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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3665　1 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS S.R. 029)　22 February 1951

Cooperation and physical condition; good. Intelligence and memory, fair. Reliability: good.

a. Security Air:

(1) Troops scattered seeking cover on approach of air craft. Were ordered to lie still and not to fire at aircraft so as to give away position.

(2) When under ground attack, troops were ordered to fall back and deploy into battle formation. Reason for falling back was to get closer to reserve unit following behind, and to draw the enemy on, and find out his actual strength.

(3) Under tank attack troops deployed to left and right facing the tank. The rifleman work their way to the rear of the tank and try to engage the trailing foot soldiers, leaving the “tank killer” team (3 men per platoon) to dispose of the tank.

b. Troops marched at night only, from 1700 to 0400 hours.

c. Troops used main highways when available; also, trails.

d. PW unit moved in one column. When main highways were used, troops marched in column of two’s. Over trails, troops were strung out in single file. Messengers on foot and occasionally on horseback were used for communications between columns. At crossroads, directional signs were posted, indicating routes for units to follow.

e. Troops were given a 10 minute break for every 5 miles of marching. When close to the battle area, security measures consisted of posting of guards about 50 m to the front.

a. Troops, after arriving at the bivouac area, immediately start digging foxholes large enough to accommodate 2 soldiers, and also strong enough to sustain the weight of tanks. Against ground attack, each individual unit is responsible for preparing its own defensive positions. Rifle units dig their own foxholes, heavy weapons unit prepares its own gun emplacements, etc.

b. PW unit posted 2 guards on the road leading to the front, about 30 - 40 m from bivouac area. Also, one guard was posted some distance out on the road leading into the bivouac area.

c. Troops sleep during the day, and food taken to the foxholes to be eaten.

d. Only shelter used were civilian houses, whenever available. They were used both for troop quarters and cooking purposes.

e. Natural vegetation such as straw, dirt, grass, stumps, etc. was used for camouflage.

a. Assembly areas were used, reached in single file. Assembly areas usually were about 2/3 the distance toward the front, from the bivouac area.

b. Single column only was used by his unit to reach the assembly area.

c. Assembly 1 hour before H-hour, approx.

d. Troops receive their battle assignments and deploy accordingly.

e. Unit moved out as skirmishers. This formation changes only when the battle situation warrants a change. No scouts.

a. When the objective is taken, the attacking force, if not badly mauled, continues to press the attack, leaving the reserve units to look after the “spoils of war”. If the attacking force suffered excessively in number of killed and wounded, the reserve unit is ordered to continue the attack, leaving the assaulting force to reorganize. Then a request is submitted for replacements.

b. If the objective is not reached by daybreak, the unit withdraws out of range of small arms fire, digs in, and fights only when forced to do so. Otherwise, they wait the day out, and then resume the attack the following night.

c. Troops dig in when they are stopped.

a. A squad is deployed around the perimeter of the assembly area; equipped with field glasses.

b. OP are set in front of defense positions, usually on high ground. If not on high ground, they are posted about 40 - 50 m ahead of the defense areas.

a. Individual foxholes are dug as protection against aircraft attack. Trench is dug across the defense position in a staggered pattern.

b. Picks and shovels are used by the individual soldier to dig defensive positions.

c. Troops are ordered not to fire at attacking aircraft. Reason: compromise their position.

Each platoon was a 3-man “tank killer” team. Equipment used consists of dynamite sticks bound together, Bangalore torpedoes, armor piercing mines, and grenades.

a. Rice, millet, and koaliang are used on a rotational basis, when available. Food is prepared in civilian houses and brought up to the troop area by the kitchen help. Food is adequate.

b. Unit was short on all types of ammo.

c. PW had one cotton padded, winter uniform that was adequate. Uniform is mended when torn, and it is very difficult to obtain a new issue.

d. Civilian clothes are used at times by “recon” units, when out on a mission. Also spies are dressed in Korean students’ uniforms, plus civilian clothes, for the purpose of infiltrating UN lines.

a. Radios are used from regimental level up.

b. Runners used between companies, verbal messages. From battalion up, coded messages. About 3 - 5 miles is the maximum distance for any runner.

c. Bugles are used when attacking. Also used as means of signalling between companies. Flares are used for signalling purposes, but PW does not know the color code.

d. The most outstanding difficulty in communications is the constant cutting of telephone wires by artillery and aircraft.

a. Received 3 months of training. Fired the rifle 3 times and fired the model 92 Jap 70mm howitzer (battalion gun) but once.

b. No field training received after entering Korea.

c. Ammo very critical item. Ammo was guarded and hand issued during training. Ammo insufficient.

a. The following diseases were noted in PW company:

(1) One man was stricken with typhus. Symptoms described are as follows: weak, red spots, delirium, and bitten by lice or fleas. The whole company was quarantined, and every soldier was checked. The troops were then ordered to wash all their underclothes in boiling water.

(2) 2 men were stricken with cholera. Symptoms described: vomiting, cramps, and weakness. Counter measures taken: to drink only boiled water.

(3) 4 men in company had frostbite to the extent that they couldn’t walk. 5 others, having frostbite could walk for a limited distance.

By concealing themselves in foxholes during the day; by skilfully camouflaging themselves with natural vegetation.

For the Commanding Officer: