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CHAO, Chao Chen 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 41 NO. 3666 1951-01-01
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3666 1 March 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS S.R. 029) 22 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: CHAO, Chao Chen (趙朝臣)
PW NUMBER: 63NK700230
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 23
DUTY: Battalion runner
UNIT: CCF, 4th Field Army, 39th Army, 117th Division, 18th Regiment, 1st Battalion.
EDUCATION: None
OCCUPATION: None
PLACE OF CAPTURE: Approx 8 miles below 38th Parallel. Near IMJIN River (臨津江).
DATE OF CAPTURE: 1 Jan 51
PLACE OF BIRTH: CHINA, SSUCHUAN-SHENG, PACHUNG-HSIEN, TISAN-CHU (中國 四川省 巴中縣 第三區)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: Pvt HEE (ATIS)

2. ASSESSMENT:
Cooperative but unintelligent. Reliability - good.

3. MARCHES:
a. One platoon was sent out as point when a regiment or a battalion was on the march. This point preceded the main body by approximately 50 m.
b. PW unit usually marched from 1700 to 0400 hours the next morning.
c. They often followed main highways.
d. March formation was single file on each side of the highway, and single file over all trails. Communications between units by bugle calls.
e. They were given 5 - 10 minutes halts for approximately every 10 miles traveled.

4. BIVOUACS:
a. During the day, sentries were posted on high grounds; during the night, sentries were posted along paths and highways. One private and one sergeant were posted at each point.
b. Following breakfast, the men were ordered to sleep in their foxholes. At dark, they utilized the civilian buildings as mess-halls and quarters. PW unit was fed twice a day; at dawn and at twilight.
c. In the bivouac area, several men were allowed to stay in one large foxhole. Camouflage measures for foxholes - covered by branches and boards, on top of which is laid grass and straw, or snow.

5. ASSEMBLY FOR THE ATTACK:
a. Assembly areas were used. From bivouac area to assembly area, was approximately 2 to 3 miles, which required less than an hour to negotiate. From assembly area to line of departure was approximately one mile.
b. Single file was used in movement to assembly area.
c. Attacking parties had approximately 20 - 30 minutes in advance of the H-hour.
d. Enemy strength and their own strength; friendly units on the left and right were told by the officers.
e. Column formation used to move out of the assembly area. Every company assigned one scouting platoon which sent out two to three scouts approximately 15 m ahead of the scouting platoon. The scouting platoon was approximately 15 m ahead of the company.

6. ASSAULT:
a. Mass fire was used for half hour. Company commander started assault when ordered. In every platoon, the platoon leader carried a brass horn. A certain number of long or short notes, prearranged by the platoon leader with his men, indicated the assault.
b. The depth of the objective for a company was approximately 100 - 150 m.
c. After having reached the objective, a patrolling squad was sent out to determine enemy dispositions. Captives and captured weapons were sent to higher headquarters. Replacements never arrived in PW unit.
d. If the attack failed, retreats were covered.
e. Before dawn the troops stopped, and dug in.

7. PROBING ATTACK:
a. The mission was to ascertain enemy strength; to capture the enemy if possible; and to attack the enemy if it was believed that they could be overcome.
b. A platoon was normally used.

8. OBSERVATION:
a. OP were located on mountain peaks.
b. OP were set approximately a mile away from the enemy. An outpost consisted of a squad leader with one or two privates.

9. DEFENSIVE TACTICS:
a. Machine gun nests were used in the organization of a defense position.
b. Weapons used in defense
Division - One 75mm Pack Howitzer Battalion with 12x75mm Pack Howitzers.
Regiment - 2 x 82mm mortar companies.
Battalion - One mortar platoon consisted of 2x82mm mortars, 6x60mm mortars, and 2 bazookas. In combat, 2x60mm mortars were assigned to each company. (All weapons in PW unit were captured from the CNA). The 75mm Pack Howitzer battalion usually was located one to two miles behind the line of defense. The two 82mm mortar companies were located from half to one mile to the rear of the line of defense.
c. Only hand tools used by the soldiers to prepare fortifications.
d. Heard lectures by his officers that they would use the tactics of driving through the center, accompanied by double envelopment.
ASSEMBLY AREA (中心闈花一点雨面)
e. Regimental reserves were located approximately a mile behind the line of defense.
f. Wherever possible, the policy is to overcome and capture small groups of the enemy without undue expenditure of ammunition.

10. ANTI-TANK TACTICS:
a. Each battalion had a bazooka squad with 2 x 2.38 inch bazookas, under control of the battalion commander.
b. In defense, PW unit once dug a tank ditch, which was 1/6 mile long, on each side of the highway - 2 m deep and approximately 4 m wide.
c. A "tank killer" squad was attached to every company. The squad was composed of a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, and 9 - 10 privates; none of the men in this squad were volunteers. The squad leader and the assistant squad leader were equipped with SMG. Each men carried 2 to 3 "Bangalore torpedoes" and four hand grenades.
d. The battalion commander said they were getting some mines, but no mines had been issued.

11. AMBUSH AND ENCIRCLING TACTICS:
Sheer man-power was used to encircle enemy units. In case of topographical difficulties which prevent the elimination of the enemy, openings on all sides would be made to lure the enemy out.

12. SUPPLY:
Believes all personnel in the 39th Army received the following clothing:
(1) One suit, NK designed padded uniform.
(2) One pile lined cap.
(3) One suit summer underwear.
(4) One pair pile lined boots and two pairs cloth shoes.
(5) One pair of woolen gloves.
(6) One pair of cloth socks.
All personnel carried 14 pounds of either rice, barley, or flour. Crackers were issued to them once in KOREA. All rations were supplied by nearby civilians. An official receipt was given. Civilians trusted that the government would reimburse them later. PW unit was well fed all the time.

13. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. Radios were used for contact between army, regiment, and battalion. The battalion radio range was approximately 10 miles. Told that the radio was made in the US. There was one radio operator to a battalion; operator and radio were reliable.
b. Telephones were used in companies. They had sufficient wire by using captured supplies.
c. Runners were used. Every regiment had a squad consisting of 20 runners. Each battalion had a squad consisting of 15 runners, and every company had four runners. The maximum distance warranting the use of a runner was approximately a mile. Important messages were written; routine messages were delivered orally.
d. Bugles.

14. TRAINING:
a. PW unit (39th Army) received two months training near LIAO YANG(遼陽) in LIAO NING PROVINCE (遼寧省).
b. Training included:
Field problems and overhead firing of machine guns and artillery.
One hundred meter target practice, allowing each rifleman to fire five rounds.
75% of the soldiers in PW unit were ex-CNA. The CCF believed that this group had received enough combat experience, so only brief training periods were conducted.
c. In Mar 50, all North Korean soldiers within the 4th Field Army, 38th Army, 43rd Army, and 49th Army were sent back to KOREA. Prior to their return, they constituted approximately 50% or more of the personnel strength in every army.
d. Ammunition was scarce in the training center.

15. MEDICAL:
a. All personnel in PW unit were vaccinated for smallpox and innoculated three times (innoculation, unknown).

16. DISCIPLINE:
Discipline was fair. Due to language barrier, no desertions occurred.

17. RELATIONS WITH KOREANS:
Korean people were afraid of the Chinese troops; their attitude toward the CCF was poor.
Believes the two interpreters in the battalion headquarters, and one interpreter in every company were Korean civilians.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROBINSON

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