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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3295　12 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1467)　5 February 1951

PW was physically exhausted, and during interrogation, frequently fell asleep.

Information seems reliable but limited.

50th Army: 148th, 149th, 150th Rifle Div, Security Guard Bn & other attached units.

148th Div: 442nd, 443rd, 444th Rifle Regt, Security Guard Co, Arty Co, and other attached units.

443rd Rifle Regt: 3 Rifle Bn, Arty Co, and other attached units.

3rd Rifle Bn: 3 Rifle Co, Heavy Wpn Co & other attached units.

7th Rifle Co: 3 Rifle Sqd and 60mm Mort Sqd.

Rifle Sqd: 9 men.

Remarks: Approx 30 troops in the 7th Company were unarmed. The unarmed troops were youths between the ages of 16 to 17 and weapons were not issued because they were not available.

Remarks: 3rd Bn was equipped with Chinese M-79 Rifles only.

3rd Bn, 443rd Regt o/a 31 Jan 51, was 4 km Northwest of SUWON (CS2527).

Between 27 to 30 Jan 51, the PW Bn engaged US and ROK units. 30 Jan 51, the 3rd Bn defensive position was over-run and the troops were forced to disperse.

First line of defense usually consists of hastily constructed fox holes and gun positions. The first line of defense is generally held from between 6 to 15 hours and if broken the troops are to fall back to the second line of defense which is approx 2 km to the rear.

Troops will fall back to the second line of defense only under cover of darkness no matter how bad the situation is.

Reason for the above is that the troops will be expose to air attacks during daylight.

Upon arrival at the second line of defense, fox holes and gun positions are hastily constructed. The second line of defense is to be held for 2 days prior to falling back to the third line of defense.

Third line of defense is approx 6 km to the rear of the second line of defense, and, like the first and second lines of defense, there are no pre-prepared defensive positions. (Fox holes are dug upon arrival).

Third line of defense is held until nightfall, and if broken, the troops retreat to the rear between 8 to 12 km for reorganization. The same type of defensive operation is repeated unless the retreat becomes a rout.

When retreating to the second and third lines of defense, no troops are left behind as rear guard or snipers.

Conscripted by the CNA on 8 Oct 39, at YUNNAN SHENG (雲南省), and assigned to the 19th Div, 2nd Regt. Between Oct 39 to Mar 45, the PW was trained as an infantryman besides working on a military farm.

Mar 45, the CNA 19th Div transferred to ANNAN (安南) to take over the demobilization of the Japanese Army. Sep 45, the demobilization was completed and the CNA 19th Div traveled by water to HULUTAO (壹蘆島), disembarked, boarded trains and arrived at CHILIN SHENG (吉林省) Nov 45.

Nov 45 to Feb 46, the PW div engaged the CCF in CHILIN Province.

Feb 46, the CNA 19th div retreated to CHANGCHUN (長春). Upon arrival at CHANGCHUN, until Oct 48, the CNA 19th Division was reequipping and training replacements.

Oct 48 the PW Regt CO negotiated with the CCF to join forces after deserting the CNA.

Nov 48 the entire regt joined the CCF 50th Army, 148th Division and the regt was redesignated as the 443rd Regt. From CHANGCHUN, the 148th Division departed for CHIUTAI (九台) to join the other div of the 50th Army. From the date of arrival until Jul 49, PW underwent political indoctrination.

Jul 49 the CCF 50th Army, after completing its reorganization, departed by rail for HONAN SHENG (河南省). At HONAN SHENG PW received 2 months of political training.

Oct 49 the 50th Army was transferred to SSUCHUAN SHENG (四川省). Sep 49 to Nov 49, the 50th Army engaged and defeated the CNA force.

Dec 49, the 148th Division was sent to HUPEI SHENG (湖北省) to work on a military farm.

Aug 50 the division traveled to CHILIN SHENG by rail and in Oct 50, was further moved to ANTUNG to guard the MANCHURIAN-KOREAN Border. After remaining in ANTUNG for about 10 days the 148th Div crossed the YALU River into SINUIJU (XE1839). From SINUIJU, they marched to MANP’OJIN (BA7259), following the YALU River.

From MANP’OJIN, the division marched South through central NORTH KOREA, bypassing P’YONGYANG, and arrived at SEOUL o/a 8 Jan 51. At SEOUL, the division was broken up into Regt, each moving South on its own. From SEOUL, the 443rd Regt crossed the frozen HAN River, and marched South until arriving at SUWON o/a 15 Jan 51.

Upon arrival at SUWON, the Regt was broken into Bn and deployed in a defensive position.

Regt Hqs and the 1st Bn were located in the mountains 4 Km S of SUWON. The 2nd Bn was deployed 4 Km E and the 3rd Bn 4 Km W of SUWON.

28 to 30 Jan 51, the PW Bn was attacked by combined US and ROK elements. 30 Jan 51 the 3rd Bn retreated in confusion. When captured, the PW was attempting to locate his unit.

148th Division marched only at night. When marching on roads, the troops moved in double files. Mountain trails were taken as short-cuts. When marching through the mountains, single file was employed.

CHEN, Che Hsien (陣草先), CG, 50th Army (former Nationalist General)

PAI, Chiao Hsueh (白朝學), Div CG. 148th Div (former Nationalist Officer)

CHU, Kwang Jen (朱光仁), Regt CO, 443rd Regt (former Nationalist Officer)

LU, Chi Yao (呂枝要), Bn CO, 3rd Bn, 443rd Regt, (former Nationalist Officer)

HSIA, Jen Hsi (夏仁西), Co CO, 7th Co, 3rd Bn, 443rd Regt, (former Nationalist Officer)

HOU, Chiao Tsai (候朝彩), Plat Ldr, 1st Plat, 7th Co, 3rd Bn (former Nationalist Officer)

SU, Tsai (蘇彩), Plat Ldr, 3rd Plat, 7th Co, 3rd Bn, (former Nationalist Officer)

148th Div carried limited food supplies brought from MANCHURIA. This was exhausted when the PW unit was in the vic P’YONGYANG. Since then, food has been confiscated from villages and farm houses along the route of march.

PW Regt had not received fresh supplies of ammo or clothing since crossing the YALU River.

For morale purposes the troops were constantly told by officers that fresh ammo supplies were enroute.

Communications between companies in the PW Regt by runners. Between Bn and Regt by telephone.

Bugles were used for mess calls, signal at the start of an attack, assembly (company level), retreat, and to locate adjacent companies.

Whistles were used at the platoon level for tactical purpose only.

Morale and combat effectiveness of the PW Bn was very low as compared to the time that they first entered KOREA. The reasons for the above are as follows:

a. Lack of food and proper clothing.

b. Fear of air attacks.

No major disease was observed in the PW Regt.

a. Did you surrender voluntarily? If so, why?

a. PW was captured.

b. Did you see any UN leaflets or hear UN loudspeaker broadcasts?

a. Negative.

c. Can you describe what they said?

a. Negative.

d. What was your reaction to them?

a. Negative.

e. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcast? What did they say or do?

a. Negative

For the AC of S, G-2: