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LEE Ryan Hwa│HUNG Chun Shuen 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 35 NO. 3392 1951-01-26
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 3392 16 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (IX CORPS MISD - 0230) 29 January 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
NAME: LEE Ryan Hwa (李亮■)
RANK: Pvt
AGE: 20
DUTY: Ammo Bearer
UNIT: 50th Army, 150th Div, 450th Regt, 3rd Bn, 7th Co, 1st Plat, 1st Sqd
DATE & PLACE CAPTURED: On 261800 Jan 51, at (CS4621)
OCCUPATION: Farmer
EDUCATION: Primary School 1 yr

NAME: HUNG Chun Shuen
RANK: Pvt
AGE: 17
DUTY: Ammo Bearer
UNIT: 50th Army, 150th Div, 450th Regt, 3rd Bn, 7th Co, 1st Plat, 2nd Sqd
DATE & PLACE CAPTURED: Same as above
OCCUPATION: Farmer
EDUCATION: None

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW were very cooperative during interrogation. Information seems limited due to short period of service in CCF, however, information given is considered reliable. Not recommended for further interrogation.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
a. Chronology:
150th Div entered KOREA in the latter part of Oct 50, and travelled south via following places: SINUIJU, CHOLSAN, SINANJU, PYONGYANG, and arrived at the vic E of SEOUL o/a 11 Jan 51. On the same day, 3rd Bn walked across the HAN River at vic (CS3457) in a single column, and arrived at (CS4621) o/a 19 Jan 51. The same night the 7th Co was deployed on hill 256 (CS467216). The first 4 days, every men of the Co dug 5 men foxholes at 50 meters intervals midway up the forward slope.
24 Jan 51, the Co procured 270 bags of rice from ANOJI-RI (CS4821).
251500 Jan 51, the 1st Plat engaged in a fire fight with a small ROK group, however, there was no gains on ground and no casualties inflicted on the ROK unit.
261000 to 261200 Jan 51, Hill 256 (CS467216) and vicinity was bombed by 4 or 5 enemy planes.
261700 Jan 51, upon being shelled by artillery, PW were separated from their unit and captured by 7th Cav at (CS470217).

b. Unit Organization and Strength:
150th Div was composed of 3 Inf Regt, and an Arty Bn.
450th Regt approx 1,600 men and composed of the 1st (code 1st volunteer), 2nd (2nd volunteer), 3rd (3rd volunteer) Rifle Bn, and 82mm Mort Plat.
3rd Bn approx 500 men and composed of 3 Rifle Co, and Hvy Wpn Co.
7th Co 125 men and composed of 3 Rifle Plat and 60mm Mort Sqd.

c. Unit Location:
As of 16 Jan 51, the 3rd Bn CP was located at (CS461218), however, in the daytime it moves into the mountain at (CS464217).
2nd Bn was deployed on their left of the 3rd Bn (location unknown).
8th Co was deployed in vic of (CS467210). 9th Co was at (CS468217) and the Hvy Wpn Co was located on hill (CS470219).

d. Weapons:
7th Rifle Co had two 60mm mortars with 12 shells per mortar, 6 LMG with 2,000 rd per gun, M-38 Japanese rifles with 150 rd and 4 hand grenades per man.
Hvy Wpn Co had 4 HMG with 3,000 rd of ammunition per gun, and three 60mm mortars with 12 shells per mortar.
The mortar plat had three 60 mm mortars with 4 boxes of ammunition.
Last ammunition received was at ANTUNG, MANCHURIA. PW were often told by their CO not to waste ammunition since the MSR was cut by enemy planes, there was no way to obtain adequate supply of ammunition.

e. Mission and Intention:
O/a 10 Jan 51, their Co CO said that the 150th Div would start on the offensive after the arrival of the awaited mechanized troops from MANCHURIA, and its objective was PUSAN via TAEJON and TAEGU.

f. Personalities:
WONG (fnu) (王), age 50, rank unknown, 150th Div Commander
FU (fnu) (傅), age 22, rank unknown, 3rd Bn Commander
CHIANG (fnu) (姜), age 30, rank unknown, Political & Cultural Officer
SUN (fnu) (孫), age 35, rank unknown, 7th Co Commander

g. Morale:
Morale of the troops were very low because they are fed inadequately (5 times in the last week) and troops are on the verge of starvation. They have to keep moving in order to avoid enemy air bombing in severe weather.

h. Identification of Friend or Foe:
At night when CCF troops encounter NKA troops since they cannot make each other understood, one hand clap was given as a signal, and in return two claps should be given as countersign.

i. Tactics:
In order to overcome a superior force opposing a company, two plat are deployed to the front, and the third plat, at a vantage point so located as to spring a surprise attack. To indicate appropriate moment to this plat, a string was strung between the Co CO and the plat ldr. A predetermined number of tugs indicated to the Plat Ldr to attack.

For the AC of S, G-2:

IIDA

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