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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 3609　27 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS Special Report 022)　15 February 1951

Fairly intelligent with a fair memory. Fairly cooperative, but judgement of distances and measurements was poor. Physical condition, poor. Reliability, poor.

Whoever spotted enemy aircraft approaching gave the alarm and reported to the commander. Troops took such cover as terrain offered.

Scouts were dispatched one day in advance to the area into which the unit was scheduled to move. Usually patrols preceded the main unit for scouting purposes.

If tanks were sighted, preparation for defense against tanks was made by burying mines and setting up fire positions along tank’s line of approach.

They marched from 1900 to 0500 hours. During the two hours before dawn, they dug fox holes.

Travelled over main roads 8 out of 10 times.

Two columns of files.

That they hardly ever halted because of extreme cold. No particular security measures were taken during halts.

Company dug 10 trenches, forming a perimeter. Each trench accommodated 12 men. 12 sentries were posted about 100 m in front of the trench and were relieved every two hours. When enemy aircraft was sighted. sentries took cover and men in trenches remained motionless. When they were attacked by enemy ground forces, sentries alerted to the commander and the unit offered resistance.

12 men from one company about 100 m in front of Co, about 20 m apart.

Meals were served in trenches. Breakfast at 0400 hours. Slept in fox holes.

d. Trenches were dug under trees or near large rocks.

e. Only tree branches and twigs were scattered around the trenches for camouflage. No other specific camouflage measures were taken.

No assembly area was used. They deployed in battle formation without prior assembly in a particular area.

a. 1st and 2nd Plat took up positions about 300 m from the enemy force, on left and right. 3rd Plat deployed in a position about 400 m from the enemy line. 2nd Plat and 3rd Plat were led by CO. 1st Plat was led by Asst CO.

b. The radio between the assaulting CCF troops and the defending UN Forces was 3 to 1.

c. After reaching the enemy defensive line, they dug for holes and made preparation for enemy’s counterattack.

d. They withdrew to rear line for reorganization, if initial assault failed.

Probing was done usually by a 3 men patrol. Its mission was to obtain information concerning strength, movement and activities of the enemy troops, and to seek information as to hostile patrols and strength of advance elements. The main source of information was what they heard from Korean civilians.

The strength of day patrols was three men. Mission was same as that of night patrols.

No special clothes were worn. No particular communication equipment was carried. A rifle and 100 rounds of ammo and 4 grenades were carried. Full pack of clothing was carried and 7 pounds of rice.

Patrols were instructed to avoid fire fights with the enemy as much as possible.

No patrols were sent out to contact guerrillas.

About 1.5m deep trench was used as air raid shelter, and it accommodated 24 men, covered by tree branches and twigs. They dug in a line about 3 m apart.

Company strength:

Rifles - Altogether about 20

SMG - 1 (Carried by plat ldr)

22 to 32 men in each trench. Plat ldr and sqd ldr were in trench. Two or three observers from one plat were about 3 m in front of the trench.

Picks (3 per plat) and shovels (6 per Plat) were used.

When it was planned for the enemy troops to come in close to the defense line, they held fire.

A bangalore torpedo (■破筒) made of cast iron, 5 foot in length and 3 cm in diameter, filled with dynamite, and weighing about 5 lb. Area of burst was 3 foot (diameter). One to a company. It was thrown at tanks and placed in the ground as a mine.

They did not bring any rations with them, but acquired them from Korean farmers. Corn and soy beans and potatoes comprised the principal ration. Meals were prepared in farm houses or under trees.

Only 100 rounds of ammo were issued. There was no resupply of ammo.

Cotton coat, cotton suits, rubber shoes, cotton caps and cotton socks. Clothing was not adequate. No replacement for worn out clothing.

The scout CO within Div Hq wore civilian clothes - Chinese civilian clothes, black in color, made of thick cotton cloth resembled the army uniform.

In most cases runners carried written messages. In rare cases, they carried verbal messages.

One month in CCF, because PW had prior training in the CNA.

40% of PW unit had diarrhea due to eating unfamiliar food and drinking unboiled water. No particular contagious disease was noted in PW unit.

No immunization were given before or after they entered KOREA.

Approx 50 men or about 50% of PW company had frost bite and frozen feet. Approx 20 men of 50 were serious cases. PW knew that frost bite patients were carried back to the rear by litters, but did not know what sort of treatment they received at rear field hospitals.

Discipline was very strict. However, inhuman treatment was forbidden. Whenever a violation of military discipline happened, “PEE PING (　　) criticism meetings” was held by the company. A violator of military laws was called up by name and his offense announced. The nature, severity of punishment were then decided by the troops.

Korean civilians were afraid of CCF. They took flight as soon as they heard that CCF troops were coming.

One Korean interpreter was hired in a company. He acted as an interpreter and guide for patrols.

For the Commanding Officer: