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YU, IL 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 46 NO. 3945 1951-02-26
    소위 중등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3945 12 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1654) 5 March 1945

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: YU, IL (柳一) (유일) (CCF)
RANK: Equivalent to 2d Lt
ORGN: 42d Army, 125th Div Hq, # 2 Section (Recon)
DUTIES: Interpreter
EDUCATION: Middle School, 2 yr
AGE: 30
OCCUPATION: Forestry
ADDRESS: HEILUNGCHIAN SHENG, TIEHLI HSIEN, TIEHLI-CHU, CHUNG CHIEN TSUN (黑龍江省 鉄驪縣 鉄驪區 重建村)
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 260600 Feb 51 at SOGU (CS 885489) by 27th British Brigade
INTERROGATOR: W.T.O.

2. ASSESSMENT:
Cooperative, information is limited, but seems reliable.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
a. Chronology:
4 Sep 50, volunteered for CCF and assigned as an interpreter to the Reconnaissance Company, 125th Div, 42d Army at HEILUNGCHIANG SHENG.
Without receiving basic training departed MANCHURIA with 42d Army, marching and arrived MANP’OJIN 20 Oct 50.
Passed through MANP’OJIN 20 Oct 50, KANGGYE (BA 0837) 23 Oct 50 and arrived HUICH’ON (BV 6749).
The 125th Division fought in HUICH’ON area for 3 days before proceeding to TOKCH’ON (BV 6903).
The 42d Army remained in TOKCH’ON area 11/2 months, engaging in construction of defensive positions.
Proceeded southward and battled its way to SINCHANG-NI (BU 5466). During this advance, 373d Regt, 125th Div was spearhead and suffered 300 casualties. 374th and 375th Regiments of 125th Div were utilized as reserves.
The Army then marched through mountains, passed through CHORWON, and arrived TOPYONG-NI (CT 5812) 12 Dec 50.
At this time PW was transferred as an interpreter to 2d Section during the unit’s week long preparation for next offensive.
The 42d Army then engaged UN forces, advancing as far as KAPYONG (CS 6988) 1 Jan 52.
Subsequent moves, took the unit via mountain trails to YONGMUN-NI (8 km E of YANGPYONG), 10 Jan 51, and arrived KOKSU-RI (CS 7942) area 13 Jan 51, where they remained 5 days.
125th Division then withdrew to TAEWANGDAE (8 km N of YANGPYONG) to regroup.
Number 2 section (reconnaissance) of 125th Division and recon company remained on the lines and engaged in recon duties in an area approx 20 km long, in KOKSU-RI area.
124th and the 126th Divisions remained in KOKSU-RI area in defensive positions.
23 Feb 51, when Reconnaissance Company and Number 2 Section returned to its division, PW deserted and surrendered to 27th British Brigade 260600 I Feb 51.

b. Locations and Activities of Unit:
125th Division was last heard to be regrouping in CHUNGBAN DAE-RI (CS 7969) 23 Feb 51.
124th Division was on a mountain approx 10 km N of YONGDU-RI. Both were in defensive positions as of 23 Feb 51.
23 Feb 51, the number 2 section and Reconnaissance Company officers held a meeting at which time the Section Chief stated that present mission of CCF Armies in KOREA was to engage defensive warfare. There was talk among the officers that within next two months, armor and aircraft would be sent to KOREA to assist in CCF advance southward. Meanwhile CCF Armies would have to engage in defensive warfare.
Officers were overheard saying that, to the 38th Parallel, no trouble was encountered by the troops, but flat terrain in South KOREA, would require mechanized support to accomplish effective gains.

c. T/O & E and Strength:
13th Army Group: 38th, 39th, 40th and 42d Armies.
42d Army (42 “BU”): 124th, 125th, 126th Divisions and 8th Arty Div.
125th Division: 373d, 374th and 375th Regiments, Reconnaissance Company, Signal Company and Supply Company.
Division Hq consisted of number 1 Section (operation), number 2 Section (Reconnaissance), Number 3 Section (Signal), number 4 Section (Supply), an officer personnel and the political sections. The number 2 section (reconnaissance) consisted of 1 officer (Field grade), A Company grade officers, 1 Runner and 1 interpreter.
Reconnaissance Company:Original (Jan 51)Present (March 51)
  EM157111
  Officer139
 Equipment & ammo:  
  60mm Mortars (US)5(35 - 40 rd ea)4(total of 200 ?)
  LMG (US)5(500 rd ea)5(400 rd ea)
  SMG (RUSSIAN)Approx 40(150 rd ea)40(150 rd ea)
  SMG M-3 (US)UnkUnk
  Grenades3 - 4 per man
  Pistols (Mauser)13(70-80 rd ea)9
Reconnaissance Company consisted of the best soldiers, 80% of which were strong Communists.
Troops usually carried 3-4 days’ supply of food with them. At times, patrols were sent out during night to capture prisoners for interrogation. However, no information of value could be obtained because the normal run of captured soldiers did not know much other than their own squad or platoon. Korean civilians were also frequently interrogated by the Reconnaissance Company for information such as the number of trucks, tanks or troop locations.
There were approx 35 Koreans in Reconnaissance Company that infiltrated through UN lines in civilian clothes to gather information. These men have been in the CCF for a long time.

d. Personalities:
WANG, (Fnu) (Code name: 30) (王師長), CG, 125th Division
WANG, (Fnu) (Code name: 304) (王科長), Regt CO - also Number 2 Section Chief (Recon), Recon

e. Replacements:
An undetermined number of replacements were observed at 124th Div Hq 5 Feb 51.

f. Food, Ammo and Other Supplies:
Food was procured locally in insufficient amounts. 2 meals were normally eaten per day. No supplies known to have been imported from MANCHURIA.
Feb 51, 42d Army was issued winter shoes brought from MANCHURIA. They were of canvas and rubber.

g. Armor and Artillery:
12 Dec 50, saw 23 guns (resembling 47mm AT Gun, Japanese) at TOPYONG-NI, which PW heard, belonged to 8th Arty Division, 42d Army. These guns were heard firing during night when big CCF offensive near 38th Parallel began. These weapons were not seen after that.

h. Morale:
Due to lack of logistical support, frequent air attacks and shelling, morale was low. Other than shoes, most troops are wearing the same clothes issued to them, prior to entering KOREA.

I. UN PW:
10 Feb 51 in WONJU area approximately 8 US PW were observed being sent to rear by 374th Regiment.

j. Signal:
Runners were employed for liaison between number 2 section, Reconnaissance Company and Division headquarters.

k. Psychological Warfare:
Deserted and surrendered voluntarily because he was against communism. His father, brothers and sisters live in SOUTH KOREA.
Believed he could get to SOUTH KOREA by volunteering to serve with CCF for facilitating his entry into KOREA. He first had a hint of a proposed CCF intervention in KOREA 25 Aug 50 while working at his civilian job, a notice that persons who could speak both Korean and Chinese were needed by the government. On the day PW enlisted (4 Sep 50), then pending entry of CCF into KOREA was confirmed. (IN: Confirmation based on a talk with government office in which he learned of the purpose of the necessity for Korean/Chinese linguists.
Read a leaflet in YONGDU-RI area 23 Feb 51.
It read; “Good food and treatment will be offered if they surrendered”.
The leaflet was too simple in contents and that a better selection of words with deeper feeling should be used.
No conversation was overheard among the troops regarding this subject.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

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