ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3447 20 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS SP RPT 021) 1 February 1951
(Ref to TIS Rpt No 2358 & 2425)
| PW NAME: | CHANG, Shun I (張順義) |
| PW NUMBER: | T-100030 |
| RANK: | Pvt (戰士) |
| AGE: | 21 |
| DUTY: | Artilleryman |
| UNIT: | CCF 4th Field Army, 13th Army Group, 38th Army, 113th Div, 338th Regt, 2nd Arty Btry, 3rd Plat, 8th Sqd |
| EDUCATION: | 5 yr Primary School |
| OCCUPATION: | RR Worker |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | TOKCH’ON Area (德川區域) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 1 Nov 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | CHINA, HOPEI-SHENG, TANGSHAN, WAFANG-CHIEH #8 (中國 河北省 唐山市 瓦房街 #八号) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | Pvt KIM (ATIS) |
Intelligent. Reliability - Fair.
a. Organization:
2nd Arty Btry of 338th Regt, 113th Div, 38th Army, 13th Army Group, 4th Field Army, CCF.
2nd Arty Btry 170 man
1st Plat 58 man
2nd Plat 38 man
3rd Plat 38 man
4th Plat 37 man
b. Personalities:
LI, Ching Wu (李淸武), Capt, 37, Commander of 2nd Arty Btry. Capt LI, Ching Wu (李淸武) formerly was with the 8th Route Army.
c. Weapons and Equipment:
4 Model 92 (1932) 70mm Howitzer
1 Battery Co Telescope (Jap made)
10 Japanese Binoculars (7 magnification and 7.1⁶ field of view)
23 Japanese Model 38 Rifles
8 German 7.82mm Pistols
1 Japanese “Walkie Talkie” Type 66
42 Horses
2 Hand Grenades par man
d. Fire Control and Adjustment:
Each battery has a survey team composed of one fire direction officer (CO of Btry) and three soldiers. The battery survey teams controlled the fire of their respective targets only when assigned separate firing missions. Each team has a map book of CHINA, MANCHURIA, and KOREA. Each team has a runner and a telephone. Each Arty Btry communication squad performed all Arty communications necessary in maintenance of efficient fire control.
Fire is adjusted by one gun and final adjustment relayed to rest of the battery. This system is used to control the expending of ammunition. During the initial phases of attacks, artillery concentrations (mass) is heavy. Observers sometimes wear civilian clothes and infiltrated behind the American lines at night and use telephone or runners to communicate with battery.
e. Types of Artillery Fire:
The CCF firing technique is patterned after that of the former Japanese Army. Mass firing is common, concentrating all guns on one specified target for softening purposes, in preparation for an infantry attack. An Arty barrage, preceding a full scale infantry attack, usually lasts about one or two hours. Approx 30 rounds per 50 square meters are laid on the target area for the first five minutes, decreasing in intensity upon satisfactory progress of the attacking infantry troops. When the infantry is within 200m - 250m, the fire is lifted and heavy machine guns are brought into action. In all might attacks, adjustments are made during daylight hours according to observations reported by the FO. In all daylight attacks, adjustments are made by the Bn CO who in turn depends upon reports from the Forward Observer.
f. Command System:
Generally, the Bn commander controls firing when the Arty - infantry team is used. Two runners are appointed by Bn commander, three telephones are used between battery and Bn Hq to communicate reports and orders. All reports are transmitted from Bn to Regt Hq by telephone and the order of battle information is given by Regt commander, through Bn commander. For short distances, runners are used.
g. AT Fires:
When the CCF Arty fires against US medium tanks, they fire directly at the idler wheel, driver’s visor, or upper front plate (nose plate). CCF had no AT gun effective against the US Pershing Tank, yet Japanese M57 (sic) 47mm was often used without much success. For this reason land mines are often used in areas where US tanks are cooperating.
During an attack, the infantry pushes ahead in triangular formation (apox to the front or rear depending upon the nature of the objective), with fixed bayonets.
Infantry battalion commander orders artillery support. The regimental commander keeps one battalion in reserve to meet counter-attacks, exploit successes or to cover the flank of a penetrating unit.
The CCF concept of attack features a complete disregard for casualties.
The following characteristics were common to CCF offensives.
(a) Careful staff work in pre-operational planning.
(b) Great boldness, both in the conception and in execution of attacks.
(c) No fear of the enemy (especially US Army).
(d) Disregard for casualties in attaining an objective.
(e) Great speed of infiltration, envelopment and pursuit.
(f) Willingness to attack in adverse weather and through terrain normally considered impossible.
a. PW Locations:
PW saw approx 10,000 ROKA PW at KUJANG-DONG (球場洞), P’YONGAN PUKTO (平安北道), KOREA, 28 Oct 50. According to PW unit CO, there were approx 500 US soldiers of Oriental ancestry with the ROKA PW.
PW unit, the 338th Regt of the 38th Army, captured approx 80 Americans in the TOKCH’ON area (德川區域) 27 Oct 50. PW unit took the US PW wherever the CCF unit moved. 29 Oct 50 the food supply was cut off by the US airforces and no meals were provided the troops for three days. The US PW were sent to HARBIN, MANCHURIA, 30 Oct 50 because the CCF unit was unable to provide sufficient food to feed them.
CCF, 4th Field Army, established three PW camps in H’RBIN, MUKDEN, and CHILIN (吉林), MANCHURIA, during the latter part of October 50. Approx 3,000 American PW and 30,000 ROKA PW were captured by the CCF in north-eastern KOREA during October 50 and were sent to MANCHURIA.
US and the ROK PW were sent to the following camps:
(1) HARBIN PW Camp 1,000 US PW
(2) MUKDEN PW Camp 1,100 US PW
(3) CHILIN PW Camp 900 US PW
The ROKA PW were also sent to above mentioned camps but the exact number of PW unknown.
b. PW organization:
PW were living under the CCF Military Organizational Systems.
Sqd 17
Plat 51
Co 170
Regt 16 Co (2,520 man)
c. Treatment:
(1) The US PW were under the direct control of English speaking CCF soldiers. The ROKA PW were under the direct control of the North Korean soldiers.
(2) Four meals (American food) were offered to the US PW and three meals (Korean and Chinese food) were served to the ROKA PW.
d. PW Training Program:
Political training was given to all ROKA PW four hours a day by the NKA political officers. The CCF political officers were assigned to the US PW camp as political training instructors
e. Treatment of PW by CCF:
The CCF initiated a military regulation governing the treatment of PW as follows:
Any person will be punished if involved, in any way, in the mistreatment and/or killing of US or KORA PW.
PW heard that three CCF soldiers stole watches from a US PW and two ROKA PW and they were sentenced to death in the Military court at SINUIJU(新義州), KOREA.
For the Commanding Officer:
ROBINSON
