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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 3660　1 March 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report 029)　22 February 1951

Physical condition was good. Cooperation and memory, fair. Intelligence and judgement of distances and measurements, poor. Reliability, fair.

a. Dispersion was used as a precautionary measure against air attack. Two advance parties of platoon size usually preceded a regimental formation.

b. The 442nd Regt marched at night, from twilight to dawn.

c. They marched over highways more frequently than trails.

d. 442nd Regt changed its march formation from a column of two’s to a file on each side of the highway. 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th squads on one side and 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th squads on the other. Plat Ldr marched at the head of his platoon. Co CO marched along center of the highway. Bn CO and Regt CO were mounted on horses. A distance of 5 paces between men. Communications between Bn - bugle calls; between Regt - mounted messengers. Within a mile distance, bugle was usually used; within 2 to 3 miles, mounted messengers; Between Regt and Div Hq - radios.

e. For every 7 to 10 miles, a halt of 20 minutes. No flank or other security measures were taken on marches.

a. Fox holes were covered with grass or snow to prevent exposure to air observation.

b. Each platoon had a roving patrol. Platoons within the company had separate bivouac areas.

c. They slept from morning until sun down. Meals were served in the morning before they went to sleep and after they awakened in the late afternoon.

d. Shelters were dangerous to occupy due to UN air activity.

e. No specific camouflage measures were used in bivouac areas.

No assembly areas were used in PW Regt.

a. Normally Bn CO gave the assault order. The order was transmitted by bugle call to the companies.

b. The depth of objective:

c. When assaulting unit reached an objective, it continued the advance until daybreak. Reserves moved up to capture objective and set up a new bivouac area.

d. If a company failed to take an objective, additional companies would be committed. This was known as the “human waves” tactics (　　). If they completely failed in the assault, reserves would “leap frog” the assault unit.

e. Troops dug in when stopped.

a. Daylight patrols were sent out. Usual strength was one squad leader and three privates from each company. Their mission was to collect information about the enemy from civilians. The patrol occasionally wore civilian clothes.

b. The mission and size of a night patrol was similar to the daylight patrol.

c. The patrols had pistols and flares. Personnel on patrolling mission were well briefed before they went out. They had to know the approx location of the enemy and of friendly units and the passwords for the night.

d. Excepting the squad leader, all members of the patrol spoke Korean as well as Chinese. Sometimes they were sent out to contact guerrillas behind the UN line.

a. The Co CP, each consisting of a squad leader and a private, were set up in front of defense positions. Their mission was to detect all enemy movements.

a. All personnel in the 50th Army carried approx 10 pounds of rice - sufficient for 3 days; 4 pounds of hard crackers for emergency uses. Before the unit arrived at 38th parallel, they were issued 5 pounds of fried soy beans. After the unit crossed the Korean border, they used N Korean Gov’t ration receipts to replenish their ration. The ration receipts stated the amount of rations needed. Rations were replenished by the Gov’t Ration Reserve Dept. Rations were sufficient at all times.

b. Rifle ammo was sufficient. Each squad had two ammo bearers, carrying 600 rounds to resupply the squad. Each rifleman carried 120 rounds.

c. All personnel in the 50th Army were issued the following clothing:

(1) One padded overcoat

(2) One padded coat

(3) One padded trousers

(4) One set summer underwear

(5) One lined cap

(6) One pair lined boots and one pair cloth shoes

(7) One pair socks

Clothing was not adequate for PW.

a. Radios were used between division and regiments.

b. Telephones were used; cooper wire was sufficient and reliable. One communications squad to a Bn.

c. Runners were used; two to each company, and to each battalion. Two mounted messengers in each of the regiments and each of the divisions. Verbal messages were used most frequently in the combat area.

d. Communications between co and plat - bugles; between Plat and sqd - whistles; flares were used at night. Four colors of flares were used; red indicated enemy’s location, blue indicated assembly point, green indicated safe to advance and white unknown.

e. The difficulty in communications was inability of runners to locate certain units.

a. 50th Army received two months training.

b. Training included combat problems and firing of such supporting weapons as 60 mm, 82 mm and HMG.

c. During the training period ammo was insufficient.

a. In PW company, approx 50 men were sick, of which approx 25 had not been acclimated, and approx 20 had malarial attacks, and 4 to 5 had frostbite.

b. PW unit had been vaccinated for small pox and innoculated five times for cholera and other diseases.

c. There were approx 50 serious cases of frozen feet in PW Army. Twelve of them were sent back to MANCHURIA. (PW was told this by the Bn CO.) The minor cases were taken care of by the company first aid men. Medicines were scarce, especially for frostbite treatments.

Discipline was good. Rape, the most serious violation in the CCF, was punishable by death. Two desertions occurred in PW company by the time they reached P’YONGYANG.

Attitude of Korean civilians toward the Chinese was fair.

For the Commanding Officer: