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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 4045　19 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1674)　7 March 1951

PW power of retention and observation were impressive. Replies to questions were concise, complete, and coherent.

Extensive military experience. Evidently well acquainted with tactics and military organization.

Often elaborated on lead questions without prompting.

Spoke fluent Japanese, which eliminated necessity of an interpreter.

Information considered reliable.

Recommended for further interrogation.

Volunteered for service in Chinese Manchurian Army (Japanese controlled) 1 Mar 39, assigned to Manchurian Army Training School, Army Off Sch at MUKDEN.

1 Mar 39 to 1 Sep 40, underwent Infantry Officers Training.

1 Set 40, graduated with rank of Sgt Major. Assigned to Chinese 5th Independent Inf Regt stationed at TA HU SHAN (大虎山).

Promoted to probationary officer upon being assigned to Hvy Wpn Co, 3d Bn, 5th Indep Inf Regt.

4 Dec 41 promoted to 2d Lt and transferred to 33d Inf Regt, 2d Bn, Hvy Wpn Co (Manchurian Army) stationed JEHOL SHENG, PINGCHUAN (熱河省平泉) in Japanese 5th Army Area, MANCHURIA.

4 Dec 41 to 5 Apr 43, was an instructor of heavy weapons. Promoted to 1st Lt Apr 42.

6 Apr 43, transferred to Manchurian Army Training Sch, Army Off Sch, as a small arms instructor.

15 Mar 44, transferred to 11th Army Area for assignment to 28th Inf Regt (Manchurian Army) at HO CHIANG SHENG, PAO CHING (合江省空淸). Assigned to 1st Bn, HMG Co as an instructor until 21 Aug 45.

21 Aug 45, and 400 others of 28th Inf Regt were captured by Russian Unit.

22 Aug 45, were marched to HU LIN (虎林) where they were joined by Japanese PW Regt of approx 1,600. Then were marched to IMAN (Maritime Province), arriving 22 Aug 45.

At IMAN they were temporarily interned in PW Camp adjacent to #1 IMAN Lumber Mill. 23 Aug 45, Chinese and Japanese PW were segregated for political reasons.

(The Manchurian Army, although controlled by the Japanese, was composed entirely of Chinese.)

PW Camp was one large enclosure with barbed barrier between Japanese and Chinese PW to prevent them from conversing with each other.

PW was held in IMAN Central PW Camp until May 46. Worked there in lumber mill and at railroad station, loading and unloading freight.

Aug 45 to Dec 45, EM (Chinese) were screened by Russians and released to return home.

Officers (30 Chinese) were held back until May 46 for further Communist indoctrination.

6 May 46, PW and 29 officers were released to return home.

PW went to HARBIN, where he worked as salesman until Nov 46.

7 Nov 46, returned to home in MUKDEN. Unemployed until 1 Jan 47 when he volunteered for service with CNA because unemployed and cost of living high.

Assigned to Independent 175th Inf Div, stationed FUSHUN (撫順), as Asst Bn CO of Inf Security Bn.

Until Jul 47, when the Div was deactivated and integrated into 207th CNA Division.

July 47, assigned to 53d CNA Army as CO.

HMG Co, 2d Bn, 2d Regt, 130th Div, stationed at TIEHLING (鉄嶺) until 1 Nov 48 with rank of Capt.

Oct 48 to Nov 48, the Division was engaged by 2d and 12th CCF TSUNG TUI (TSUNG TUI (■隊) equivalent to present CCF "Army") and surrendered 1 Nov 48 after being encircled.

1 Nov 48, all officers of the Division were interned at CCF PW Camp in WA FANG TIEN (瓦房店).

The EM were integrated into 2d and 12th TSUNG TUI. April 49, 2d and 12th TSUNG TUI redesignated 39th and 49th CCF Armies in vicinity of PEKING.

WA FANG TIEN PW Camp held approx 1600 officer (CNA) PW.

PW was held prisoner until 6 Mar 49. During internment, received political indoctrination.

6 Mar 49, PW and 36 officers were released and sent to ANSAN for employment in arsenal as civilian technicians on heavy weapons.

PW was employed by arsenal until Aug 49.

9 Sep 49, conscripted by CCF. Assigned to 169th Independent Inf Div Hq at ANTUNG as small arms instructor.

The Div presently is training replacement troops for CCF Army in KOREA at ANTUNG.

15 Aug 50, transferred to 42d Army Hq at TUNGHUA (通化) as small arms expert.

42d Army, prior to intervention in Korean war, was organized and assembled at TUNGHUA between 15 Aug 50 and 6 Sep 50.

After completion of organization, PW was transferred to 126th Div Hq. 13 Oct 50, transferred to 378th Regt, 2d Bn, Hvy Wpn Co.

15 Oct 50, 42d Army and its elements travelled by rail to CHIAN, arriving 16 Oct 50. Waited 3 days for rear elements to catch up.

19 Oct 50, 124th and 126th Rifle Div (advance elements) traveled by rail to KANGGYE (BA 0837) by way of MANPOJIN (BA7259). 42d Army Hq, Rear Services Units, and 126th Div followed by foot.

124th and 125th Div arrived KANGGYE morning of 20 Oct 50. 42d Army Hq, Rear Services Units, and 126th Div arrived KANGGYE 22 Oct 50.

124th Div was broken up into Regt and traveled southeastward to TOKSIL-RI (CA 4811), and 125th Div marched to YOWONJIN (BV 8761).

3 Nov 50, 126th Div marched to TOKSIL-RI as reinforcements for 124th Div which was then engaged by 3d ROK Div and one US Regt.

3 Nov 50, 126th Div retreated to CHANGJIN (CV 5171) and 124th Div marched southwestward to close the gap between 126th Div and 125th Div in YOWONJIN Area.

3 Nov 50, 42d Army and Rear Services Units marched to North of YOWONJIN.

23 Nov 50, 124th, 125th and 126th Div secretly moved out from their positions under cover of darkness and marched to YONGWON (BU 8812). At YONGWON were concentrated into a single force in preparation for a surprise offensive against UN Forces between TOKCH'ON (BV 7907) and MAENGSAN (BU 8593).

25 Nov 50, offensive began. 124th Div mission was to make a breakthrough to TOKCH'ON, 125th Div mission was to advance toward PUKCH'ANG-NI (BU 7186), and 126th moved toward MAENGSAN (BU 8593).

26 Nov 50, 124th Div received orders to sweep around IOKCH'ON, and 126th to move around MAENGSAN. 125th Div was ordered to hold central front while both divisions attempted an envelopment of ROK and US Forces.

27 Nov 50, the div successfully enveloped 6th, 7th, and 8th ROK Div in MAENCSAN, PUKCH'ANG-NI, TOKCH'ON triangle.

27 Nov 50 to 29 Nov 50, 124th, 125th, and 126th Div were in TOKCHON area for regrouping and to pick up ROK stragglers in area of encirclement.

27 Nov 50, they received orders from 42d Army Hq to attempt another envelopment along SUNCH'OWN (BU 3368), SINCH'ANG-NI (BU 5366), SONGCH'ON (BU 0648) triangle.

Night 29 Nov 50, the 3 Div departed, and 1 Dec 50, 124th and 126th Div arrived at designated locations (SUNCH'ON and SONGCH'ON respectively). 126th Div was in northern outskirts of SINCH'ANG, engaging UN Forces. Up to 31 Nov 50, 126th Div employed only 378th Regt to attack UN Forces in vicinity north of SINCH'ANG: 376th and 378th Regt were in rear, awaiting report on 124th and 125th Div progress.

8 Dec 50, envelopment of SUNCH'ON, SINCH'ANG, SONGCH'ON triangle was established, but, all UN Forces had withdrawn to S toward PYONGYANG.

8 Dec 50, 124th, 125th and 126th Div grouped in northern outskirts of SONGCH'ON, prior to marching southward.

8 Dec 50, 124th Div marched southward through YUL-LI (BU 6205), SUAN (BT 7188), SINGYE (BT 8565), and SIBYON-NI (BT 9941) to CHORWON (CT 4333).

125th and 126th Div followed same route taken by 124th Div, departing SONGCH'ON at two day intervals, with 126th Div leaving last.

30 Dec 50, 124th, 125th, and 126th Div assembled at village 30 km SW of CHORWON, prior to moving across 38th Parallel.

30 Dec 50, orders for 3d large scale encirclement was issued to 124th, 125th and 126th Div from 42d Army Hq, which was at village 30 km SW of CH'ORWON.

30 Dec 50, 3 Divisions began moving across 38th Parallel.

The 126th Division marched S through the mountains (sector between KAPYONG and CH'UNCHON). 125th Div marched SW on UIJONGBU (CS 2878) - SEOUL highway, turning SE near PUCH'ON (CS 4495) to KAPYONG (CS 6988), and 124th Div marched SE to CH'UNCH'ON (CS9893). On a pre-determined date, 3 forces were to join up and encircle UN Forces. When orders to join forces were received 1 Jan 51, all UN forces in vicinity had withdrawn, avoiding the trap set by the 42d Army.

1 Jan 51 to 3 Jan 51 124th Div assembled at CH'UNCH'ON (CS 9893). 125th Div assembled at KAPYONG (CS6988), and 126th Div assembled midway between CH'UNCH'ON and KAPYONG.

4 Jan 51, 124th Div marched to HONGCHON, and 125th Div moved to SABANGU (CS 9379). 126th Div was dispatched to SABAN-LI (사반리) for training and political indoctrination, and to serve as reserve for 124th and 125th Div. (126th Div is weakest Div in the 42d Army because it is largely former CNA troops and troops with no combat experience. Although in size and equipment it is similar to 124th and 125th Div, consensus of the men in 42d Army is that 126th Div lacks necessary determination and experience). The 124th, 125th and 126th Divisions were in HONGCH'ON, SABANGU, SABAN-LI vicinity until 2 Feb 51.

During this period, 3 divisions’ mission was to collect UN stragglers and engage anti-communist guerrillas within area of occupation. They were also awaiting supplies and replacement troops. The supplies were coming from CH'ORWON. As of 24 Feb 51 they had not received replacement troops which were supposed to have been enroute from ANTUNG.

2 Feb 51, 3 divisions received orders from 42d Army Hq to attempt their 4th encirclement movement - on IPORI (CS 7040), YOJU (CS 7928), WONJU (DS 0533) triangle - because of UN Forces advance northward.

124th and 125th Div were ordered to move to WONJU.

126th Div was to move southward to vic of Mt KAEGUN SAN (CS 7045).

The divisions were to secure their objectives by 7 Feb 51.

9 Feb 51, 124th and 125th Div, in conjunction with elements of 39th CCF Army, engaged US 2d Div and 8th ROK Div in vicinity southwest of WONJU. (PW knew the UN units facing them).

9 Feb 51, 126th Div moved to CHIPYONG (CS 7947) where it engaged one Regt of US 24th Div and elements of a French unit. 126th Div had UN Forces surrounded between 11 to 13 Feb 51, until a tank-led column of US 1st Cav Div troops made a breakthrough. 13 Feb 51, 126th Div retreated to KAPYONG area after suffering heavy losses (PW estimates that between 600 to 800 CCF troops KIA and WIA in this single engagement.)

16 Feb 51, 124th Division retreated to Mt SONG SAN after engaging UN forces southwest of WONJU. That night retreated to a mountain 6 km North of YONGDU RI (CS 8556), arriving 18 Feb 51. Then ordered to construct defensive positions and make a stand if UN forces attacked.

125th Div on 17 Feb 51, retreated northward to vicinity of HOENGSONG (DS 1049).

24 Feb 51, PW deserted to surrender to US 8th Cav Regt.

1st Field Army: 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Army Grp, unk number of arty div, Rear Services Unit, and other units.

1st Army Grp: 1st, 2d, 3d Armies, Rear Services Unit, unk number of arty div attached from 1st Field Army, and other units.

2d Army Grp: 4th, 5th and 6th Armies, Rear Services Unit, unk number of arty div, and other units.

3d Army Grp: 7th, 8th and 9th Armies, Rear Services Unit, unk number of arty div, and other units.

4th Army Grp: 10th, 11th and 12th Armies, Rear Services Unit, unk number of arty div, and other units.

2d Field Army: 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Army Grp, small armored Unit, Rear Services Unit, unk number of arty div, and other units.

5th Army Grp: 13th, 14th, and 15th Armies, Rear Services Unit, unk number of arty div, and other units.

6th Army Grp: 16th, 17th and 18th Armies (other units same as above).

7th Army Grp: 19th, 20th and 21st Armies (other units same as above).

8th Army Grp: 22nd, 23d and 24th Armies (other units same as above).

3d Field Army:

9th Army Grp: 25th, 26th and 27th Armies, Rear Services Unit, probably 3 arty div, and other units.

10th Army Grp: 28th, 29th and 30th Armies (other units same as above).

11th Army Grp: 31st, 32d and 33d Armies (attached units same as above).

12th Army Grp: 34th, 35th, 36th Armies (other units same as above).

13th Army Grp: 38th, 39th and 40th Armies, Rear Services Unit, 3 arty div attached from 4th Field Army, and other units.

14th Army Grp: 40th, 42d and 50th Armies, Rear Services Unit, 3 arty div.

Remarks: 8th Arty div is attached to 42d Army.

15th Army Grp: 47th, 48th, and 49th Armies, Rear Services Unit, and possibly 3 arty div attached from 4th Field Army.

17th Army Grp: 50th, 51st and 52d Armies, Rear Services Unit.

Remarks: 51st and 52d Armies, composed of former-CNA troops, was deactivated in HANKOU area Jul 50 and troops discharged. PW believes that 51st and 52d Armies have been activated recently.

4th Field Army: 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th Army Grp, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th Arty div, 41st Mechanized Army, Rear Services Unit, and other units.

Remarks: 41st Mechanized Army has 3 armored div: 121st, 122d and 123d, 20 Feb 49, PW saw this unit in a parade in PEKING. Had approx 200 tanks US Shermans and Chaffees, Japanese, and limited number of T-34 and 300 trucks.

Part of 1st Field Army is in HSI TSANG (TIBET) as CCF attacking force there.

2d Field Army is in SSUCHUAN (四川) Province engaging approx 200,000 CNA guerrillas.

3d Field Army is at SHANTUNG (山東) preparing for long-planned invasion of FORMOSA.

9th Army Grp of 3d Field Army (25th, 26th and 27th Armies) is in KOREA and is at present deployed between NAJIN (FB 0978), HAMHUNG (CV 7517) and WONSAN (CU 6536). Mission of 9th Army Grp is to guard seacoast between WONSAN and NAJIN against possible UN amphibious landings.

Remarks: Army Arty Regt entered KOREA Oct 50. Never committed to battle. 4 Nov 50, PW saw 6 multiple rocket launchers that had been destroyed by UN aircraft at KANGGYE (BA 0837)

PW believes every army under 4th Field Army has 1 Army Artillery Regt organic to it. This regt is not to be confused with the arty div attached to each army from 4th Field Army. PW did not know if army arty regt existed in T/O of armies under 1st, 2d and 3d Field Armies.

Regarding the arty div attached to armies of 4th Field Army, PW knew of only 5th and 8th as being in KOREA. Others may possibly be.

Casualties (42d Army):

KIA: 4,000 plus

WIA: 10,000 plus

Non-battle casualties: 2,000

The above KIA, WIA, and non-battle casualties are PW estimates of 4 major engagements of 42d Army since its arrival in KOREA.

The weapons used by 42d Army are in good condition in general. The losses of small arms in battle have been somewhat off-set by captured weapons.

25 Feb 51, following CCF Armies were on the line, beginning from the right flank, facing southward:

50th Army - Zone of responsibility: INCHON to SEOUL

38th Army - Zone of responsibility: SEOUL to YANGPYONG.

42d Army - Zone of responsibility: YANGPYONG to HOENGSONG.

39th Army - Zone of responsibility: HOENGSONG to East coast.

Remarks: It is not known how far East of HOENGSONG the 39th Army is deployed.

4 NK Div are employed between each CCF Army. According to original plans, 5 NK div were to infiltrate UN positions in area N and NE of TAEGU to wage guerrilla warfare.

(Interrogator's remarks: PW probably meant II NK Corps)

25 Feb 51, 66th Army was in reserve area N of SEOUL, between SEOUL and 38th Parallel.

PW heard from another PW 3 Mar 51, that 66th Army was going into front line and that 38th Army was to be relieved for rest and reorganization in near future.

40th CCF Army 25 Feb 51, was located N of present 42d Army area between CH'ORWON and KAPYONG. PW heard 40th CCF Army will not be committed until a future date.

43d Army, 15 Feb 51, was in PYONGYANG area. PW heard primary mission of 43d Army is to guard west coast against amphibious landings between CHINNAMPO and ANJU. The secondary mission of 43d Army is to reinforce CCF elements on west coast in vicinity of SEOUL.

Railroad guard div is spread out between PYONGYANG and SINUIJU (XE 1839). Mission is to repair railroad and guard it against sabotage.

Rear Services Unit of 9th Army Group, 3d Field Army, is reported to be operating from KANGGYE.

Rear Services Unit of 13th Army Group, 4th Field Army is located in ANTUNG.

Approx 3 NK training div are in KANGGYE Area. PW heard 32d NK Div was in area in Oct 50.

A div of engr troops is spread out between ANTUNG and SEOUL, repairing the MSR, which is constantly bombed by UN aircraft.

25th, 26th and 27th Armies of 9th Army Grp, 3d Field Army, are deployed on east coast from 38th Parallel N to NAJIN (FB 0978).

Primary mission of 9th Army Grp is to guard west coast against probable UN amphibious landings. Secondary mission is to defend west coast if UN Forces should threaten left flank.

At present, only NK Forces are used along west coast S of 38th Parallel.

28 Jan 51, sent one of his officers to ANTUNG to collect some replacements. PW heard that 169th CCF Div is at present training replacements for 42d Army at ANTUNG and that approx 100,000 replacements were located between PYONGYANG and SE to 38th Parallel, presumably undergoing training.

An unidentified unit of large strength is said to be deployed between KAESONG and P'YONGYANG. Believed this unit could be replacement troops for 50th, 38th, 42d and 39th CCF Armies. Did not know whether this is part of 100,000 troops previously mentioned.

Nov 50, heard that an airfield was constructed in vic of KANGGYE.

The P'YONGYANG airfield is being repaired for probable use by CCF Airforce.

42d Army Hq, 25 Feb 51, was in vicinity of KAPYONG (CS 6988).

126th Div Hq, 25 Feb 51, was in mountain approx 30 km SE of KAPYONG and 20 km NE of YANGPYONG (CS 6649).

376th and 378th Regt were (25 Feb 51) at Mt CHUNGWON SAN (CS 7656), 15 km N of YANGPYONG (CS 6649).

377th Regt 25 Feb 51, was in vic of 126th Div Hq.

376th, 377th, and 378th Regt were preparing defensive positions for an expected UN attack by 1st US Cav Div.

25 Feb 51, 125th Div and its elements were in vic of WONJU (DS 0734), and 124th Div was in rear, regrouping and assembling N of KAPYONG near 38th Parallel.

It is strongly believed that the "fourth phase" is to begin soon. Forementioned troops (100,000) have been undergoing intensive training and will shortly be integrated into combat-veteran units. As in past, many of those troops are unequipped but will be integrated into these combat units for this offensive.

Because of failure of Feb 22 offensive in WONJU area, it is believed that this integration will be completed in approx 30 days.

These 100,000 replacements will be distributed in units now active because it is believed that an entire unit of inexperienced troops will be too easily routed.

WU, Kuo Chen (吳國■), None, but equivalent to Lt Gen, CG, 42d Army

HSIEH, Tung Shu (謝東樹), None, but equivalent to Colonel, Regt CO, 378th Regt

LIU, Ming Ho (劉明和), Equivalent to major, Bn CO, 2d Bn

LIU, Kuo Chuan (劉國全), Equivalent to capt, CO, 2d Bn, Hvy Wpn Co

LIU, (fnu 劉), Equivalent to capt, CO, 4th Co, 2d Bn

SUN, (fnu 孫), Equivalent to capt, CO, 6th Co, 2d Bn

26 Jan 51, PW dispatched one of his jr officers to ANTUNG to get replacement troops.

169th CCF Div at present is in ANTUNG and is training replacement troops for 42d Army.

PW was told by his superior that 14,000 replacements are to be received by 42d Army within a month.

28th Jan 51, PW heard from his superior that 11 independent div under North China Political Bureau Hq might be sent to KOREA.

Most replacements expected by 42d Army are troops with no formal military training, except 4,000 ex-CNA troops.

Replacement troops are ill-equipped.

Since 11 Nov 50, 42d Army has never received food brought from CHINA. Wherever the army moves, a party is formed to confiscate food from populace and to dig up rice buried by fleeing refugees.

The collected rice is taken to unit supply for distribution.

When not on front line, each unit bivouacs in mountains near villages reported to have an abundance of food.

Prior to entering combat, enough rice is collected to feed 1 man 3 to 5 days.

Ration of 42d Army consists mostly unpolished rice, soy beans, corn and millet.

42d Army has never received fresh supplies of ammo. Its only source of ammo is captured stock of ammo left behind by dead and fleeing UN troops. Large percentage of CCF troops are using captured US M-1 rifles.

PW heard that fresh supplies of ammo are supposed to be enroute to 42d Army from CHINA, but to date, none had been received.

Supply route for 50th and 66th Armies is ANTUNG, SINUIJU, SINANJU, PYONGYANG, KAESONG to SEOUL.

Supply route for 38th, 39th and 42d Armies passes through PYONGYANG, SUAN (BT 7186), SINGYE (BT 8564), SIBYON-NI (BT 9941) to CH'ORWON (CT 4334). CH'ORWON is one of the largest supply dumps maintained by CCF along 38th Parallel.

38th, 39th, and 42d Armies Rear Services Units are in CH'ORWON. Hundreds of horse (or ox) wagon teams and trucks are in CH'ORWON area.

Supplies from CH'ORWON are hauled to 38th, 39th, and 42d Armies mostly by horse and wagon teams.

Horse wagon teams hauling supplies from SINUIJU operate in groups of about 50. When moving at night, interval between groups is said to be about 50 km. During daylight, wagons are camouflaged at designated locations along highway, which are at every 50 km along the MSR.

PW heard that approx 1,000 trucks are being utilized for supply purposes between ANTUNG and PYONGYANG.

Main supply route for 3d Field Army, 9th Army Group (25th, 26th, 27th Armies) in CHIAN (MANCHURIA), MANPOJIN, (BA 7329), KANGGYE (BA 0837), HAGARU-RI (CV 5171) to HAMHUNG (CV 7517).

Alternate supply route is KANGGYE, PUNGSAN (EB 6277) to HAMHUNG.

Same system of transportation and concealment is utilized by 8th Army Grp.

All trucks transporting supplies operate from temporary motor parks located at every 100 km interval along supply route. Trucks haul supplies 100 km from base of operation, transfer load to horse drawn wagons, and return.

PW believes TOKCHON (BV 6903) is also a large supply dump of CCF in KOREA.

20 Jan 51, 39th and 42d Armies received limited supplies of clothing and shoes. Supplies were brough from vic of CH'ORWON.

The 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Field Armies each have a mechanized unit of between div and army strength.

Feb 49, 41st Mechanized Army organized in PEKING. (PW saw it on parade 20 Feb 49).

Assigned to 4th Field Army Hq.

Composed of 121st, 122d, and 123d Mech Div. Each mech div has 1 truck bn. 1 mech div is composed of 3 tank bn.

41st Mech Army has approx 200 tanks and 300 trucks.

Approx 150 tanks are US Sherman medium and Chaffee light tanks captured from CNA forces. Remainder are Japanese M-94 medium tanks and tankettes. A very few Russian T-34 tanks were observed.

PW was told by his superior that some elements of 41st Mech Army are in KOREA. Heard that 41st Army is expected to arrive KOREA by end of Mar 51 in time for CCF spring offensive (4th phase of war).

The 8th Arty Div, 4th Field Army, is attached to 42d Army (in KOREA) and 5th Arty Div, 4th Field Army, is attached to 39th Army. PW heard from his superior that 66th and 50th Armies each has 1 arty div of 4th Field Army attached to them.

Remarks: Arty Co in inf regt is part of T/O organization.

Army Arty Regt comes under Army and has nothing to do with 8th Arty Div, 4th Field Army.

37mm AT Gun Bn at present is in CHINA.

8th Arty Div, 4th Field Army has 3 Arty Regt.

Each arty regt consists of 1 x 75mm field gun bn, 1 x 75mm howitzer bn, and 1 x 105mm howitzer bn.

Each arty bn has 3 batteries and each battery has 2 sections.

75mm howitzer bn - Total no of guns: 12 (Jap M-38)

75mm field gun bn - Total no of guns: 12 (加農野砲)

105mm howitzer bn - Total no of guns: 12 (Japanese)

All guns in 8th Arty Div are horse-drawn.

Arty regt assigned to 42d Army (Army T/O) has 1 37mm AT gun bn, 1 105mm (or 4.2) mortar bn and 1 x 85mm multiple rocket launcher bn (KATSUSHA).

37mm At gun bn - Total no of guns: 18 (US)

Remarks: Because 37mm AT guns are ineffective against US tanks, the bn did not come to KOREA. At present in CHINA training with 57mm Russian AT Guns.

105mm (4.2) mortar bn - Total no of mortars: 12 (US 4.2-called 105mm by Chinese)

Rocket launcher bn - Total no of rocket launchers: 3 (KATSUSHA, Russian, Chinese-made)

Remarks: 6 rocket launchers were destroyed by UN aircraft Nov 50 at KANGGYE. The multiple rocket launcher is trailer-type (truck-or horse-drawn) with 6 x 85mm multiple rocket tubes.

Rocket Launcher Illustration

Remarks: April 50, PW tested above type rocket launchers manufactured at MUKDEN Arsenal. Copy of Russian rocket launcher: Chinese official name: HUO CH'IEN P'AI P’AO (火箭■灼). Commonly called KATSUSHA (Russian name: KATUSHKA).

All artillery and rocket launchers are horse-drawn. When is need of rapid transportation, rear services unit is contacted to supply necessary vehicles.

Weapons Characteristics:

75mm Howitzer (Jap - M-38): Maximum range: 12,000 meters

Accurate range: 8,000 meters

75mm Field Gun (Chinese): Maximum range: 12,000 meters

Accurate range: 6,000 meters

70mm Pack Howitzer (Jap M-92): Maximum range: 4,000 meters

Arty pieces fire contact and predetermined fragmentation shells only.

Rocket launchers have following type ammo:

(1) Contact fragmentation rockets.

(2) AT rockets.

(3) Delayed action, fragmentation rockets.

(4) Incendiary rockets.

(5) High explosive rockets.

Captured UN 105mm and 155mm howitzers are being shipped to CHINA. PW heard large percentage of these pieces are to be used for defending south-central seacoast against expected CNA invasion or raids.

Captured ammo for above weapons is also being shipped to CHINA by trucks that go to MANCHURIA to haul supplies.

Casualties from UN arty are negligible considering amount of ammo expended. Arty fire had an intense effect on nerves of CCF troops. Therefore, for psychological reasons, arty very effective.

PW suggested UN arty mass fire on areas, using air bursts and delayed fuses. CCF units relatively distant from front frequently move out of the mountains to the nearest village to pass the night. This movement usually occurs about 2200 hours. Arty, previously adjusted on these villages, could take a great toll if they were able to fire without warning en masse.

1946, approx 2,000 CCF air cadets were sent to SIBERIA for training with Russian Air Force. Spring 1948, this group returned to CHINA. CCF aircraft encountered by UN Forces are piloted by them.

There are two air training schools in CHINA. One is MUKDEN and the other in PEKING.

Instructors at both air schools are Russians. Japanese (former Japanese Air Force personnel stranded in MANCHURIA), and a few Chinese trained in RUSSIA).

CCF Air Force is said to have approx 1,200 aircraft of all types:

200 Jap Trainers (HAYABASA type)

30 P-51, US

U/k no P-40, US

U/k no C-47, US

Approx 500 MIG 15 and Yak attack bombers.

3 Aug 50, CCF Air force was organized into air div consisting of 8 air bn. An air bn had 2 fighter co and 1 fighter-bomber co.

Air co are designated from 1 through 24.

Air co has approx 30 fighters or fighter-bombers.

The newly organized air div is at present broken up into 3 groups which are stationed at ANTUNG, MUKDEN, and HARBIN Airfields.

PW saw approx 300 aircraft at ANTUNG Airfield when stationed there Aug 50.

No set number of vehicles in a convoy. Motor vehicles operating between ANTUNG and PYONGYANG operate in groups of 10 to 50.

At each 100 km mark, beginning with SINUIJU on S, along the main highway to PYONGYANG, concealed motor parks are maintained for trucks.

Vehicles are usually camouflaged with vegetation and are parked in valleys adjacent to the highway where vegetation is thick.

Horse-drawn carts operate in groups of 50. They move only at night, and during the day are camouflaged at designated places every 50 km.

Every 50 km aircraft spotters are employed along the supply route.

The interval maintained between vehicles is between 40 to 150 meters, depending upon the intensity of UN air activity at night.

Div level and higher employ both field phones and wireless for communication. Cryptographic material is handled by specially trained personnel attached to div level and higher from 4th Field Army.

Between bn and regt, field phones and runners are used.

Between co and bn runners are used.

Only known types of flares are red, yellow and green. Significance of flares is determined by bn or regt CO.

Bugles are often employed in combat to coordinate attacks by Co size units. Bugles are also used for psychological effect, when charging UN Forces.

Morale of 42d Army in general is very low as compared with Nov 50, when they almost annihilated, ROK 6th, 7th and 8th Div, Morale of troops can be classified as follows:

Group with excellent morale: Communist Party members

Group with good to excellent morale: Youth Organization members, officers NCO, and Labor Organization members.

Group with fair to good morale: Farmers who received 1 to 2 years of political indoctrination.

Group with poor to fair morale: Former CNA troops. Troops who have had higher education than average former land owners.

The group with lowest morale is about 60% total strength of 42d Army.

Battle effectiveness of 42d Army is only fair because:

(1) Casualties not replaced.

(2) Lack of medical treatment.

(3) Lack of food and clothing.

(4) No assurance of fresh ammo supplies.

3 Jan 51, PW saw approx 300 US PW near 38th parallel S of CH'ORWON.

Heard they were to be taken to ANTUNG, central collecting point for US PW.

From ANTUNG, PW are sent to ANSHAN, FUSHUN, and PANSHIH for permanent internment.

PW sent to FUSHUN and PANSHIH work in coal mines, PW sent to ANSHAN work in steel mills as laborers.

Captured ROK PW are turned over to North Koreans for internment. ROK PW are either killed or indoctrinated with communism, then integrated into NKA. Heard that ROK whom the NKA could not use were killed because of lack of sustenance.

Because of poor medical and sanitary conditions, disease of all types was prevalent (skin disease, TB, stomach ailments, etc, but no communicable disease).

Estimates that 60 soldiers were ill from above-mentioned diseases in each bn.

Average of 5 to 6 severe cases of frozen feet in each co.

No counter measures or inoculations against diseases have been used.

PW surrendered 25 Feb 51 to 8th Cav Regt because:

(1) Although he was an officer, his authority was limited.

(2) A communist party member (EM) was assigned to him as orderly and made periodic reports on PW activities to the political bureau.

(3) Did not like idea of fighting for CCF because he believed CCF is tool of USSR, and also because, when he was hold PW by Russians (1945 to 1946), treatment of PW was terrible.

(4) Living conditions were better prior to communist domination of CHINA.

(5) When he was with CNA, US government helped Chinese (CNA), and he has no desire to fight US troops because he himself is anti-communist.

(6) Believed US forces would treat him well if he surrendered.

(7) CCF has been confiscating rice, etc, from farmers and villagers in NORTH KOREA, and thus he feels that in the near future, farmers living in Communist-dominated territory will revolt and conduct guerrilla warfare.

Saw UN leaflets. Remembers leaflets promising food, shelter, and medical aid to troops who surrendered.

Believed above statements prior to seeing leaflet. Leaflet reaffirmed his convictions.

Troops never discussed leaflets because afraid of punishment.

Night broadcasts from low flying aircraft are believed to have most affect because the soldiers are usually separated from each other and have opportunity to escape.

Suggestions for improvement.

Propaganda leaflets, besides promising food, clothing, and medical treatment, should be made in graphic form, illustrating how much a PW gets as compared to what he gets in CCF.

Propaganda leaflets promising pardon by CNA Forces would also have a great effect among ex-CNA troops.

Releasing of small groups of captured CCF troops after giving them ample clothing, food and medical treatment would prove effective.

Continuous broadcasts of Chinese folk and love songs by helicopter, with intermittent news on daily CCF casualties, would be effective.

Estimates approx 200,000 Japanese in MANCHURIA not repatriated.

Approx 30,000 Japanese (former ex-troops) are in CCF as instructors, technicians and doctors.

Approx 180,000 Japanese are employed in factories, steel mills, power plants, etc.

Heard that Lt Gen SAITO, former KWANTUNG Army Chief of Staff, had joined 4th Field Army as LIN PIAO's advisor in 47. Believed to be in HANKOU with 4th Field Army.

16 Oct 50, saw approx 200 Russian officers depart for KOREA from CHIAN.

Following areas in CHINA are said to contain organized anticommunist guerrilla forces:

KWANGSI Province (康西): 200,000 guerrillas under CNA Gen PAI, Chung Hsi (白崇禧)

SSUCH'UAN Province (四川): 200,000 guerrillas under CNA Lt Gen Hu, Chung Nan (胡忠南)

SIKANG Province (西康): 50,000 to 60,000 guerrillas under CNA Lt Gen HO, Kuo Kuang (賀國光)

SINCHIANG Province (新疆): 10,000 guerrillas under unk leader. (The Communist paper claims US has agents working with these guerrillas.)

YUNNAN Province (雲南): 30,000 guerrillas under CNA Lt Gen LI, Mi (李彌)

NINGHSIA Province (寧夏): 20,000 guerrillas under CNA Gen MA Hung Kuoi (馬鴻違)

800,000 to 1,000,000 CCF troops are needed to control CNA guerrillas.

2d Field Army and elements of 1st 3d, and 4th Field Armies comprise the approx 1,000,000 troops engaging these guerrillas.

Therefore, PW believes a large CCF force will have to remain in CHINA to contain these guerrillas and guard against possible invasion by CNA.

(IN: Following are general principles, which are modified by terrain and situation. They are tactics which are favored over other methods).

38th, 39th, 66th, and 40th CCF Armies are known as "Offensive Armies". 42d, 43d and 50th Armies are known as "Defensive Armies". None of the forementioned is restricted to one type of warfare, but past experience in CHINA indicates they have been generally employed as the designation implies. It is alleged that troops of "Offensive Armies" are better trained for offensive than for defensive warfare and opposite is true for troops of "Defensive Armies". Therefore, unit mission is more efficiently executed.

(1) ATTACK:

Normal attack formation employed by CCF is "two up, one back". However, whenever possible, following maneuver is executed.

When an advancing CCF Army or Div encounters an enemy MLR or formidable defense, one div is withdrawn to area of the reserve div and the remaining div assumes the responsibility of the withdrawn div sector (i.e., one div covers the entire Army front). The div on the line immediately dispatches probing forces to confuse enemy and to seek weak points in enemy defense. Often small units are dispatched to engage numerically larger units to keep enemy in doubt and apprehension.

Meanwhile, reconnaissance units are dispatched to ascertain enemy strength and defense positions. These troops don civilian clothing and enter enemy territory. Civilians of immediate neighborhood are interrogated on intelligence matters. PW claims this technique of gaining information has proved the most reliable and effective. Reports from probing attacks (previously mentioned) also contribute, but civilians and recon troops are more relied upon. Acquisition of this intelligence information is of utmost importance because it is claimed that CCF will not execute an attack maneuver unless it outnumbers the enemy six or seven to one. (Sic)

The relieved div having reorganized in rear, the Army is now prepared to execute the maneuver. This period of preparation is usually approx three days from time the div leaves the line. One of the two div in rear is then committed in a thrust on a maximum three-mile front through a weak point in enemy line. This point is preferably at boundary of two large enemy units (regt or div). When CCF div penetrates line and is well in rear of the enemy line units, approx two bn are sent to the right and approx 2 bn are sent to the left, with approx five bn continuing on to engage the enemy reserve unit.

Reserve CCF div is to have executed a single envelopment movement meanwhile and joins with one of the penetrating forces moving out to right or left.

Meanwhile the div on the line will have been actively occupying the enemy.

Reserve (or defense) Army (one night's march to rear) will have moved in to act as an active reserve for attacking Army.

After the ground has been secured, the "two up, and one back" formation is reestablished.

This tactic is basic and can be executed down to co.

Refer to Inclosure #1 for illustration of the above maneuver.

In the attack, an Army front will be not less than 20 km.

The reserve Army is generally located approx 40 km to rear of the attacking Armies. It is so located as to be out of normal arty range and yet close enough to the front to be available upon demand.

The minimum div front is 10 km.

Reserve div is approx 3 hours walking distance from the front.

Refer to Inclosure #2.

(2) DEFENSE:

CCF does not employ principle of MLR.

When CCF expect to remain in a given position for any period over three or four weeks, and if circumstances permit, the previously mentioned "Defensive Army" occupy the sectors of two "Offensive Armies". However, often circumstances do not permit this operation, which is a practice favored by CCF.

CCF employ a defensive formation of "one up, and two back".

When an Army or div is in defensive position, one div is placed on the line as a screening and delaying force. This div dispatches small forces for limited attacks to confuse the enemy and keep them wary.

Meanwhile, the other two div are situated in the rear approx 3 hours walking distance. These two div are thus located to enable them to rest and reorganize.

The two "Offensive Armies" are located approx 100 km to rear of the line. These are situated to enable them to regroup, re-equip, and rest.

Mission of unit on the line is to serve as a screening force and to delay the enemy. If the enemy launches an attack, this unit is to offer moderate to stiff resistance and move slowly backward when forced to do so. The retreating div eventually falls back to the other two div of the Army. If circumstances are such that the two rear div have been able to adequately reorganize and re-equip, a counter-attack will be launched. In the event that the two rear div have been unable to prepare themselves to launch a counter-attack, they become a part of the line units serving as a screening-delaying force for the two Armies in the rear of the entire Army then on the line.

The entire Army then constitutes a delaying force and will slowly fall back to the two Armies in the rear. During all this, the two Armies are supposed to have been re-equipped and reorganized. When the Army acting as the delaying force withdraws to approx 100 km of the original front line, a major counter-offensive is launched by the two rear Armies in conjunction with the Army waging a delaying action.

If circumstances are such that the two rear Armies have been unable to prepare themselves for combat, they, too, will slowly fall back until some other force in the rear is reached or until circumstances permit them to launch a major counterattack. CCF is more prone to fall back and await favorable circumstances than to conduct an all-out engagement along a predetermined line (MLR).

Refer to Inclosure #3.

For the AC of S, G-2:

3 Incl:

1. Attack Maneuver Sketch

2. Position in the Attack

3. Position in the Defense

INCL #1 ATTACK MANEUVER SKETCH

INCL #2 POSITION IN THE ATTACK

INCL #3 POSITION IN THE DEFENSE