ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3742 2 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI 1600) 26 February 1951
| PW NAME: | LEE Kil Ho (李吉鎬) (리길호) (NKA) |
| RANK: | Sr Lt |
| ORGN: | II Corps, 10th Div, 25th Regt, 2nd Bn |
| DUTIES: | Battalion Asst S-2 |
| EDUCATION: | 6 yr |
| AGE: | 23 |
| OCCUPATION: | Railroad Station ticket seller |
| ADDRESS: | HWANGHAE-DO, PYONGSAN-GUN, ANSONG MYON, MULGAE-RI, #22 (黃海道 平山郡 安城面 物開里 二二番地) |
| DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 221530 I Feb 51, approx 30 km Southeast of KUNWI (DR 6109) by 2nd ROK Div |
| INTERROGATOR: | GWA |
| INTERROGATED AT: | TAEGU (DQ 5058) |
Cooperative; PW appeared to be in good physical condition.
PW had considerable access to details about his unit because he was an intelligence officer.
Information is reliable.
a. Chronology:
PW was conscripted into NK Democratic Training Unit on 9 Apr 50 at SUKCH’ON (YD 2564). Received 2½ months of basic infantry training. During June 50, Democratic Training Unit was redesignated 10th NKA Division.
Departed from SUKCH’ON 25 June 50 with 10th Div by train, and traveled via the following places:
| Place Departed | Date | Mode of Travel | Place Arrived | Date |
| SUKCH’ON | 25 June 50 | Train | SADONG(YD4422) | 30 Jun 50 |
| SADONG | 25 July 50 | 〃 | SEOUL | |
| SEOUL | 〃 | TAEJON(CR5921) | 10 Aug 50 | |
| TAEJON | o/a 11 Aug 50 | Marched | HYONP’UNG(DQ5050) | Sep 50 |
| During Sep 50, retreated with remnants of 10th Div (approx 5,000 men) marched through the TAEBAEK Mountain range via the following places: | ||||
| HYONP’UNG | Sep 50 | Marched | KUMHWA(CT6438) | |
| KUMHWA | 〃 | HWACH’ON(CT8717) | Oct 50 | |
| HWACH’ON | Oct 50 | 〃 | YANGGU(DT1117) | Oct 50 |
Departed from YANGGU during Oct 50 with 10th Division, marched and arrived at CHUNGH'ON (CS 9994) the first part of Nov 50. There, approximately fifty of the 10th Div officers including PW, had OD winter uniforms made by CHUNCH’ON tailors. Was commissioned Sr Lt.
Departed CHUNCH’ON 4 Dec 50 with 10th Division, marched (at night only) over mountain trails, and arrived outskirts of CHECH’ON (DS3010) the first part of December 50.
Departed outskirts of CHECH’ON the middle of Dec 50, marched with 10th Div, and arrived at P’UNGGI (DR 5879) during Dec 50.
Departed P’UNGGI Dec 50 with 10th Div, marched (at night only) and arrived at a point approx 10 km East of TANYANG (DR 3987) during Dec 50.
Departed 16 km east of TANYANG Dec 50, marched with 10th Div, and arrived approx 20 km east of ANDONG (DR 7646) Jan 51.
Departed the village 20 km east of ANDONG Jan 51, marched and arrived in mountains approx 4 km east of TOP’YONG (DQ 5963) Jan 51.
Departed TOP’YONG Jan 51, marched with 25th Regt, 10th Div, and arrived in the mountains approx 30 km SE of KUNWI during latter part of Jan 51. There elements of the 2nd ROK Div attacked the 2nd Bn, 25th Regt, 10th Div on 22 Feb 51. As the ROK soldiers advanced, PW believed his battalion to be surrounded. Therefore, he surrendered to the ROK soldiers at 221530 I Feb 51.
b. Location and Activities of Units (as of 22 Feb 51):
The 10th Div Hq was located KORO-MYON (DR 8605) as were the Hq of the 25th, 27th, and 29th Regiments.
The mission of 10th Div was to sever UN routes of communication between ANDONG and KUNWI.
The 10th Div is not moving northward but moves about through ANDONG-GUN (county) and KUNWI-GUN (county) to escape destruction by UN forces which are constantly attempting to “wipe out” the 10th Division.
c. T/O & E and Strength (as of 22 Feb 51):
II NKA Corps: 2nd, 6th and 10th Rifle Divisions.
10th Rifle Div (code: 745 ARMY UNIT): 25th, 27th, 29th Rifle Regiments, Arty Regt, Engr Bn, Communication Bn, Medical Bn, Recon Co, Transportation Co, Training Bn, AT Bn and Guard Platoon.
25th Rifle Regt: 3 Rifle Battalions, Arty Bn, Recon Plat, Medical Co, Communications Co, Engr Plat, Guard Plat, Weapons Repair Unit, Veterinary Unit, SMG Co, Supply Unit, Operations Section, Political Bureau and C/S Section.
2nd Rifle Bn: 3 Rifle Companies, Communications Plat, Medical Plat, Supply Plat, 82mm Mortar Co.
4th Rifle Co: 3 Rifle Platoons, and HMG Plat. Each Rifle Platoon has 4 squads. Each HMG Platoon has 2 squads.
| 2nd Bn, 25th Regt, 10th Division: | Original (Nov 50) | Present (22 Feb 51) |
| EM | Approx 125 | Approx 70 |
| Officer | 〃 25 | 〃 20 |
| Equipment & ammo: | ||
| PPsh SMG | 20 | 10 |
| US M-1 rifles | 20 (50 rd per) | 40 (200 rd per) |
| US .30 cal Carbines | 2 (50 rd per) | 20 (300 rd per) |
| M1891/30 rifles (USSR) | 80 (30 rd per) | 25 (10 rd per) |
| PTRD AT Rifles (USSR) | 0 | 2 (5 rd per) |
| DP LMG (USSR) | 3 | 3 (50 rd per) |
| Browning Auto-rifle (US) | 0 | 1 (500 rd per) |
| Maxim HMG (USSR) | 8 | 3 (50 rd per) |
| US LMG | 0 | 1 (500 rd per) |
| 60mm Mortar (US) | 0 | 1 (no ammo) |
| 82mm Mortar (USSR) | 1 | 0 |
| AT Grenades (USSR) | 15 | 15 |
| Handgrenades (US & USSR) | 20 | 100 |
| Magnetic Compasses (US & USSR) | 3 | 5 |
| Whistle, thunderer (US) | 0 | 5 |
| Shovels (US) | 50 | 10 |
| Combat Packs (US) | 10 | 1 per man |
| Field Glasses (US & USSR) | 2 | 2 |
| Field telephones | 2 | 3 |
| Field phone wire (US) | 500 meters | 1000 meters |
| 25th Regt, 10th Division: | ||
| Personnel: | Approx 1,400 | Approx 800 |
| Equipment & ammo: | ||
| 45mm AT Gun | 1 | 0 |
| Wireless transmitter-receiver (USSR) | 2 | 2 |
| AT mines (USSR) | 2 | 2 |
| 10th NKA Division: | ||
| Personnel: | Approx 5,000 | Approx 3,500 |
Approx 500 men in 10th Div were non-battle casualties. Approx 1,000 men and certain types of equipment were lost as a direct result of combat. Considerable US equipment was gained by capturing it from ROK police and UN troops between Nov 50 and 22 Feb 51.
d. Personalities:
CH’OE Hyon (최현), CG, II NKA Corps.
LEE Pang Nam (李方南) (리방남), Maj Gen, CG, 10th Div.
MUN Ch’ol (문철), Sr Col, C/S, 10th Div.
KIM Ch’ol Man (김철만), Colonel, CO, 25th Regt.
LEE Chang Ho (리장호), Maj, S-2, 25th Regt.
KIM Kwang Tok (김광덕)，Maj, CO, 2nd Bn, 25 Regt.
HONG, U Sop (홍우섭), Capt, Political Officer, 2nd Bn, 25th Regt.
YOH Hyon Ku (여현구), Capt, Executive Officer, 2nd Bn, 25th Regt.
KIM, Ch’ae Kyo (김재교), Capt, S-2, 2nd Bn, 25th Regt.
HAN Hyon Paek (한현백), Lt, CO, 4th Co, 2nd Bn, 25th Regt.
LEE Chong Yong (리종용), Jr Lt, Political Officer, 4th Co, 2nd Bn, 25th Regt.
KIM Pyong No (김병로), Lt, Political Officer, 5th Co, 2nd Bn, 25th Regt.
PAK Hak Chun (박학준), Sr Lt, Propaganda Officer, 2nd Bn, 25th Regt.
KIM Hak Chun (김학준), Jr Lt, Plat Ldr, 3rd Plat, 5th Co, 2nd Bn, 25th Regt.
e. Replacements:
Oct 50, while 10th Div was at YANGGU, each battalion in the division received approximately 50 replacements. These replacements were conscripted from the civilian populace of KANGWON-DO. They received no training, were not issued clothing or equipment, and made poor soldiers. They were used as ammo bearers until the regular soldiers were killed, at which time they inherited the deceased soldiers’ clothing, weapons, and equipment.
The 10th Div has received no replacements since departing from YANGGU Oct 50.
The 6th Div received an unknown number of replacements from the 31st Div when the 31st Div was deactivated during Nov or Dec 50.
f. Food, Ammo and Other Supplies:
The 10th Div personnel subsisted by raiding small Korean villages and confiscating food from the villagers.
Sporadic attacks upon ROK police and UN forces resulted in the division capturing considerable weapons and other supplies, but the division has received no supplies from the NKA since August 1950.
g. Signal:
Each battalion of 10th Div has several field telephones. These phones were used from Bn to Regt are of mixed USSR & US types. Each regiment has 2 wireless transmitter-receivers (USSR manufacture). PW does not know what levels these are used between.
Echelons below battalion level use couriers as their sole means of communication.
h. Morale and Battle Effectiveness:
10th Division personnel have low morale because they are ill clothed, have no direct support from other NKA or CCF units, and are not very effective in combat. Chief reasons for poor combat efficiency are lack of trained personnel and lack of resupply from rear echelons.
I. UN PW:
PW observed approx 20 ROK soldiers captured by the 25th Regt during Jan 51 approx 28 km east of ANDONG. These captured ROK soldiers were taken to 10th Div for interrogation. Information gleaned from PW is not generally distributed to lower echelons. If Division G-2 deems any information to be of immediate value to lower echelons, such information, however, is rushed by courier to the unit concerned.
Since 10th Div has no facilities to keep UN PW for a long period, PW are generally released and allowed to return to their units. ROK PW are advised to return to their respective homes, however, a few ROK PW are incorporated into 10th NKA units as replacements.
The 10th Div Hq has 1 Major who is an English-speaking interpreter for the Division G-2. He has grey hair, is over 40 yr old, and was formerly a professor of English at KIM Il Sung University in P’YONGYANG (YD 3822). This Major interprets for the Division G-2 officers in the event that US troops were captured.
j. Medical:
Many (approx 300) men in 10th Div became ill with an unidentified kind of fever between Dec 50 and 22 Feb 51. These men were so sick that they were unable to continue with the division. As they became ill they were abandoned by the division and left to whatever fate nature might have for them. Likewise approx 200 severe frostbite cases were abandoned by the division. At least 50% of the men in the 10th Div suffered from frostbite ranging in severity from mild to hopeless cases.
Treatment, immunization, or other counter-measures are not given to 10th Div personnel because the medical units have practically no medical supplies.
k. Psychological Warfare:
PW did not surrender voluntarily. Was captured when the 2nd ROK Div surrounded his battalion.
Observed UN leaflets dropped in the vicinity of TOP’YONG 25 Jan 51. Heard loudspeaker broadcasts being made from an airplane 5 Feb 51, approx 30 km southeast of KUNWI.
UN leaflets promised humane treatment and good food. The leaflets instructed NKA personnel to desert their units at night and surrender to UN forces. NKA soldiers should surrender carrying UN leaflets and holding their hands up. The leaflets added that possession of leaflets at the time of surrender was not absolutely necessary.
PW was unable to understand the loudspeaker broadcasts because the broadcasts were not clear.
PW did not believe the UN leaflets because of constant propaganda from the 10th Div political officers to the effect that NKA soldiers captured by the UN forces were tortured and then killed. 10th Division political officers warned that it would be better for NKA personnel to commit suicide than to suffer capture by UN forces. The political officers, furthermore, ordered 10th Division personnel not to read UN leaflets or to discuss them.
10th Division personnel did not discuss UN leaflets because they were afraid of punishment from political officers.
For the AC of S, G-2:
HONG
