ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3884 8 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1642) 4 March 1951
| PW NAME: | YANG, Chuen Cheng (楊■正) |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| ORGANIZATION: | CCF 4th Field Army, 14th Army Group, 42d Army, 124th Div, 370th Regt, 2d Bn, 6th Co, 1st Plat, 2d Sqd |
| DUTIES: | Rifleman |
| EDUCATION: | Middle School (3 years) |
| AGE: | 31 |
| OCCUPATION: | None |
| ADDRESS: | HUPEI SHENG, CHUN HSIEN, ■I SAN CHU, HACHIA KANG TSUN (湖北省■■■三■■■■村) |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 011000 I Mar 51 at YONGDU RI (CS 8556) |
| INTERROGATOR: | TMO |
PW although severely wounded was very cooperative, information seem to be reliable.
a. Personal and Unit History:
Conscripted by CNA 25 Dec 38, at WUHAN (武漢) and assigned to YUN-CHUN Area (■■■■■) Training Center until May 39.
May 39, commissioned 2nd Lieutenant and assigned to CNA 32d Army, 139th Division stationed at SSUCHUAN SHENG, WAN HSIEN (四川省萬縣).
O/a 15 Sep 47, 12th Field Artillery Regiment was sent to LU■DEN to support the 8th and 9th CNA Army Groups fighting CCF 3d, 4th 5th, 6th, and 11th Armies.
2 Nov 48, CNA Forces surrendered to CCF, with most units intact.
Between Nov 48 to Jun 49, PW was interned at the TUNG KAN TZU (東坎子) PW Camp, ANTUNG. While interned, received political indoctrination and worked on a state farm.
Jun 49, released from prison camp together with 1200 other CNA officers and integrated into CCF 42d Army as privates. Assigned to 124th Div, 370th Regiment stationed at HONAN, CHENG CHU. Between Jul 49 to Oct 49, performed occupation duty.
Oct 49, 124th Division was moved to SSUCHUAN SHENG, WAN HSIEN to attack CNA Forces. Successfully defeated CNA Forces and had occupation duty until Jan 50.
Jan 50, 42d Army assembled at WAN HSIEN and moved by rail to PEI AN (北安), arriving there in Feb 50.
Between Feb 50 to 20 Oct 50, Army and its elements were utilized to work on military farms.
20 Oct 50, moved by rail to CHIAN in preparation to enter KOREA by way of MANPOJIN (BA 7259).
27 Oct 50, 124th Division crossed YALU River, followed by other elements of 42nd Army. It took approximately 3 days for 42nd Army. It took approximately 3 days for 42nd Army to complete crossing.
From MANPOJIN, Division marched southward as advance force of 42d Army, attempting to infiltrate UN positions for a planned encirclement movement that took 6th, 7th, and 8th ROK Divisions by surprise.
From TOKCHON (BV 6903) area, pursed fleeing UN Forces southward through central North KOREA, arriving at CH’ORWON (CT 4334) during latter part of Dec 50.
At CH’ORWON 42d Army assembled prior to marching southward. From CH’ORWON 124th Division marched southward, by Regiments, passing through CH’UNCHON (CS8993) to vicinity of capture, YONGDU RI (CS 8556).
On 1 Mar 51, deserted unit and walked southward to YONGDU RI, where he stepped on a landmine which blew off his leg. He was unconscious for several hours until picked up by a 5th Cav tank-led patrol.
b. Location and Activities of Unit:
124th Division Headquarters 1 Mar 51, located in a small village approximately 12 Km northeast of YONGDU RI (CS 8556)
In event of a major set-back by CCF, division headquarters most likely will be moved to CH’ORWON, the assembly area of 42d Army prior to crossing 38th parallel.
370th Regiment Headquarters 1 Mar 51, was on a hill approximately 25 Km northeast of YONGDU RI (CS 3556).
270th Regiment deployed on a hill approximately 2 Km northeast and adjacent of Regiment CP.
371th and 372d Regiments were on east and west flanks of 370th Regiment, preparing defensive positions.
c. T/O & E and Strength of Unit:
4th Field Army: 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th Army Groups, Artillery Division. 14th Army Group is in KOREA.
14th Army Group: 38th, 39th, 40th, 42d Armies, Artillery Regiment, Field Hospital and other units.
42d Army: 124th, 125th, 126th Rifle Divisions, Artillery Regiment, Rear Services Unit and other units.
124th Division: 370th, 371st, and 372d Rifle Regiments, Mountain Artillery Battalion, Security Guard Battalion, Medical Unit, and other units. Artillery Units at Army and Division level are independent from Artillery Division at Field Army level.
370th Regiment: 1st, 2d, 3d Rifle Battalions, Recon Platoon, Signal Platoon and other units.
2d Battalion: 4th, 5th, 6th Rifle Companies, and Heavy Weapons Company.
6th Company: 1st, 2d, 3d Rifle Platoons and Mortar Platoon.
| 1st Platoon | Original (20 Oct 50) | Present (1 Mar 51) |
| EM | 32 | 14 |
| Officers | 2 | 2 |
| Equipment and ammo: | ||
| LMG (Canadian, Russian, and Czech) | 3 (1,000 rd ea) | 2 (600-800 rd ea) |
| SMG (PPsh M1941) | 1 (100 rd ea) | 1 (100 rd ea) |
| Rifles, M-1 | Unk | 7 (150 rd ea) |
| Rifles (Japanese M38) | 26 (80 rd ea) | 0 |
| Grenades | 3 per man | 5 per man |
| Bugle | 1 | 1 |
| Whistle | 1 | 1 |
| 6th Company | ||
| EM | 160 | 90 |
| Officers | 10 | 10 |
| Equipment and ammo: | ||
| Mortars (60mm, US) | 3 (35 rd ea) | 2 (25 rd ea) |
| Flares (Mortar) | Unk | Unk |
| Field Phone | 1 | 0 |
| 2d Battalion | ||
| EM and Officers | 800 | 500 |
| Equipment and ammo: | ||
| HMG | 4 (2,000 rd ea) | 4 |
| Mortars, 81mm US | 2 (25 rd ea) | 0 |
| Bangalore Torpedoes | Unk | Unk |
| AT Mines | Unk | 0 |
| AT Rocket Launcher (US) | 1 | 1 (5 or 6 rd) |
| Wireless Telephone | 1 | 1 |
| 370th Regiment | ||
| EM and Officers | 4,000 | 2,000 |
| 124th Division | ||
| EM and officers | 13,000 | 7,000 |
Estimated Casualties (124th Division)
KIA: 1,500 Mostly due to aircraft and artillery.
WIA: 2,000 Mostly due to aircraft and artillery.
Non Battle: 2,400 Frozen feet, typhus, dysentery, malnutrition, and other.
d. Personalities:
SU, Ko Shih (蘇克■)
CG, 124th Division
CHAO, (FNU) (■)
Regimental Co, 376th Regiment
e. Replacements:
Told by company political officer that replacements from North CHINA are now enroute to KOREA. Also told that a limited number of replacements are in KOREA and that 42d Army’s replacements were in CH’ORWON (CT4334).
f. Food, Ammo and Other Supplies:
Food procured locally by each unit. An emergency ration of 3 days was always kept on hand and was used only when local supplies were exhausted.
124th Division received ammo only once when 42d Army assembled at CH’ORWON prior to crossing 38th parallel.
Believes that CH’ORWON is the main supply base for 42d Army because when in CH’ORWON, every division received fresh ammo supplies.
A large percentage of weapons and ammo issued at CH’ORWON were captured UN stocks left behind by retreating US Forces.
Estimates that at least 70% of supplies flowing to front line units are destroyed by aircraft.
g. Signal:
Bugles and whistles were most commonly used by company size units for tactical and non-tactical purposes.
In battle, bugles and whistles are often used for psychological effect.
Communications between Company to Battalion were made by runners unless field phones were available.
Battalion to Regiment communication employed horse-mounted messengers besides field phones.
Regimental level and higher units used field phones and wireless.
h. Morale and Battle Effectiveness:
Morale of 42d Army, in general, was very low. Morale of individual troop depended on:
(1) Group with Excellent Morale
(a) Communist Party Membership
(b) Labor Organization Membership
(c) Officers (Original CCF)
(2) Group with Fair Morale
(a) Officers (Ex-Nationalist)
(b) Men who are in the Army because they have nowhere else to go.
(c) Non-Party Members
(3) Group with Lowest Morale
(a) Ex-Nationalist Officers (stripped of rank)
(b) Anticommunists
(c) Ex-land owners
(d) Intellectuals
Estimates that group with fair to poor morale comprises 90% of 42d Army.
Battle effectiveness of 42d Army is not rated as high as expected by CCF higher command because of following reasons:
(1) 42d Army has been under constant attack by land and air forces.
(2) Fatigue (most front line troops have never been rotated to rear for rest).
(3) Increase of non-battle casualties.
(4) Limited amount of food and ammo supplies.
i. Medical:
Of the 2,400 non-battle casualties in 124th Division, more then 50% were caused by frozen feet, and remainder, by all types of disease.
No counter-measures or immunizations have been given against communicable diseases.
Treatment for frozen feet was not available.
j. Psychological Warfare:
1 Mar 51, deserted unit to surrender because of the following reasons:
(1) Not a Communist Party Member.
(2) Most ex-Nationalist Officers when pressed into service of CCF, retained their title but PW was reduced to Pvt.
(3) Unlike most captured Nationalist troops, was held in a prison camp for 7 months, subject to hard labor and political indoctrination.
(4) Believed that UN Forces would treat him well.
Has read UN leaflets which promised adequate clothing, food and medical aid. Believed in leaflets and deserted unit with another (later captured and shot by CCF) to surrender.
For the AC of S, G-2:
HONG
