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CHANG Kong 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 40 NO. 3614 1951-01-01
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3614 27 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report 022) 15 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: CHANG Kong (張功)
PW NUMBER: 53 NK 700232
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 30
DUTY: Machine Gunner
UNIT: 4th Field Army, 38th Army, 114th Div, 32nd Regt, 1st Bn, 1st Plat, 1st Sqd
EDUCATION: None
OCCUPATION: Barber
PLACE OF CAPTURE: HWACH’ON (樺川)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 1 Jan 51
PLACE OF BIRTH: CHINA, CHIANGHSI-SHENG, KUEICHI-HSIEN, TIENLOHSIANG (中國 江西省 貴■縣 天羅鄕)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: Pvt KIM (ATIS)

2. ASSESSMENT:
Cooperative, Reliability-Fair.

3. MARCHES:
a. Air Attack: When attacked by enemy planes Model 92 (1932) 7.7mm HMG were used, and all personnel concealed themselves utilizing natural cover.
Ground Attack: When attacked by enemy ground forces counter fire was not used until the enemy approached within 150 meters of the unit’s position. Unit would disperse when enemy attacked from the rear.
Tank Attack: When attacked by tanks, everyone except the bazooka teams, anti-tanks rifle gunners Model 97 20mm, and HMG gunners Model 92 7.7mm, took cover. 12 lbs (approx.) mines were laid as anti-tank measure.
b. Marches occurred during hours of 1900 - 0400.
c. Marched cross country and over mountain trails.
d. Unit moved in single file. Rifle shots and flares were used for the purpose of communication between columns. Usually marched 4 miles an hour.
e. A fifteen minute halt was given for every two hours of the march. Between 0400 - 0300 breakfast was served. Sentries were posted at the entrances to the unit position and at the top of mountains.
f. During the march, no smoking and no talking allowed.

4. BIVOUACS:
a. Security:
(1) Air Attacks: During air attack, all soldiers remained in their camouflaged fox holes. Three rifle shots were used as air attack warning. No counter fire was used while in bivouacs.
(2) Ground Attack: Unit position was completely camouflaged by use of branches, trees and grass. Automatic rifles, LMG, and HMG were used within 200 meter range.
(3) Tank Attack: For defense against tank attack, there were bazookas, HMG and Model 92 anti-tank rifles set up in the bivouac area. Only LMG were used against infantry men who followed the tanks. No specific camouflage measures were used against enemy attack.
b. Two sentries were posted at the bivouac area. Two sentries were posted at the highest point.
c. 1700 - 1800 Supper
1900 - 0400 (next morning) - March
0400 - 0600 Breakfast
0700 - 1700 Sleeping hours
During the sleeping hours, no one was allowed to come out of the unit position or to make noise on account of the security regulation which was applicable to all officers and EM. Camouflage was used by soldiers going to the latrine. No meal was served during sleeping hours.
In the bivouac area, 16 lbs of dried rations enough for 5 days, was given to each soldier. Mess hours were not regular and soldiers helped themselves whenever they wanted to eat. There was no regular sleeping hours. It depended upon the situation.
d. Shelters, constructed by the UN forces and NKA, were used by the CCF units.
e. Because of air attacks, unit tended to avoid heavy wooded areas. Areas without too many trees were always selected because they could use the natural feature without inviting air attacks.

5. ASSEMBLY FOR THE ATTACK:
a. Assembly area commonly used was within 300m of enemy position. Artillery support was given soon after infantry unit left the assembly area.
b. Multiple columns were used in movement to assembly area.
c. It was reached in 15 minutes. Departure began 3 hours in advance of attack.
d. In the assembly area, 4 hand grenades, and 100 rounds of rifle ammunition were given to each soldier.
e. Single column formation was used in the moving out of the assembly area.

6. ASSAULT:
a. Assault was led by the Bn commander, Co commanders, Plat leaders and squad leaders. Reconnaissance was made before starting assault. In the assault, triangular formation was very effective in reaching the objective. When within 200m of the enemy position, men started to points of vantage. The following formation was used in the assault. Each squad divided into 4 teams.
TeamNo. of MenDutyWeapon
1st Team3PursuitCarbines
   Automatic rifles
2nd Team3Destroying enemyAnti-tank guns
  Hvy weaponsAnti-tank mines
3rd Team3SecurityRifles
4th Team3Ammunition supplyRifles
b. 300 meters depth of objective for companies, 400 meters depth of objective for Bn, 1,000 meters for Regt and Div.
c. After reaching the objective the wounded were gathered and sent to the rear by the medics. There was no reorganization after the objective was reached.
d. When the attack failed, the 2 platoons of the unit retreated while one platoon held on supported by HMG firing. When the 2 platoons were completely withdrawn, the other Plat then started to retreat, as the first 2 Plats provided covering fire and supported by mortar and HMG firing.
e. Troops dug in when the attack was halted.

7. PROBING ATTACKS:
a. Missions were assigned to a Plat.
b. 3 or 4 men from a Plat were sent on a scouting patrol and often captured 2 or 3 prisoners for interrogation.
c. After completion of the mission, probing forces attacked the enemy flanks to determine the enemy’s defensive power.
d. The mission was not preceded or accompanied by pre-planned supporting fire.

8. PATROLLING:
a. 3 or 4 men were used for patrolling in daylight. They wore Korean white dresses or Korean student uniforms. The time of departure was usually 1000 to 1700 hours.
b. No patrols sent out at night.
c. No particular preparation was needed because they didn’t take along any food. 4 hand grenades and a German made pistol (Mauser?) were carried by each man.
d. The following instructions were given to the patrol:
(1) Determine enemy strength and position.
(2) Capture prisoners.
(3) Observe enemy shelters, fox holes, tank activity, mine fields and booby traps.
e. Patrols were sent out for the purpose of contacting guerrillas. The following instructions were given to such patrols:
(1) Observe natural terrain.
(2) Estimate number of guerrillas available.
(3) Patrol shelters and guerrilla activities.

9. OBSERVATION:
a. Observation post were equipped with US made radio. Intercepting receivers were set up in the perimeter of division assembly areas, and operated by Div Hq.
b. OP were set up along lines of march.
c. OP were set up in front of defense position.

10. DEFENSIVE TACTICS:
a. Straw, dried grass and pine trees were used in camouflaging defense positions.
b. PW does not know about the normal doctrine of CCF defensive tactics; however, PW knows that on 21 Oct 50, the CCF 114th Div set up a defensive line against three companies of ROKA at WOLBONGSAN (月俸山) vicinity, P’YONGAN NAMDO (平安南道), KOREA. OPLR located at 5km from the ROKA offensive positions and three points were occupied by the 1st Bn, 2nd Bn, and 3rd Bn of the CCF 114th Div to engage the enemy. One Arty Plat was 1,000m behind each Bn position. 2,300 m behind the Arty positions was the MLR. The Arty Btry HQ was located 3,000m behind the MLR (see sketch). At the OPLRm interdiction fire was employed to destroy enemy position. Japanese made mountain guns also supported the Arty interdiction. Among infantry weapons were model 38 rifles, US .30 cal carbines, automatic rifles (Chinese), SMG, (Chinese), US LMG, Czechoslovakian LMG, Canadian LMG, Model 92 7.7mm Lewis type Japanese model 38 LMG, 60 Chinese made mortars, Model 92 105mm guns, US bazookas, mines, and Model 94 Mt (pack) guns.
c. The normal depth of a defensive line was approx 3,000m.
d. 60m from the OPLR, anti-personnel mines were used.
e. Sweeping fire was used by covering forces.
f. HMG and 60mm mortars were used in counter-attack. Infantry used hand grenades.
g. Troops had order not to fire until enemy approached within 50m of the defensive position.

11. ANTI-TANK TACTICS:
When tanks are sighted, a tank killer team was organized. 15 lb explosives were thrown against the tanks. If there were two tanks, the first tank would be their first target because the second tank would be immobilized when the first tank blocked the road.

12. ABUSH AND ENCIRCLING TACTICS:
a. Three man ambush teams were organized, and they were located in the most vulnerable spots.
b. No anti-tank weapons were used in ambush. They carried carbines, automatic rifles or pistols.
c. While the encircling unit attacked the center of the enemy position, two other groups attacked the flanks. When the frontal group observed that the flanking attacks were successful it started to retreat in order to draw the enemy from its position. As the enemy advanced forward, the flanking groups encircled its rear. They did not leave a hole in the encirclement.

13. AIRCRAFT:
No defensive measures were taken against UN aircraft. Camouflage measures were used in the assembly and bivouac area.
Japanese Model 92 (1932) 7.7 HMG with AA adapter, US made AA guns, and Japanese made AA guns were used.

14. SUPPLY:
a. 2 1bs of rice, kaoliang, and millet were given to each person. The ration was enough. The kitchen detail prepared hot food for soldiers in the bivouac area. In the combat area, dried rations were issued.
b. 80 rounds of rifle ammunition were issued to each infantry man. 150 rounds of LMG ammunition were given to everyone in the LMG Squad. 200 round of HMG ammunition were issued to each in the HMG squad.
c. No clothing was issued.
d. Civilian clothing was brought from CHINA.

15. COMMUNICATION:
a. Types of RadioUnitsMax Range
 Walkie-Talkie SCR 300Bn - Div7 miles
 SCR 600 Radio TelephoneDiv - Field Armyunk
b. American wire equipment was used.
c. Runners were used and carried both written and verbal messages within two miles distance.
d. When attacked by enemy ground or air forces, bugles and whistles were blown. Between Plat and Co bugles and whistle were used. Cos up to Regt only bugles were used. Between Regt and Div flares were used.
e. Infantry had an outstanding difficulty in communication in combat area for the lack of radio telephones.

16. TRAINING:
a. Received basic infantry drills, rifle firing, and combat training for three months.
b. The normal training period was three to five months.
c. Actual firing using 3 live rounds was allowed each soldier.

17. MEDICAL:
a. PW has noticed diarrhea and influenza in his Plat. Diarrhea; 2 men; influenza; 12 men.
b. Before the departing for Korea, triple typhoid vaccine, vitamin injection (榮養祖元江射), and typhus vaccine were given to everyone.
c. 11 frost bite and frozen feet cases had occurred in his Plat. No medical treatment given.

18. DISCIPLINE:
Discipline was well maintained in Korea in because they were strict in discipline. The soldier who violated military discipline, he would be forced to miss one meal.
There were a few desertions.

19. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE:
Attitude of Korean civilians was not friendly toward CCF soldiers. Many Koreans ran away before the arrival of CCF.

For the Commanding Officer:

ROBINSON

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