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CHAO, Pei Chin 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 40 NO. 3617 1951-01-08
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3617 27 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS SPECIAL REPORT 022) 15 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: CHAO, Pei Chin (趙佩金)
PW NUMBER: 700379
RANK: Pvt
AGE: 40
DUTY: Ammo Bearer (MG Co)
UNIT: 4th Field Army, ? Army Group, 50th Army, 148th Div, 1st Regt, 3rd Bn, MG Co
EDUCATION: 3 years elementary school
OCCUPATION: Farmer
PLACE OF CAPTURE: SUWON (水原)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 8 Jan 51
PLACE OF BIRTH: CHINA, YUNNAN-SHENG, LUCHUAN-HSIEN, CHINGLUNGHSIANG (雲南省 陸川縣 淸龍鄕)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: Pvt HEE

2. ASSESSMENT:
Cooperative but not intelligent. Reliability, fair.

3. MARCHES:
a. Security
PW unit had not encountered any air attack; was instructed to wear the white side of their padded overcoats out; and keep as close to the ground as possible. PW unit had no antiaircraft weapons. If under heavy air attack, they were instructed to mount their machine guns. Special instructions were given for defense against ground and tank attacks.
b. PW unit never marched during the day. They usually marched from 2100 to 0300 the next morning. The distance covered was approx 20 miles per day.
c. PW unit used trails and highways, and cross country on its marches.
d. PW unit travelled along highways (a file on each side). Cross country and over trails was in single file. For communication between companies and between battalions, runners were used. Each platoon provided a runner to company Hq and each company a runner to the battalion Hq. As the unit was usually on the move at night, no wire communication was employed. During the day, when situation was stabilized, telephones were put to use.
e. Halts during their marches were 10 minutes to an hour long. Depending upon the entire distance required to cover that night.

4. BIVOUACS:
a. PW believes there was no security taken against air attack, ground attack, and tank attack.
b. One sentry was sent out from each squad. No one was allowed to wander around, but to remain in his fox hole, which was about a meter deep a little over a man’s height in length, and a little wider than his shoulders in width. Location of guards mostly on the hills or higher ground.
c. Enlisted men slept over straw in their fox holes. Officers slept in civilian huts or buildings. They had two meals a day, one at dawn and one at twilight. They retired as soon as they had breakfast. At 1600 they had their second meal for the day.
All personnel in PW regiment carried approx 14 lb of fine grain rice, sufficient for 5 days ration. They also carried two pounds of crackers, and about four pounds of mixed flour. Every man had sufficient ration for the day. They were not allowed to eat their crackers unless ordered to do so. Whenever they could they replenished their rations daily.
Every company had a supply officer responsible for the ration of his company. With two or three men, he searched the villages for food and firewood. When they found what they needed, they gave the owner a receipt which he in turn handed over to the chief of the village or town. They paid for everything except the rice and firewood.
d. No shelters for the enlisted men; only officers had shelters.
e. No specific camouflage measures were taken in bivouac area, but some straw and wild grass were used to camouflage the weapons such as machine guns and mortars.

5. ASSEMBLY FOR THE ATTACK:
a. Troops reached the assembly areas by foot. These areas were half a mile from the battalion Hq, and 1½ mile from line of departure.
b. They rarely used multiple columns in movement to assembly areas. More often they used single file movement because of the limited width of trails and paths.
c. The allotted time for the attacking party to reach the line of departure was half an hour.

6. ASSAULT:
a. PW was instructed that all assault will be conducted by bugle calls ordered by Bn CO.
b. The depth of objective for a company was approx 300 to 1000 meters.
c. If attack fails, enforcement will be added to the attacking party. If enemy still firmly holding the objective, they will then retreat squad by squad, platoon by platoon.
d. Troops will dig in when they are stopped in daylight.

7. PROBING ATTACK:
a. Cavalrymen were used for probing attack. The size of the unit are approx 30 from a regiment, and 50 to 60 from a division.
b. Probing forces will report to their own unit Hq after completion of their mission.
c. PW believes there was no supporting fire preceding or accompanying the probing forces, because these cavalrymen were only reconnaissance troops.

8. DEFENSIVE TACTICS:
a. Normal depth for a company defense line is 1 mile.
b. The company reserve force will be located 2/3 mile from the defense line.
c. Troops at times will receive orders not to fire, but PW had no idea why.

9. ANTI-TANK TACTICS:
PW believes some companies had one or two US bazookas size similar to the 3.5 inch USA bazooka.

10. AIRCRAFT:
The only defensive measure taken against UN aircrafts was instruction to mount the heavy machine gun when the UN aircraft fly within their range, which is approx 3000 meters. They never did, however, receive any order to fire so far.

11. SUPPLY:
a. All personnel in PW unit were required to carry 5 days rations consisting of approx 14 pounds of rice, two pounds of crackers and approx 4 pounds of mixed flour. All rations were replenished by nearby villagers through the chief of the village. They always had extra rations for each day.
b. Each man had a hundred to hundred fifty rounds of ammo, depending upon the individuals physical ability. Two hundred rounds to a man was not common.
c. All soldiers had the following items before they left for KOREA.
Padded overcoat - 1
Padded coat - 1
Padded pants - 1
Leather boots - 1
Cloth shoes - 8
Undershirts (cotton) - 2
Drawers (cotton) - 2
Pile lined cap - 1
Socks - 2
Gloves - 1
According to PW, they were adequately equipped. In fact they were better off than they were in the CNA. They even had to send some of their clothing back to MANCHURIA because it was too heavy for them to carry. No clothing will be replaced; if worn out, each individual had to repair them himself.
d. No civilian clothing was used without permission. Spies were excepted.

12. COMMUNICATIONS:
a. Runners were used to carry oral and written messages. Distance usually covered was 2.3 mile at the most.
b. Bugles were used only upon contact with the enemy while on marches, and transmission of messages between units.

13. TRAINING:
PW received no military training since he joined the CCF except political training and discussions.

14. MEDICAL:
a. Approx 10 out of every 120 soldiers had malaria attacks. Last summer in PW regiment 65% of the unit were malaria patients.
b. Each individual was vaccinated for smallpox every year. PW believes that injections for cholera were also given.
c. Frostbite and frozen feet were not common in PW regiment. In fact there is more frostbite in MANCHURIA than in KOREA. Serious cases of frostbite within the unit were sent back to MANCHURIA immediately on trucks or by litter-bearers.

15. DISCIPLINE:
Discipline was excellent. If a soldier violated any regulation he was admonished by his fellow comrades, of his plat or of his company depending upon the violation. No corporal punishment was given to violators. Maximum punishment was confinement for a couple of days.
Because ex-CNA soldiers received better treatment from the CCF, desertions were rare. Besides, communities in MANCHURIA were well organized so that any deserter could be recaptured immediately. In KOREA, desertions were also few due to language difficulty.

16. RELATIONS WITH KOREANS:
North Korean attitude toward CCF was fair, but the South Korean attitude toward the CCF was passive. Things had to be forced before they were carried out.
PW believes there were no Korean civilians working in the CCF, and no CCF officers or advisors working in the NKA.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROBINSON

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