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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 4046　16 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1668)　7 March 1951

Attention is invited to PW statements under paragraph "Psychological Warfare". Despite his hopeless disappointment at the treatment received as a UN PW, he was extremely cooperative and unhesitantly responded to all questions posed him. He possessed a good memory for details and seemed to be mentally alert.

The information seems reliable.

Conscripted Dec 47 at HARBIN into CCF 5th Independent Inf Regt where he received six months of basic infantry training.

Transferred to present unit at CHANGGHUN (長春) in May 48 and underwent three months artillery training.

25th Regt departed CHANGCHUN on foot to I HSIEN (義縣), arriving Sep 48. It marched to CHINCHOU (錦州) arriving Oct 48 and battled for 5 days.

Marched through SHANHAI KUAN (山海關) and arrived TIENTSIN (天津) Jan 49.

25th Regt passed PEKING and arrived approx 27 km N of PEKING Jan 49, where they remained for 20 days, resting.

Departed and arrived HUNAN SHENG (湖南省), HSIANG HSIANG HSIEN (鄕湘縣) June 49, where entire regiment was engaged in repairing and servicing their guns until Dec 49.

Departed by train and arrived CHIAMU SSU (佳木邱) Feb 50.

Engaged in agricultural work for five months. Then departed by train and arrived ANTUNG Jul 50.

Engaged in gun maintenance, and underwent communist indoctrination for three months.

PW and 7 other officers departed by train for MUKDEN Aug 50 with 2 guns to be repaired.

Heard that 1st Bn, 25th Regt, had departed ANTUNG during Oct 50 for KOREA. 1st Bn, at UNSAN (BV 4365), was attached to 42d Army, Nov 50.

PW and 7 officers at MUKDEN were picked up by battalion adjutant and traveled by train to K'UANTIEN (寬旬), arriving Nov 50.

9 officers departed K'UANTIEN on foot, crossed YALU, and entered KOREA Nov 50. They traveled over the main highway during nights, and arrived 37 km N of UNSAN, where they met 1st Bn, 25th Regt which was resting, Dec 50. 9 officers brought along 2 guns drawn by four horses which had been repaired in MUKDEN.

1st Bn departed UNSAN, after 15 days arrived KAECH'ON (YD4998) Dec 50. Heard that approx 48 shells were used by battalion in UNSAN (BV4365) engagement.

1st Bn with 12 guns and 40 rd for each gun traveled over main highway, arrived 38th Parallel area, Dec 50.

1st Bn proceeded south over main highway, and approx 20 km N of SEOUL, traveled eastward over a secondary road, arriving Feb 51.

(IN: Upon checking the map, PW unit (1st Bn) arrived in the general area where 42d Army is located north of WONGJU (DS 0736).

1st Bn, in this area, fired its guns for three days, using approx 10 shells per gun (12 guns) during the 3 days, mid Feb 51.

Battalion was inactive when PW deserted 2 Mar 51. Surrendered approx 14 km S of his unit location.

(Disposition and location of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 25th Regt, and the 26th and 27th Regiments, 1st Arty Div unknown).

Heard from battery commander that presently, they are on the offensive.

3d battery, 1st Bn, was approx 8 km N of YONGDU RI (CS8556), 500 (m) off the east side of main road. 1st battery was on west side, approx 500 meters off main road. 2d battery was said to be approx 4 km S of these 2 batteries. Guns were in entrenched positions, covered with dirt. Horses were taken to forest for concealment and pasturing.

Indep 1st Arty Division (code number: 61): 25th, 26th, and 27th Arty Regt, Propaganda Unit, Observation Unit, Guard Company and Political Section.

25th Regiment: 3 Arty Battalions, Observation Unit, Propaganda Unit, Guard Platoon, and Political Section.

Each Arty Battalion: 3 Batteries, Guard Squad, Observation Squad, and Signal Squad.

Each Battery: 2 Platoons and Fatigue Duty Platoon

Platoon: 4 Squads

Squad: 10 - 11 men

Other batteries had same TO/E as the above.

1st Bn strength was a little over 500 men when it first entered KOREA; present strength unknown.

PW estimated losses to be small in 1st Battalion.

Knows of 8 similar independent artillery divisions in CCF that were stationed in MANCHURIA. (Numerical designations were 1 through 8th Divisions). Heard that arty units were placed at disposal of infantry units requesting them.

These 8 artillery divisions compose Special Troops, commanded by WAN, I (萬義).

The Special Troops Hq was last heard to be at HANKOU (漢口) Jun 49.

PW battalion was attached to 42d Army at UNSAN (BV4365) Nov 50 and has been receiving orders from them.

WANG, (fnu), (王), CO, 25th Regt, 1st Arty Div

FENG, (fnu), (馮), CO, 1st Bn, 25th Regt, 1st Arty Div

CHANG, Chen Wen (張振文), CO, 3d Btry, 1st Bn

TAI, Hung Sheng (戴洪昇), Plat Ldr, 1st Plat, 3d Btry

Yen, Shih Ho (顔世和), Plat Ldr, 2nd Plat, 3d Btry

KUO, Hsiao Chung (郭少宗), Political Officer (Advisor)

Two meals received daily. Food was procured locally in insufficient amounts. No food supplies from CHINA.

No artillery ammo received after unit entered KOREA. Of original 40 rounds per gun, 30 rounds were still intact, when PW deserted 2 Mar 51. Believed that rather than lack of this type ammo, the lack of transportation facilities have prevented them from receiving any supplies. No rumors were heard of receiving ammo in future. Officers were worried because when all the ammo was used, there seemed to be no source to replenish supplies.

The constant movements, marches, and activity only at night lowered morale of troops considerably. After working during the night troops hid in cold mountains during the day which did not allow them to rest comfortably. After listening to broadcasts or reading leaflets, usually were moved with a desire for deserting, as they realized the truth of the contents (of their suffering, etc).

Runners were employed between companies and battalions when phones were unable to be installed. Ordinarily, phones were used within battalion.

Deserted and surrendered voluntarily as he was against communist regime.

Loudspeaker broadcasts and UN leaflets were frequently heard and read, which urged him to surrender.

He had full confidence in contents of leaflets, but he was quite disappointed after surrendering and receiving the present treatment.

(PW during interrogation interrupted by saying that he had something to say. The following is his statement:)

He said when he deserted his unit, he had high hopes of serving United Nations and if the promise of loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets were true, he was going to induce others to surrender. Prior to leaving his unit, he told some of his men that upon finding good treatment he would inform them in some way, so they would also surrender. But, upon surrendering and receiving treatment contrary to propaganda leaflets and having received poor and insufficient food, PW stated that he could not allow himself to induce others to surrender.

The cells were too cold to sleep in.

He would have rather remained in his unit and died fighting, if he had known PW were receiving this type of treatment.

PW overheard other PW say that leaflets were not keeping up to their promise and that they would have rather remained with their units.

(IN: The interrogator did not request the statement. PW asked permission to speak during interrogation and was granted.)

(1) PW unit is 2d Bn, 25th Regt, 1st Arty Div, Special troops.

(2) Each battery had 2 arty platoons and 1 general duty platoon.

(3) Assigned to arty unit May 48 and received 3 months arty training. The unit's training location unknown. No information concerning training of officers and NCO available.

(4) 1st Bn was engaged in UNSAN (BV 4365) area for a period of time. It has had much combat experience in CHINA.

(5) No counter-battery fire was received by PW unit. In case of this happening, PW stated that firing ceased.

(6) The men feared aircraft, but were only attacked once with 2 killed and 3 wounded. Only 5 men were attacked when they had exposed themselves. They usually remained motionless.

(7) 1st Battalion, 25th Regt had 12 model 91 (1931), 105mm Howitzers (Japanese).

(8) 8 km range

(9) Each gun was pulled by 7 to 8 horses.

(10) Japanese manufactured ammo was used.

(11) There were 4 guns to each battery.

(12) 1st Battalion still possessed the same ammo they had while in CHINA. No ammo received by 1st Bn since entering Korean War.

(13) 1st Battalion entered KOREA with 480 rounds of ammo; 360 rd still on hand.

(14) No armor piercing shells in PW unit.

(15) Ammo was hauled by wagons.

(16) There were no set positions for the guns.

(17) Natural camouflage was utilized. Guns were placed in dugouts, covered with a thin layer of dirt on top. The barrel was covered with branches.

(18) Guns were dug in at no set depths or widths.

(19) Guns were employed by batteries.

(20) Communication was conducted through phones ordinarily. At times, runners were employed when phones were unable to be set up.

(21) 2d Battalion had one observation squad (10 men).

(22) Believed that no observers were infiltrated through UN lines.

(23) PW battery fired only once; in the UNSAN area, the 2d Bn used 10 rd per gun in a 3 days engagement.

(24) No guns were lost by PW battery.

For the AC of S, G-2: