본문 바로가기주메뉴 바로가기하단 바로가기
일자별 보기
sidemenu open/close

LEE Tae Un 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 36 NO. 3417 1951-02-02
    전사 미분류 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3417 17 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (163-MISDI-0267) 8 February 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: LEE Tae Un (李泰雲)
PW NO: 1st M-P-4540
RANK: Pvt
DUTY: Supply Carrier
UNIT: 4th Sqd, 1st Plat, 1st Co, NCO Training Bn, 10th Div
PLACE OF CAPTURE: PU-DONG MYON (ER 1226)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 2 Feb 51
INTERROGATOR: MATSUSHITA

2. ASSESSMENT:
2 Feb 51 PW deserted because he heard from villagers that the UN Forces gave good treatment to PW. O/a 1600 hours, PW surrendered at PU-DONG MYON (ER 1226). PW cooperative but information limited. Not recommended for further interrogation.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
a. Mission: Upon crossing the 38th Parallel, PW heard that the 10th Div mission was to cut the UN MSR.

b. Strength of Unit:
Original Strength:
Indep NCO Training Bn - 1500 men
1st Co, Training Bn - 150 men
1st Plat, 1st Co, Indep Bn - 40-50 men
Present Strength:
PW’s 1st Plat - 19 men

c. Military History:
O/a 27 Dec 50 - 10th Div left HWACH’ON, North KOREA, for the South. All traveling was at night via mountain ridges.
O/a 5 Jan 51 - The 10th Div received air attack. PW saw 3 KIA.
O/a 15 Jan 51 - 10th Div received another air attack. (Area unknown). Some troops were killed (No. unk.)
30 Jan 51 - Arrived in PU-DONG MYON (ER 1226) Area.
2 Jan 51 - PW heard that the UN Force treated PW humanely so he surrendered to the KMC.

d. Weapons and Equipment: Indep Educ Bn had following weapons:
2 x 82mm Mortars, 10 rd ammo per Mortar.
2 HMG
Unk number of LMG.
4 PPSh-SMG per plat. Approx 150 rd ammo per man.

e. Status of Supply; Route of Supply:
Ammo - There was no resupply in ammunition. The only ammo was what the troops carried.
Food - Food foraged from villages. Ate twice daily.
Clothing - Only the clothing which they wore.
Shelter - Was taken mostly in village houses. In mountains, troops slept on the ground with no other clothing beside what they wore.

f. Morale: The troops’ morale very low because they were forced into the NKA and because of the limited food and clothing. Officers’ morale was high.

g. Effectiveness of Weapons: NK troops feared Artillery the most. Reason was that, airplanes can be heard and the troops have time to take cover; however, they do not have time to take cover from arty.

h. NCO Training Bn composed of men who were intelligent. The following subjects were taught:
1. Army Life
2. Leadership
3. Care of Equipment
If a person was active and studious he could become a NCO in 2 months. Instructors of this Bn were Political Officers. At present, this Bn is name only.

For the AC of S, G-2:

UYEDA

페이지 상단으로 이동하기