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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3668　1 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report 029)　22 February 1951

Unintelligent but cooperative and memory fair. Reliability, fair.

a. Security

(1) Air attack:

PW unit marched only during the night, without camouflage. But, when snowing, all men reversed their uniforms to the white side and covered their heads with white towels.

During the daytime, troops dug foxholes approx 80 cm wide, 70 cm deep and camouflaged them with grass or tree branches. 3 - 5 EM dig a shelter, approx 1.7 m long, 2 m wide, covered with dirt.

(2) Ground attack:

Generally marched in Bn strength. A plat with 2 men in civilian clothing is sent out as scouts, advancing approx 200 m from main body. The scout plat is equipped with one additional LMG and each EM is equipped with 5 grenades (normally each Em carries 4 grenades).

b. Start march immediately after sunset, approx 1900 hours, halt about 0500 the next day. PW unit generally halted early enough to have foxholes dug before sunrise.

c. Unit usually travelled the main road.

d. Unit moved in Bn column; each company formed a column.

e. Halted for 15 minute breaks at intervals of 1 - 2 miles. (Sic) During halts the forward plat sent out two sentries.

a. Marched during the night and rested during daytime. For security against air and ground attack, each company posted 3 - 5 sentries and for tank attack the leading company buried 3 mines.

b. Sentries are posted on high ground and placed bout 100 m from leading company.

c. Troops slept in foxholes dug as soon as they were halted for the day. PW unit ate 3 meals a day. Breakfast cooked under cover of darkness in the villages; dinner prepared before sunset. Unit also carried dried ration (kaoliang for lunch and midnight meal).

d. PW unit used no shelters other than foxholes.

e. Took advantage of the terrain for cover and did not use any artificial camouflage in bivouac area.

A battalion in bivouac dispatched movement orders by runner. Companies formed in column upon movement out of bivouac area.

a. Normally 2 platoons; led by company leader (led by asst Co leader) undertake the attack, with the third plat held in reserve. The heavy weapons company splits into 3 plats; each plat assigned to a rifle company. Under cover of darkness, the company, in an over-running operation, commences charge from approx 100 m from enemy lines.

b. When the objective is taken company leader reports to Bn CO by runner, and awaits further instructions whether to pursue the enemy. PW did not experience unit reorganization in the battle field.

c. In case a Bn attack fails, attacking unit retreats and another Bn takes the attacking units place in the line.

d. When the attacking unit takes an objective, troops dig in while awaiting further instructions.

a. Probing forces mission is limited to testing the enemy strength and fire power. When probing attacks are repelled by the enemy, probing elements are instructed to return without attempting to continue attack.

b. Normally a rifle company is used as a probing force.

c. Probing forces do not participate in any immediately following action, but are held in reserve.

d. No planned supporting fire used.

PW claims that when the necessity to attack occurs, the attack was made generally in battalion strength.

a. Sentries in bivouac areas also serve as observers. No separate CP set up either in bivouac or in march.

b. Set up 2 - 4 OP within 80 m from Co CP and 30 - 40 m from foremost communication trench.

a. For a prolonged defensive operation, at least one zig-zig communication trench in each company is dug, camouflaged with tree branches. It is approx 100 - 120 m long, 2 m wide, 1 - 1½ m deep. A battalion prepares 3 communication trenches at intervals of 100 m to the flanks. In a limited encounter, PW unit dug individual foxholes, at intervals of 7 m, camouflaged with grass or tree branches.

b. No special weapons used in defense. PW unit used approx 100 rifles for 140 EM in each co; 9 x 30 LMG and 3 x 60 mm mortars. Set up 3 OP at a distance of 30 - 50 m from foremost foxhole, deployed triangularly. The 3 x 60 mm mortars were placed to the rear of company CP (See Sketch below). Saw 3 HMG delivered to his unit when enemy attack started, but had no information as to employment of these weapons.

c. Picks and shovels used to dig foxholes or trenches. Troop dig their own foxholes. Communication trenches are dug by all hands, including squad leaders.

d. From the position of the foremost LMG to the company CP, about 30 - 40 m, and from the Co CP to the rearmost mortar position, approx 70 - 100 m.

e. PW saw mines but never used them.

f. The reserve company was located approx 200 - 500 m behind the foremost company.

g. PW unit always fired when the enemy attacked.

Since entering KOREA, in Oct 50, PW saw dynamite sacks (tsa-yao 炸藥), dimensions approx 20cm x 20cm x 10cm respectively. Squad leader told PW that these were used to blow up enemy tanks. They were wrapped in cotton cloth and bound with string. Sqd leader explained operation of sacks as follows:

Dynamite sack is laid on the road approx 200 - 300 m from Co CP and a man is concealed about 100 m distance from the sack. When enemy tank passes, the fuse string, connected to dynamite sack, is pulled to detonate.

PW was told that CCF uses the dynamite sack (tsayao 炸藥) as an antitank weapon in ambushes.

a. Upon crossing YALU River, PW carried 14 "taping" (大餅) Chinese flour pan cakes (enough for 2 days), "pingkan" (餅乾) Chinese hardtack (enough for 2 days), 6 catties (1.3 lb per catty) of rice (enough for 3 days) and ½ catty of cooked beef. These rations lasted about 5 - 6 days after entering KOREA. Thereafter, each squad received soy beans for dry rations, 7 - 8 catties per man. Food consisted of the following:

1 meal cooked kaoliang

1 meal boiled potatoes and cabbage

1 meal dry rations

Grain was requisitioned from Korean farmers, against CCF receipts. Until 5 - 6 days after crossing the Korean border, CCF had enough food, but after that their rations were inadequate. PW received 2 packs of cigarettes (40 cigarettes) when crossing border.

b. Company had sufficient ammo. Ammo was obtained through the squad leader.

c. PW had following items of clothing:

1 suit cotton padded uniform

1 each cotton undershirt

2 each cotton outer shirt

3 each summer cotton uniform

1 pair leather boots

2 pair canvas shoes

2 pair cotton socks

2 each cotton towels

1 cotton padded glove

1 cotton cap

1 cotton padded quilt

Clothing was adequate to keep body warm but extremities suffered from the severe cold.

Usually required 8 - 10 days to replace such items as towels, socks, shoes when worn out. They could also be replaced when lost but under severe criticism. No replacement for uniforms and quilts.

d. No civilian clothing used in PW unit.

PW unit used only runners for communication between company and battalion, and company squad. All messages were written; no verbal messages carried.

a. PW trained 3 months.

b. Normal training period is 3 months. 7 out of 10 in PW unit received 3 months training.

c. PW received one months training in firing with live ammo. Trained with over head firing of 60 mm mortar in Nov 49 and May 50 in the SHANGHAI Area. 3 x 60 mm mortars fired 3 shells each from approx 200 m behind 1 rifle squad on a target approx 150 m to the squads front.

d. No training since entering KOREA.

e. Each rifleman received 3 rounds and each light machine gun crew 5 rounds in firing practice. In monthly field exercises, each rifleman received 3 rounds of ammo and each LMG 15 rounds.

a. PW unit received two immunization inoculations in Apr 50 and Jul 50, while in the SHANGHAI Area.

b. In PW company, 25 frostbite cases (5 ears and 20 feet). 4 severe frostbite cases were evacuated in Bn Hq. Knew nothing concerning the medical treatment for frozen feet.

Because CCF marched during night only, hid in camouflaged foxholes or air-raid shelters, and scattered troops over comparatively wide areas, enemy planes could not find them.

CCF unit maintains discipline through public meeting at which violations are aired and offenders publicly rebuked. 2 deserters who were apprehended were given no punishment except open criticism before whole company.

PW saw no desertion in his own company.

Most Koreans did not seem to welcome the arrival of CCF. CCF troops traded their possessions for Korean farmer's soy beans. PW traded his towel for 3 catties of soy beans. CCF requisitioned soy beans and potatoes from Koreans. PW learned from experience that 2 out of 3 Koreans were unwilling to give up their produce and PW saw 5 men in Korean clothes at Bn Hq presumably Koreans. They worked as interpreters when requisitioning supplies from Koreans, and served as plain clothes agents when unit was on the march. Could not identify them as Korean or Chinese since they spoke both Korean and Chinese well. Saw no Korean employees except ox cart drivers who evacuated the wounded and ill to the rear.

For the Commanding Officer: