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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3215　7 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1447)　30 January 1951

PW was cooperative and talked freely. PW claimed he did not have any information concerning artillery, because he had never seen any pieces, although he was in the Artillery Regt.

Information seems reliable.

II Corps: 2nd, 6th, 9th, 10th and 31st Divisions and an Ind Regt.

II Corps Hq: Staff Bureau, Political Bureau, and Rear Service Section.

II Corps Hq, Staff Bureau: Operation, Signal, Personnel Administration, and Recon Sections.

II Corps Hq, Political Bureau: Administration, Propaganda, Public Relation, and Special Activities (■工部) Section.

10th Division: 25th, 27th, and 29th Regiments, Artillery Regt (Code Name 753RD UNIT), AT Gun Bn, Artillery Bn, Hq Bn, Signal Bn, Engineer Bn, Medical Bn, and Rear Service Bn. Hq of the 10th Div was organized similar to that of the Ⅱ Corps Hq.

Artillery Regt: 3 Artillery Bns, Hq Btry, and Transportation Platoon. The Headquarters of the Regiment was organized similar to that of the Ⅱ Corps Hq.

A Political Bureau was organized in each Corps, Division, and Regiment of the NKA during early Nov 50. The Political Bureau was patterned after the CCF and USSR organization.

The Political Section was organized to carry out order Number 75.

Order Number 75 was as follows:

"The reason we had to withdraw from South KOREA after liberating the area was because:

a. We did not win the people of that area.

b. We underestimated the strength of the enemy because we did not know the enemy.

Hereafter:

a. We must have better relations between the civilians and our troops.

b. We must organize Civilian Security units in each "Gun"(郡) consisting of 243 armed men.

c. We must go behind the enemy lines to cut their route of withdrawal when our forces are advancing.

d. We must hide all food, ammo and equipment when we are withdrawing.

e. We must organize our youth (from 7 yrs old) into Youth Self Defense Units.

f. We must organize our female into Female Self Defense Units.

g. We must fight the enemy with everything we have".

The Political Bureau was composed of the Administration, Propaganda, Public Relations and Special Activities Sections. The personnel was believed to be varied in each command.

The Administration Section conducted the following:

a. Keeping statistics of the Unit's KIA, WIA, and MIA.

b. Personnel placement (of the entire unit)

c. Control of the Peoples Youth Organization.

The Propaganda Section conducted the following:

a. Communist education of personnel in the unit.

b. Propaganda aimed at personnel in the unit.

The Public Relations Section Conducted the following:

a. Communist education of liberated peoples.

b. Relation between civilians and troops of the unit.

c. Set up Self-government in the liberated area.

The Special Activities Section conducted the following:

a. Cause confusion behind the enemy line by inciting the people against their present government.

b. To go behind enemy lines and learn about enemy activities.

c. To sabotage key points behind enemy lines.

PW heard that the mission of the Ⅱ Corps was to go behind the UN lines without being detected and to cut UN supply routed in the ANDONG (DR7646) area. They were to cut the UN route of withdrawal when the offensive begins (when or by whom unknown).

12 Jan 51, the 10th Div passed through YANGJUDONG (DR0471) and headed toward ANDONG.

Twenty seven (27) South Korean civilians from CHUNGCHEONG PUKTO (忠淸北道) and KYONGSONG PUKTO (慶尙北道), who had fled northward when UN advanced during Sep 50, were with the 10th Div. These individuals were to set up the government after the 10th Div liberated a South Korean town.

PW was inducted into the NKA at HWACHON (CT8718) on 29 Nov 50 and was assigned to the 10th N.K. Div, Arty Regt.

The 10th Div departed HWACHON on 26 Dec 50 into South KOREA. After entering South KOREA, the 10th Div travelled through mountain terrain until they arrived at YANGJI-DONG (DR0471) on 12 Jan 51.

At YANGJI-DONG PW and approx 110 other wounded and ill personnel were left behind as the 10th Div departed.

16 Jan 51, YANGJI DONG was attacked by a ROK Unit and the 10th Div troops left behind there fled into the mountains.

After wandering through mountains until 25 Jan 51, PW surrendered to South Korean Police near MUNGYONG (DR2165).

CHOE, Hyon (崔賢) Maj Gen, CG, 2nd Div (Formerly Ⅱ Corps Commander took command of 2nd Div during Dec 50).

LEE, Sung Yop (리승엽), Chief; Political Bureau, Ⅱ Corps.

There have been no replacements for the 10th Div since entering South KOREA.

Food was obtained from farmers.

Usually 20 men were assigned to approach each farmers for food.

Ammo was last supplied at HWACHON o/a 25 Dec 50. Each rifleman was issued approx 200 rounds. This ammo was said to have been obtained from the 2nd NK Div which went North to get it.

Liaison officers were usually used for communication.

During long stops, telephone was used for communication between the regiment and Division.

Morale of the 10th Div troops was very low because of the intense cold and lack of proper clothing.

PW heard o/a 5 Dec 50 that approx 100 ROK PW were interned in a PW enclosure located between HWACHON and KUMHWA (CT6538) and that an additional 30 ROK PW were now being taken there.

a. No diseases noted in his unit.

b. No immunizations given.

c. Approx 20% of the troops were suffering from frozen feet in the 10th Div. PW feet were frozen and mercurochrome was the only medicine applied to it.

a. Did you surrender voluntarily? If so, why?

a. PW surrendered because he was hungry and heard from civilians that PW are treated fairly.

b. Did you see any UN leaflets or hear UN loudspeaker broadcasts?

a. Yes, at an unknown area.

c. Can you describe what they said?

a. No, because it was written in Chinese.

d. What was your reaction to them?

a. Negative.

e. Did you hear the soldiers discuss leaflets of broadcasts? What did they say of do?

a. No

For the AC of S, G-2: