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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3751　2 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1612)　27 February 1951

Although PW army service was only 6 months, he seems to have observed and absorbed much during this period.

Information seems reliable.

6 Aug 50, PW conscripted into the NKA at SUWON (CS 2527).

13 Aug 50, taken on foot to CHORWON (CT4335) (鐵原) and given basic training there.

1 Sep 50, assigned to 509th Indep Co which moved to ANBYON (CU7223) where it received weapons and supplies.

8 Sep 50, 509th Indep Co arrived at PANGGUMI RI (CU6453) and was put in the defense plan of the above named town.

27 Sep 50, 509th Indep Co reached HAMHUNG after withdrawing from PANGGUMI RI.

30 Nov 50, 509th Indep Co arrived at CHILPYONG (CA2759).

1 Dec 50, assigned to 38th Div which was made up of units disorganized during the fall retreat. Told that 509th Indep Co went to CHINA (no further details as to reasons or specific destination).

38th Div arrived at PYONGGANG (CT5152) on foot. Left here 24 Dec 50.

10 Jan 51, 38th Div arrived at HONGCHON (CT0271), and departed on the same day.

1 Feb 51, 38th Div was disbanded at WONJU (DS0834), personnel and equipment were integrated into the 6th, 7th and 12th Div.

Assigned to 7th Div.

20 Feb 51, 7th Div arrived at SANGGYE RI (DS3026).

While 2nd Bn was preparing defensive positions, deserted and walked to UN lines, surrendering on 230100 I Feb 51 at approx 12 km South of SILLIM NI (DS1921).

23 Feb 51 2nd Bn, 1st Regt of 7th Div was located on a mountain about 3 km N of SONGGYE RI (DS3026). Defense line of 2nd Bn extended for three km in an East-West direction. This was to be a defense line for 1st Regt which was planning to withdraw. 1st and 3rd Bn flanked the 2nd, but does not know their relative positions.

Defense line of 2nd Bn consisted only of riflemen in foxholes.

Reported seeing no artillery in the area.

V Corps: 6th, 7th and 12th Div, formerly consisted of 6th, 7th, 12th, 4th, 38th and unk Div.

7th Div : 1st, 2nd and 3rd Regt, Sig Plat, Sanitary Plat, Recon Plat, Engr Co.

1st Rifle Regt: 3 Rifle Bn (Code name: KURONGSAN 九龍山), and 3rd (either 1st or 3rd Bn has a code name of HALLASAN 漢拏山).

2nd Rifle Bn: 3 Rifle Co [1st, 2nd (Code name: ODAESAN 五台山) and 3rd], Mortar Co, and Antitank Squad.

2nd Rifle Co: 3 Rifle Platoons.

3rd Rifle Plat: 3 Rifle Sqd, 1 HMG Sqd.

All weapons in good, workable condition.

Increase in strengths (personnel and equipment) was because of the integration of the NK 38th Div troops into the 7th Div o/a 1 Feb 51.

Early Feb 51 2nd Bn, 1st Regt, 7th Div received 600 men from disbanded 38th Div.

7th Div ammo supply point located approx 24 km ENE of WONJU (DS0834) in the immediate vicinity of a village of about 40 houses. Ammo was kept just on the outskirts of the village. Concealed in ditches along the road and covered with straw. Road, the main road leading through the village. Not positive but believes this village is ANHUNGRI (DS2841). Supply point was not discovered by UN aircraft because the enemy used this supply point only at night.

For Co and below, runners were employed.

For communications between Bn and Regt, there was 1 field phone per Bn (make unk).

Regt had approx 9 field phones for comm to div.

Field phones were in good condition but that the runner system was inefficient.

Morale of 2nd Bn was rather low due to the long marches, UN aircraft activity, and food shortages.

PW observed 1 ROK PW who was given Political Training for 20 days after which he joined the 2nd Bn, 1st Regt.

No immunization.

Most men in 2nd Co were suffering from frozen feet but were able to walk. None of them were sent to the rear.

PW surrendered voluntarily because did not believe in the NKA or communist principles. PW methods were inhuman, especially their ravaging of villages.

Saw UN leaflets on three separate occasions. Scattered sentences he remembered were:

“Think sincerely, placing your hands on your breast, - for what are you fighting in the deep mountains?”

“Communist leaders order you to shoot US planes without giving you any weapons.”

“The CCF puts the NK forces ahead of them and ravages Korean villages because the CCF brought no food supplies when they came.”

PW believed that the UN leaflets were ture. One reasons for his surrender.

For the AC of S, G-2: