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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3662　1 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS S.R. 029)　22 February 1951

Intelligence, cooperation, judgement of distances and measurements, memory, and physical condition were fair. Reliability: fair.

a. Only passive defense employed against air attack during march. Unit marched at night with standing black-out orders. For security against ground attack, there is always an advance element which usually consisted of a squad sent out approx one half mile ahead of the moving company. A battalion moves as a group, with each company preceding another in files on each side of the road, and maintaining a distance of 50 m between each company. To secure against tank attacks, there is a bazooka team with 3 bazookas. The team takes up position along the tank’s line of approach. Anti-tank mines are also used in tank attacks.

b. Unit started marches at 1800 hours and halted at 2400 or 0100 hours.

c. Unit marched over highways and trails or went cross country only to change to another route.

d. Unit marched with files on each side of the road. Runners were used for communication.

e. There were 5 - 10 minute breaks at 3 - 4 mile intervals.

a. Upon arriving at a designated bivouac area, each soldier digs his individual foxhole. Foxholes are dug at intervals of 5 m apart, and camouflaged with trees, grass, or earth. Battalion commander designates each company’s position when they stop marching. Normally company commanders send a platoon to available high ground or hills to observe hostile movements. PW saw no security measures taken against tank attacks.

b. Company commanders designated a squad to insure the security of the bivouac area. They serve as roving patrols around the perimeter at night, and stay in their foxholes during the day. 3 to 4 sentry posts were set up around the company bivouac area, with 1 or 2 sentries at each post.

c. Men eat in the open air at night in the bivouac area. Before daybreak, they eat their morning meal, and go to their foxholes to sleep.

d. The only shelter is their foxhole.

e. PW saw no specific camouflage measures other than what was offered by the terrain in the bivouac area.

a. Before a company starts on an assault, the company commander, deputy company commander, political instructor, and assistant political instructor hold a conference. Then the company commander designates a platoon as an assault unit, which is led by one of the four officers. The other 2 platoons remain at a distance of approx 80 m behind the assault platoon as reserves to exploit openings made by the assault platoon. However, if the assault platoon fails, the reserve platoons back up the assault unit.

b. Upon reaching an objective, it is up to the company commander, battalion commander, or higher commander to decide whether the unit would hold the ground. 4 litter men in the company take care of the wounded. However, if the number of wounded were too great, they would be abandoned, if the unit was ordered to retreat to their former positions.

c. The assault unit commander orders the retreat if the attack fails.

d. Troops dig in when halted.

a. The probing attack unit is told to return to original position in the event of a failure.

b. A platoon is normally used.

a. Daylight patrols of squad strength are used. Mission is to capture prisoners.

b. The patrolling unit received instructions from company commander. Each man carried a rifle.

a. No OP set up along line of march

b. OP were set up in defense position. 3 men each; one serves as a runner.

a. Troops dig foxholes in defense positions.

b. PW own company was designated by regimental commander to guard a mountain about 10 miles N of CHANGGAP’O (　　). Unit was equipped with 3 x 60mm mortars, 9 x 7.9 light machine guns, and rifles (80 rounds per soldier). 2 platoons of the company dug in on two adjacent hills, while the other platoon dug in at the bottom of the hill. OP were set up on the hills. However, there was no patrol activity while the unit was stationed there. The mission of the unit was to guard the rear position of the regiment. No anti-personnel mine field was laid.

c. Shovels were used to dig foxholes.

a. There are 2 bazookas in a battalion. 3 to 4 anti-tank mines in the company. Hand grenades are also used to fight tanks.

Stick to tank when placed by “tank killers”.

Weight of AT Mine: Approx 2 catties

b. The company commander designated 3 to 6 men as a team to destroy approaching tanks.

a. 3 catties of cooked dried rice, half catty of salt. This ration is enough for four meals.

b. Clothing:

1 fur cap.

2 summer cotton uniforms.

1 winter uniform, double lines, cotton inside.

1 quilt, cotton.

1 pair “sneakers”.

1 pair boots - leather and canvas.

1 pair socks - cotton.

1 poncho.

1 pair drawers, cotton.

1 underwear, cotton.

Three sets of summer uniforms are issued a year. A winter uniform is issued once a year. It is very difficult to get replacements when worn out or lost.

c. Unit did not use civilian clothes.

a. Telephones are used between battalion command posts and regimental command posts. Wire extends approx 4 to 5 miles.

b. Runners are used to carry verbal and written messages. Runners are used even for long distances.

c. Bugles are not used to call the attention of other units when near the front lines. Whistles are used instead, to avoid drawing the attention of hostile forces. Flares are used when the assault is to be coordinated with other units.

a. PW only period of training was while in the CNA.

b. Saw no training conducted in forward areas in KOREA.

a. Diseases in unit:

2 cases of tuberculosis

1 case of eye disease

4 cases of malaria

1 case of typhus

1 case of frostbite

2 cases of rheumatism

b. PW received one injection when in MANCHURIA. (The injection appears to have been tetanus). No other immunizations given.

Offender in minor infractions is subjected to public ridicule. PW himself deserted twice; first time was in MANCHURIA while unit was moving into KOREA. He was caught and confined for 4 days, slept without blankets, and was ridiculed by other soldiers. Second time was in KOREA, where he was picked up by another CCF unit and sent back to regimental headquarters, where the regimental commander and political commissar gave him a talk. However, no punishment was given, but a warning that he would be shot if he tried to desert again.

Three to four desertions occurred in PW company. Deserters had a discussion before deserting, in order to take different routes. One soldier shot himself in the leg in order to avoid going with the unit to KOREA.

For the Commanding Officer: