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hoi powr_001_0460_0210

LIU Kwang Shin 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 46 NO. 3919 1951-02-18
    미분류 무학 남성
상위 그룹 이전 기사 다음 기사
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3919　9 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (521 LDI 0454)　18 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
NAME: LIU Kwang Shin
AGE: 20
UNIT: 40th Army, 1st Div, 33d Regt, 1st Bn, 3d Co, 2d Plat, 3d Sqd.
DUTY: Inf
EDUCATION: None
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 18 Feb 51 KORYODAE (DS 0239)
UNIT MAKING CAPTURE: Patrol of 2d Bn, 187th RCT
INTERROGATOR: Lt Rambicur

2. ASSESSMENT:
Reliability: Questionable
Physical Condition: Good
Attitude: Questionable
Comment: PW wanted to assist but some answers given could not be correct and when such discrepancies were brought to his attention insisted he told only the truth and invited bodily harm if we did not believe him.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
a. Chronology:
About 2 years ago - Entered CNA from SHANTUNG.
About a year ago - Captured by CCF at CANTON.
About six mo ago - Became soldier in CCF at CANTON.
About 20 days - 1st Bn crossed YALU River into KOREA.
About 5 days ago - Saw Bn for the last time as other Co (three) preceded 3d Co in southward movement
About 4 days ago - 3d Co, following about eight km behind other elements of the Bn was attacked by UN Air. When other soldiers dispersed in a northerly direction, PW decided to move south and surrender.
　Reasons:
　　Hardships suffered in the lack of food and proper clothing, the dangers from UN Air and artillery, and shortage of ammo.
Three days ago - After moving about 3 km from where his Co suffered UN Air strike arr KORYODAE (DS 0239) where he took refuge for three days until he sighted the patrol from 3d Bn 187th RCT.

b. Organization, Strength & Armament:
1st Bn
　1st Co (Hv Wpn)1102 HMG and AW and SA
　2d Co (Mortar)1152 mortars (50mm Russ)
　3d Co (Rifle)1152 Russ LMG and AW and SA
　4th Co (Rifle)100Rifles only Japanese
3d Co, 2d Plat (Rifle)23Jap rifles and 80 rd
3d Co, 2d Plat, 3d Sqd (Rifle)8Jap rifles 80 rd
(All strengths as of time of arrival this area).

c. Casualties:
Obs following casualties in third Co during air strike 14 Feb 51 - KIA 20, WIA 11.

d. Supply:
Ammo and food in short supply. Believes that should UN attack at this time UN could not be stopped because of the shortage of ammo.
23 horses carried food, ammo for the entire Bn.

e. Other Units:
While PW was in hiding 15 Feb - 18 Feb 51 at KORYODAE, obs north-ward movement of many CCF troops in small groups during the hours of darkness.
There were litter patients (12 obsd) among them.

f. Former CNA Troops in CCF:
13 of the personnel in 3d Co are ex-CNA. Until time of his capture PW thought he was fighting CHIANG Kai Shek’s Army. Remainder of the Co believed the same thing since this was told them by the Co CO.
Estimates that 50% of 3d Co have no desire to fight. They would desert, but desertion is difficult because there are frequent head counts and death is the penalty for attempting to desert. (At this point interrogee was accused of attempting to make statements he thought we would like to hear, citing for example that he surely recognized American planes and their identifying markings and had come to the conclusion that the Americans were among the forces opposing his country’s army.
He was also accused of being a plant. He became highly indignant, and persisted in his assertion that he only spoke the truth).
Officers in CCF are identified by red piping along the outside seams of their trousers and their tunics button down the center, rather than over lap and button down the right side (double - breasted).

For the AC of S G-2:

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