CCF begins its offensive. Bn commander stated that the CCF troops have nothing to worry about, because with the aid of these new units, a great encircling movement will be made to trap the UN troops now north of the HAN River. This offensive was slated for the near future.

50th Army: 148th, 149th, and 150th Divisions (Code: LIANGSHAN PU) (梁山部)

150th Div: 448th 449th, and 450th Regiments, Arty Btry and Guard Company (Code: LIANGSHANPU) (梁山部)

450th Regt: 3 Rifle Battalions, Recon Platoon and Guard Plat.

Each Rifle Bn: 3 Companies, HMG Co, Telephone Squad, Signal Sqd, and Medical Unit.

Each Rifle Co: 3 Rifle Platoons

Each Rifle Plat: 3 Rifle Squads, and 60mm Mortar Squad.

Each Rifle Sqd: 4 to 5 men

WANG, Chin Shan (王嘉善), CG, 150th Div

LI, Jung Hsiang (李榮祥), CO, 1st Bn, 450th Regt, 150th Div

During the early part of Feb 51, the 1st Bn received approx 200 replacements from MUKDEN. All believed to have been combat-experienced troops

PW heard that most of the food supplies were received from TUNGPEI (東北) by trains, which transported them to SEOUL. Limited amounts of food were procured locally. An average of two meals per day, were eaten. At times, the troops did not eat for 3 days, due to lack of supplies.

No ammo stockpiles or dumps were seen. PW heard that ammo was brought in by trucks from ANTUNG.

Before departing ANTUNG in Oct 50, PW observed model 14, 105mm guns 1925, in the 150th Division. Each gun was pulled by 8 horses. This was prior to the division’s entry into KOREA. Upon entering KOREA, these guns were not seen; however, an estimated 120 rounds were being transported by trucks.

Morale was at its peak among the troops when they first entered KOREA and during the early stages of the war. However, due to the long night marches and bestial life caused by their daily hiding from aircraft, their insufficient food supply, poor clothing, and inferior weapons and equipment, morale has been considerably lowered.

Many men were disgusted with the present situation, and troops crying in their foxholes or shelters have become a common sight. Activities during the day was kept at a minimum, due to the constant threat of aircraft.

Troops were overheard declaring that if they had better equipment and weapons, they could win this war and would be able to fight more whole heartedly.

Heard that UN PW were being sent to TUNGPEI, CHINA.

Telephone Squad laid communication lines between the battalion and the companies. 1st Battalion had 3 telephones of which one was installed in the Bn Hq, the remaining two at the Rifle Companies. (Company on the front lines usually was equipped with phones).

It usually required 2,800(meters) to (2.8 kilometers) of wire to set up communications within the battalion. This communication system was set up within one or two hours.

Phones were also used between battalions and regiments.

Wireless-radios were used between regiments, divisions and armies.

Telephone batteries were received immediately from regimental Hq upon request. No shortage of batteries noted.

Used telephone wire was not salvaged for further use. New supplies were received from regiment upon exhaustion of supplies in the battalions.

PW surrendered because of the hardships suffered in the CCF.

Saw leaflets during Feb 51 which state that the CCF troops were suffering for useless reasons.

Believed contents and realized the truth of them.

Because the leaflets fell just at the time when the troops were suffering most, many were heard to be greatly affected by their contents.

For the AC of S, G-2: