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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3671　1 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report 029)　22 February 1951

Intelligent, cooperative. Reliability - good.

a. Security:

(1) Against air attack; When subjected to an air attack, the troops would lie down on each side of the road.

(2) Against ground attack; One advance platoon 100 yards ahead screened the flanks and front.

(3) Against tank attack; One soldier from each squad was selected as antitank man.

b. Unit marched only during the night from about 2000 to 0300 hours.

c. Unit usually followed mountain trails.

d. Moved in single file.

e. PW unit had a 10 minute break every 2 hours. One temporary sentry from each platoon was posted 30 m to the flanks.

a. Security:

(1) Against air attack; Foxholes were covered with tree branches and grass.

(2) Against ground attack; PW unit always bivouacked at the foot of a hill and had one sentry on the hill-top, and another at the bottom of the hill.

(3) Against tank attack; Antitank team of three in each squad carried "Bangalore torpedoes".

b. Sentries were posted approx 200 m to the front and rear.

c. Slept from 0430 to about 1700 in foxholes. Also ate in their foxholes. Breakfast - 0500; Supper - about 1900.

d. Foxholes (dimensions approx: 180 cm x 80 cm x 80 cm deep) were the only shelter. Whenever units ceased marching, they dug foxholes.

e. For camouflage, tree branches and grass were used.

a. First attacking line consisted of three platoons in the front of enemy position, having Japanese water cooled machine gun (Sic) supporting fire about 100 m back. Two other units attacked enemy flanks.

b. Company objective was approx 500 m in depth; battalion, about 800 m.

c. PW unit took up the pursuit after reaching the objective.

d. If the attack failed, unit retreated.

e. Troops dug when they halted.

a. Probing unit was ordered to resist as little as possible, and if enemy did not fire, not to fire.

b. Normally platoon strength was used.

c. Probing forces went to the rear of the main body after completion of the mission.

d. Probing forces were supported by 4 x 82mm mortars.

a. Regiment had one recon platoon, divided into about six groups, collecting enemy situation, strength, and intentions.

b. Night patrols were similar to daylight patrols.

a. 2 OP were set up along the line of march. Approx 5 men in each group. OP moved forward to the next hill as unit advanced.

b. An OP, consisting of two men, was posted on the nearest and highest hill-top in a defensive position.

a. Trenches and foxholes were the only fortifications used.

b. Shovels and picks were used to prepare positions.

c. Normal depth of a defensive position was approx 1,500 m.

d. One battalion was used as a covering force.

e. The reserve was located approx 1,500 - 2,000 m back. Its mission was to alternate with the forward troops. When the forward troops captured enemy positions, the reserves secured the position.

a. Upon entering KOREA, the rations consisted of corn. This corn was prepared by a "farming society" and division headquarters issued ration tickets. There was enough corn for each person.

b. Ammunition was short. It was supplied from the division supply and was transported by hand.

c. Quilted overcoat, jacket, and trousers were adequate. Not replaced when lost or worn out.

d. Intelligence personnel used civilian clothing.

a. Radio was used in division headquarters.

b. Field telephones were used at battalion level and up. Wire was sufficient.

c. Runners were used between non-wired places. Written messages were carried.

d. Bugles and whistles were used when time was short.

No definite period of training, but occasionally squad or platoon leaders instructed the soldiers while in the field.

a. 12 men in PW company had malaria.

b. Twice, inoculations were given before entering KOREA. (type unknown).

PW unit was never found by air.

Discipline was well maintained.

No desertions were heard of in KOREA.

Attitude of North Korean civilians toward the CCF was good.

CCF does not use Korean civilians. (Sic)

For the Commanding Officer: