본문 바로가기주메뉴 바로가기하단 바로가기
일자별 보기
sidemenu open/close
hoi powr_001_0450_0340

KIM, Chae Ok 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 45 NO. 3882 1951-03-01
    전사 무학 남성
상위 그룹 다음 기사
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3882　8 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1640)　4 March 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: KIM, Chae Ok (金在王) (NKA)
RANK: Pvt
ORGN: III Corps, 1st Div, 3d Regt, 2d Bn, 3d Co, 2d Plat
DUTIES: Rifleman
EDUCATION: None
AGE: 23
OCCUPATION: Shoemaker
ADDRESS: KYONGGIDO, KOYANG GUN, SUNGIN MYON, MIARI (京畿道 高陽郡 崇仁面 ■阿里)
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 011200 I March 51 at PYONGCHANG (DS4735) by US troops.
INTERROGATOR: CHY

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW dull and unobservant, replies were slow, and seemed to have great difficulty in trying to remember past events. Apparently was trying to be cooperative, but information offered was very limited.
Information considered to be only fairly reliable.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
a. Personal and Unit History:
Conscripted into NKA 15 Sep 50 at MI ARI (CS2565). After approximately one month of basic training, assigned to III Corps, 1st Div, 3d Regt, 2d Bn, 3d Co, 2d Plat at WONSAN (CU6536) 22 Oct 50.
III Corps began to retreat o/a 2 Nov 50, and reached P’YONGYANG o/a 5 Nov 50.
III Corps arrived KANGGYE (BA0837) o/a 12 Nov 50, given basic training and political indoctrination until 20 Dec 50.
III Corps moved S 20 Dec 50, and reached vicinity of P’YONGYANG o/a 20 Feb 51 via HAMHUNG (CV7517), WONSAN (CU6536), CHUNCHON (CS8993) and HOENGSONG (DS1049).

b. Location and Activities of Unit:
1st Div located on high ground approx 6km north of PYONGCHANG (DS4735) 26 Feb 51.
When captured 1 March 51, 1st Div troops were retreating northward individually, scattered from above defense line.

c. T/O & E and Strength:
3d Regiment: 3 Rifle Battalions, (2d Bn-code: KUMKANGSAN 金剛山), Mortar Co, Sanitary Co, Political Sec, HMG Co, LMG Co
2d Battalion: 1st, 2d, 3d (code: SAKURA 사쿠라) Rifle Companies, Signal Co
3d Company: 1st, 2d and 3d Rifle Platoons
2d Platoon: 1st, 2d and 3d Rifle Squads
2d Plat 3d Co, 2d BnOriginal (22 Oct 50)Present (28 Feb 51)
　3d Regiment:
　　EM3322
　　Officers11
　　　Personnel losses were: 1 WIA: 1 KIA: and 9 ill.
　Equipment & ammo:
　　M1891/30 rifles29 (30 rd ea)10(150 rd ea)
　　SMG (Russian)31
　　Pistol, Tokarev11
　　Grenades02 per man
　　LMG01 (400 rd)
3d Company:
　　EM11080
　　Officers44
　　　There were 2 KIA, 5 WIA and about 24 men left behind because of sickness.
　Equipment & ammo:
　　M1891/30 rifles80 (80 rd ea)Approx 65 (150 rd ea)
　　SMG (Russian)9 (50 rd ea)9 (200 rd ea)
　　Pistols, Tokarev44
　　Grenades02 per man
　　US M-1 rifles1010
　　Carbines, US33
　　HMG01
　　LMG33
3d Regiment:
　　EMApprox 1,300Unk
　　Officers30〃
　Equipment & ammo:
　　Mortars02

d. Personalities:
LEE, Ki Hwa (리기화), Jr Lt, Plat Lt, 2d Plat, 3d Co, 2d Bn, 3 Regt, 1st Div
CH’OE, Kil Sik (최길식), Lt, Co CO, 3d Co, 2d Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Div

e. Replacements:
Had not seen replacements joining his Regt since leaving KANGGYE in Dec 50.

f. Food, Ammo and Other Supplies:
Each man supplied with 100 rd of ammo and 2 grenades in vicinity of PYONGCHANG (DS4735) o/a 25 Feb 51.

g. Signal:
Company and below: Runners
Battalion: Field phones (1 in each Bn CP)

h. Morale and Battle Effectiveness:
Morale was low because most of troops realized inferiority of their weapons; also fatigue from long marches was a factor.
There was also a difference of attitude between officers and EM as to desire to fight for communism; officers were staunch supporters whereas, most troops were passive.

i. Medical:
There were two cases of frozen feet in PW platoon.
No immunizations were given in the Regiment.

j. Psychological Warfare:
PW captured when wounded.
Once saw a UN leaflet which said: “If you surrender, your life shall be saved”.
Felt that it was true.
Heard some men discussing leaflets, and their consensus was that leaflets were not true. Saw several men destroy them, saying that they were lies. However, they were either officers or NCO.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

페이지 상단으로 이동하기