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HO, Fu Hsing 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 33 NO. 3283 1951-01-27
    소위 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3283 10 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1441) 29 January 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: HO, Fu Hsing (句福興) (CCF)
RANK: 2nd Lieutenant (少尉副排長)
ORGN: CCF 4th Field Army, 50th Army, 149th Div (Code No: 2ND BN), 447th Regt (Code No: 2ND BN, 3RD CO), 3rd Bn (Code No: 2ND BN, 3RD CO, 3RD PLAT), 8th Co (Code No: 2ND BN, 3RD CO, 3RD PLAT, 8TH SQD), 1st Plat.
DUTIES: Ass’t Plat Ldr
EDUCATION: Primary School (2½ yr)
AGE: 36
OCCUPATION: Farmer
ADDRESS: YUN NAN SHENG, KWANG NAN HSIEN, CHE WAI TE, MEI TSUN (雲南省 廣南縣 者歪衙 稚村)
DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE: 27 Jan 51 at SUWON (CS 2528)
INTERROGATOR: T.M.O.
INTERROGATED AT: HAYANG (DQ 8374)

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW well acquainted with tactics used by the CCF.
Info seems reliable.

3. T/O & E AND STRENGTH:
4th Field Army: 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th Armies.
50th Army: 148th (Code No: 1ST BN), 149th (Code No: 2ND BN), 150th (Code No: 3RD BN) Rifle Divisions, Artillery Bn, Field Hospital, and Engineer Bn. Remarks: Every army of the 4th Field Army had Cav Div except the 50th Army.
149th Rifle Div: 445th (Code No: 2ND BN, 1ST CO), 446th (Code No: 2ND BN, 2ND CO), 447th Rifle Regt (Code No: 2ND BN, 3RD CO), Arty Bn, Recon Co, Security Guard Co, Signal Co, Medical.
447th Rifle Regt: 1st (Code No: 1ST PLAT), 2nd (Code No: 2ND PLAT), 3rd Bn (Code No: 3RD PLAT), Signal Co, Recon Plat, Arty Co, Security Guard Co, and other unk units.
3rd Rifle Bn: 7th (Code No: HD SQD), 8th (Code No: 8TH SQD), 9th Rifle Co (Code No: 9TH SQD) and Hvy Wpn Co (Code No: 12TH SQD).
The Rifle Co of the 447th Rifle Regt were designated 1 thru 9. The Hv Wpn Co of the 1st Bn was designated as the 10th Co and the Hv Wpn Co of the 2nd Bn was designated the 11th Co.
8th Rifle Co: 3 Plat.
1st Rifle Platoonoriginal (28 Oct 50)present (25 Jan 51)
 Personnel:
  EM3630
  Off21
  Total3831
 Equipment and ammo:
  SMG (M-3, Grease Gun)2 (300 rd ea)1 (250 rd ea)
  LMG (Bren Gun - Czech)2 (1500 rd ea)2 (900 rd ea)
  Rifles (Jap M-38)24 (150 rd ea)24 (100 rd ea)
  Bangalore Torpedoes (Chinese)2 ea man2 ea man
  Grenades2 to 4 ea man2 to 4 ea man
  Shovels1313
8th Rifle Co
 Personnel:
  EM120107
  Off1110
  Total131117
 Equipment and ammo:
  Pistols (Mauser MP)4 (100 rd ea)4 (90 rd ea)
  Mortars (60mm)2 (60 rd ea)2
Heavy Weapons Co
 Personnel:
  EM10680
  Off1111
  Total11791
 Equipment and ammo:
  HMG66
  Mauser Machine Pistols44
  Rifles (Mauser)1010
  Grenades3 ea manUnk
Unarmed personnel in the hv wpn co were utilized as ammo bearers.
Casualties were caused by arty shelling and malaria.
Weapons were in fair and usable condition.

4. LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF UNIT:
3rd Bn Hq, (447th Regt), 7th, 9th and Hv Wpn Co, all elements of 3rd Bn, o/a 25 Jan 51, were at a small village consisting of about 10 houses located at 12 Km NW of SUWON (CS 2528) and 2 Km due W from the SUWON - SEOUL Highway.
3rd Bn moved to its present location o/a 15 Jan 51 from SEOUL.
7th and 9th Rifle Co, and the Hv Wpn Co, since 15 Jan 51, have been given the mission of confiscating food from the nearby villages and to stock them at the Bn Hq.
Whenever the Co were sent out to confiscate food 1 Plat from each Co was left behind to guard the Bn area. The villages from which the troops confiscated food were within 1 or 2 days walking distance from the Bn area.
8th Co, since 15 Jan 51, has been used by the 3rd Bn as its Recon and Probing Force, operating in the SUWON (CS 2528) area.
Houses located in the 3rd Bn area were used for cooking purposes only.
Food supplies were stored in dugouts adjacent to the farm houses.
Troops used dugouts for shelter on the slopes of both hills flanking the village. The average dugout was large enough to accommodate between 10 to 12 troops and it was camouflaged with dry grass. The interval between dugouts was between 3 to 5 meters.
The dugout used as the Bn GP was located approx 500 meters E of the village.
The telephone line connecting the 3rd Bn to the 1st and 2nd Bn extended NW from the village occupied by the 3rd Bn, and consequently, the PW believes that the 1st and 2nd Bn are located within the radius of 5 Km.
PW heard that between 2 to 3 armies of the 3rd Field Army were being held in reserve of the 4th Field Army N or PAKCHON (YD 2198) o/a 15 Jan 51.

5. PERSONAL AND UNIT HISTORY:
Conscripted by the CNA at YUNNAN (雲南) and assigned to the newly organized 6th Independent Regt in Jul 37. Between Jul 37 to Jun 41, the PW was trained as an infantryman.
Jun 41, the PW was transferred to 23rd CNA Div stationed within the city of YUNNAN. In Aug 41, 23rd CNA Div was transferred to KWANG-NAN (廣南). At KWANGNAN, 23rd Div was deactivated and renamed the 2nd Brigade. The 2nd Brigade was stationed at KWANGNAN, until Jun 43. Between Jun 43 and Sep 43, the PW was sent to TIENCHEN (滇■) for the purpose of training. After the completion of training, PW was sent to YUNNAN (雲南) to rejoin 2nd Brigade. 2nd Brigade was stationed at YUNNAN until Aug 45.
Aug 45, PW was transferred to 182nd CNA Div at ANNAN (安南). Between Aug 45 to Aug 48, 182nd CNA Div was in charge of the demobilization and repatriation of the Japanese Army.
Aug 48, PW Regt (545th) was transferred to CHILIN SHENG, ANSHAN SHIH (吉林省安山市) to fight the CCF. The PW was promoted to 2nd Lt upon arrival at ANSHAN.
17 Oct 49, all elements of 182nd CNA Div defeated and joined forces with the CCF, and the 182nd Div was redesignated the 148th CCF Div. The 148th CCF Div departed for CH’ANGCHUN (長春) after spending several days reorganizing.
148th Div had occupation duty in CH’ANGCHUN, until Mar 50.
4 Mar 50, PW was transferred to 149th Div, 447th Regt stationed at ER TAOKOU (二道潢). Between Mar 50 to 28 Sep 50, 149th Div performed garrison duty.
28 Sep 50, 447th Regt was sent to ANTUNG. At ANTUNG 447th Regt was inactive, waiting for further orders from div.
28 Oct 50, 447th Regt crossed YALU River under cover of darkness into SINUIJU (XE1839). From SINUIJU PW Regt marched through mountain trails and secondary roads, passing around the eastern outskirts of P’YONGYANG, S and across the 38th Parallel in the vicinity of the IMJIN River. In the vicinity of the IMJIN River the 447th Regt marched to SEOUL by battalions. The 3rd Bn arrived at SEOUL 12 Jan 51.
15 Jan 51 PW Bn marched S to its present location. (Village located 12 Km NE of SUWON (CS 2528) and 2 Km E of the SUWON - SEOUL Highway.
25 Jan 51 PW company was dispatched to SUWON (CS2538) to probe US positions. On 26 Jan 51, PW company arrived in the northern sector of SUWON (CS2538), near the ancient city wall. At 2100 hours PW company attacked US positions and engaged the US forces for about 3 hours prior to retreating in confusion.
During the fire fight PW was wounded slightly above the right eye. When the troops dispersed PW was alone. He was taken PW at daybreak, while attempting to locate his platoon.
PW believes that the troops returned to the Bn area for regrouping and reorganization.

6. PERSONALITIES:
LUNG Yao (龍要); Maj Gen, CG, 50th Army, 149th Div, (Former Nationalist Maj Gen).
LI (fnu) (李); Col, Regt CO, 149th Div, 447th Regt, (Former Nationalist Col).
LIU (fnu) (劉); Maj, Bn Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt.
YANG Te Chang (楊德章); Capt, Co CO, 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt, (Former Nationalist Capt).
TSAI (fnu) (再); Capt, Asst Co CO, 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt, (Former Nationalist).
WANG Hung Hsin (王洪信); 1st Lt; Plat Ldr, 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt.
CHANG (fnu) (張); Capt, Political Officer, 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt.
WANG, Yu (王玉); 1st Lt, Plat Ldr, 2nd Plat, 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt, (Former Nationalist 1st Lt).
CHIN (fnu) (陳); 1st Lt, Plat Ldr, 3rd Plat, 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt.
WU, Lian (吳亮); 2nd Lt, Asst Plat Ldr, 2nd Plat, 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt, (Former Nationalist 2nd Lt).
YIN (fnu) (尹); 2nd Lt, Asst Plat Ldr, 3rd Plat, 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt.
LI (fnu) (李); 2nd Lt, Culture Officer, 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 447th Regt.

7. FOOD, AMMO AND OTHER SUPPLIES:
After arriving in KOREA, the PW Bn received an additional 50 rd of small arms ammo per man at PAKCHON (YD2198). There have been no new supplies, ammunition was not plentiful but adequate.
3rd Bn 27 Jan 51 had approx 10 days food supply.
Prior to marching S, the PW Regt was issued overcoats at PAKCHON.
The PW believes that there is no clothing replacement system.

8. SIGNAL:
Communication between plat and co was by runners who carried either verbal or written message.
Co to Bn: (same as above)
Communication between Bn and higher echelon was by telephones, runners, and mounted messengers.
Signal flares were used on the Regt level or higher. One flare generally means the start of an attack.
PW unit did not have bugles, whistles, etc, like most CCF units.

9. MORALE AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:
Morale and combat effectiveness was low compared to the time that they first crossed the YALU River into KOREA.
The causes for low morale are:
a. Troops are disgusted with the promises of the CCF that have never materialized.
b. Troops feel that the Chinese Nationalist Forces will send troops to KOREA.
c. Fear of air attacks.
d. They feel that they will lose the war because UN Forces have superior weapons (tanks, artillery, & aircraft).
e. Frozen feet, lack of proper clothing and medical treatment.

10. US, ROKA AND OTHER UN PW:
Prior to crossing the IMJIN River, the PW saw 6 US prisoners.
The US prisoners were being sent to the rear.
PW are processed by political officers of the capturing unit, higher units, and the internment camp.

11. MEDICAL:
The following types of diseases were observed in the PW unit:
a. Pneumonia
b. Malaria
c. Unknown disease that causes headaches followed by vomitting.
PW unit received typhus shots at PAKCHON. Prior to crossing the 38th Parallel the unit received shots of unknown nature.
PW unit’s casualties caused by frozen feet and frost bite were 2% of the company strength.
Medical treatment in the PW unit was limited to first aid.
PW unit did not purify water prior to consumption.

12. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
a. Did you surrender voluntarily? If so, why?
a. PW was captured.
b. Did you see any UN leaflets or hear UN loudspeaker broadcasts?
a. Negative.
c. Can you describe what they said?
a. Negative.
d. What was your reaction to them?
a. Negative.
e. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcasts?
a. Negative.

13. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES:
a. Marches:
PW unit marched only at night. The troops, when marching, use the platoon formation if in the rear areas. The interval between marching Plat is 50 paces.
When enemy territory is nearby, the Platoon’s formation is broken and the troops march in a single file by squads.
Generally, secondary roads were used in the rear areas. Mountain trails adjacent to roads were taken only when approaching the enemy or when in fear of air and mechanized attacks, or ambush.

b. Bivouacs:
The bivouac areas in the rear are generally towns and villages along the route of march. There were no designated bivouac areas.
When close to the front lines, sqd foxholes, camouflaged with grass etc, were dug in the hills. On several occasions the PW unit utilized foxholes previously constructed by other units.

c. Attack:
Attack formation used by PW company 27 Jan 51, at SUWON:
The LMG alternate position was the 2nd Sqd of each plat.
Interval between 1st Sqd and 2nd Sqd: 20 to 30 meters
1st and 2nd Plat: 50 meters
1st, 2nd to 3rd Plat: 100 meters
3rd Plat and Mortar positions: 100 to 150 meters
Attack formation used by Bn level:
Interval between 1st and 2nd Co: 150 meters
Interval between 1st Co and Heavy Weapons Co: 100 meters
Interval between 2nd Co and Heavy Weapons Co: 120 meters
Interval between 1st and 3rd Co: 200 meters
Interval between 2nd and 3rd Co: 230 meters
Interval between 3rd Co and Heavy Weapons Co: 100 meters
Interval between 3rd Co and Mortar Plat (82mm): 150 meters
Remarks: In certain instances the 82mm Mortar Plat is with the Heavy Weapons Co. The same formation is maintained during assault or defense.
The PW believes the same formation is used at Regiment level.

Encircling Movement (Bn Level):
The 1st, 2nd, and Heavy Weapons Co engage the enemy, meanwhile the 3rd Co tries to move a platoon around both flanks to the rear of the entrenched enemy.
The mission of the fighting units is to attempt encirclement of the enemy whenever possible unless ordered by the commander.
Pursuit of the retreating enemy is to be made only when the unit CO feels that encirclement of the enemy is possible. Other than that, contact with the enemy will be broken temporarily for reorganization and planning the next movement. While halting for reorganization after pursuing the enemy, foxholes and temporary defensive positions are dug for expected counterattacks.

Probing attacks: Probing attacks are made for the following reasons:
a. Locate enemy strong points.
b. Determine enemy strength by engaging the enemy over a short period.
c. Throw enemy off balance prior to the main attack by means of diversion.
Strength of the probing force depends upon the strength of the main body.

d. Patrolling: Patrolling is usually done by the Recon Plat assigned to each Regiment. A Recon patrol’s mission is to get information by infiltrating the enemy positions and rear areas. If infiltration is not possible they are to go as close as possible to the enemy line. When infiltrating, civilian clothes are used. When a position is infiltrated, the following information is chiefly desired:
a. Location of enemy defensive positions.
b. Troop disposition.
c. Supply dumps etc.
d. Vehicular movement.
e. Probable route of retreat, etc.
f. Type of weapons, number, ammo etc.

e. Bangalore Torpedo:
Description: Length: about 1 meter
Diameter: about 1½ inches
Weight: about 4.5 Kg
Type of Charge: Unknown, believed to be TNT
Firing Mech: Manually ignited, dynamite fuse
Note: Protective cap unscrewed reveals fuze.
Place originated: about 20 years ago in China
Date of Use of CCF: PW first saw it in Nov 50 (used by both Japanese and Nationalists prior to World War II).
Employment of Bangalore Torpedoes:
(1) Blasting wire entanglements
(2) Anti-tank
(3) Demolishing of bridges, buildings; and railroad tracks.

When used against tanks, the dynamite type fuze is first ignited, then thrown in the path of the tank, preferably underneath the tracks. The charge contained in the Bangalore Torpedo is strong enough to wreck the tracks but is not able to penetrate tank armor (belly).
There is no special training, for the use of the Bangalore Torpedo because of its simplicity (just like a fire cracker).
Troops who carry Bangalore Torpedoes are fanatics, selected by the CO for this suicide mission.
Each Company has between 7 to 8 fanatics who use the torpedoes to attack tanks.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

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