ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3198 6 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1423) 26 January 1951
| PW NAME: | LI, Po Fu (李■福) (CCF) |
| RANK: | Pvt |
| ORGN: | CCF 4th Field Army, 42nd Army, 126th Div, 277th Regt, 3rd Bn, 9th Co, 2nd Plat, 4th Sqd |
| DUTIES: | Rifleman |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School (2 yrs) |
| AGE: | 32 |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| ADDRESSS: | ANTUNG SHENG, HUAN TIEN HSIEN, NIU MAO BU TSUN TOUTAO KOU TAUN (安東省 ■抱縣 牛毛䲨村 斗道河屯) |
| DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 21 Jan 51 at IPO ( ) (CS0704) |
| INTERROGATOR: | TMO |
| INTERROGATED AT: | HAYANG (DQ8374) |
PW was very cooperative.
Information although very limited seems to be accurate and reliable.
4th Field Army composed of 38th, 39thy, 41st, 42nd armies plus several unk armies.
42nd Army composed of 124th, 125th and 126th Inf Div, Cav Div of unk strength, and an Arty Div.
124th Div was composed of 370th, 371st and 372nd Inf Regt. 125th Div was composed of 373rd, 374th and 375th Inf Regt. 126th Div was composed of 376th, 377th and 378th Inf Regt.
To each Inf Regt, the following units were attached:
Security Guard Co
Composite 82mm Mortar & 76mm Howitzer Co
Sig Plat
Recon Plat
Telephone Plat
Wireless Sac
Med Plat
Sig Co handled mail only.
Inf Regt is composed of 3 Bns of about 400 men each.
To each Bn the following units were attached:
Sig Sqd
Heavy Weapons Co (82mm Mortars-HMG-AT Rifles-ROCKET LAUNCHERS (US)
Inf Bn consisted of 3 Co of 100 men each.
Rifle Co was composed of 3 Plat and made up of 3 Sqd of about 10 men each.
2nd Plat|Original|Present
Personnel:
EM|32|13
Officer|1|1
Total|33|14
Equipment & Ammo:
LMG|2 (800 to 1,000 rds ea)|2 (800 rds to 1,000 rds ea)
Rifles (Jap - M38)|27 (70 rds ea)|7 (80 to 90 rds ea)
SMG (US Thompson)|2 (100 rds ea)|2 (50 rds ea)
Grenades|3 per man|1 to 2 per man
Rifle Co:
Personnel:
EM|140|106
Officers|12|8
Total|152|114
Equipment and Ammo:
Mauser Machine Pistol|1 (40 rds ea)|1
Mortars, 60mm (US)|3 (50 rds ea)|3 (40 rds ea)
Heavy Weapons Co:
Personnel:
EM|140|106
Officers|12|8
Total|152|114
Equipment & Ammo:
82mm Mortars|3|3
HMG (US)|6 (1,000 rds ea)|5
AT Rifles (15.5mm)|2|2
Rocket Launchers (US) 2.5|2 (12 rds ea)|2
Rifles (Jap M38)|(70 rds ea)|(70 to 90 rds ea)
SMG (US Thompson)|6 (80 to 100 rds ea)|6 (50 rds ea)
Grenades|3 per man|3 per man
|Original|Present
Composite Mortar - Howitzer Co:
Personnel:
EM|130|130
Officers|12|12
Total|142|142
Equipment & Ammo:
Mortars (82mm)|3 (20 rds ea)|3 (15 rds ea)
Howitzers (Jap) 76mm|3|3
SMG (US, Thompson)|2 (100 rds ea)|
Rifles (Jap M38)|8 (70 rds ea)|8 (70 rds ea)
Mauser Machine Pistol|4 (20 rds ea)|4 (40 rds ea)
Pack horses|30|30
126th Div o/a 5 Jan 51, started to move to a small village NE of YANGPYONG (CS6749) on the banks of the HAN River. Prior to starting its movement the Hq was at KAPYONG (CS6988).
377th Regt Hq o/a 21 Jan 51, was located on a mountain 40 Km NE of IIPO near the HAN River.
1st and 2nd Bn of 377th Regt o/a 21 Jan 51, was 40 Km NE of IPO (CS0704) near the HAN River in the vic of Regt Hq.
1st and 2nd Bns were in reserve position of the 3rd Bn.
3rd Bn on 21 Jan 51, was in YANGPYONG (CS6749). The mission of 3rd Bn at that time was to confiscate as much food as possible and return to the Regt Hq. The Bn was not given a set date of return to the Regt Hq.
No UN troops were encountered at YANGPYONG.
The route taken by the Bn between YANGPYONG and Regt Hq was the main highway extending NE of the village.
126th Div at present is suffering from lack of rations and 50% non-battle casualties. Most of the elements in the Div at present are collecting food from nearby villages and towns.
There were no indications Div will attempt to move south. PW heard that his Div will stay at its present location (along the HAN River NE of IPO (CS0704) and if UN forces should advance to their zone of deployment, they will attempt to make a stand.
The PW heard his Div will construct fortifications along the HAN River.
Conscripted 4 Feb 50 at ANTUNG SHENG, KUANTIEN HSIEN (安東省 寬向縣) and traveled by rail to HEI LUNG KIANG SHENG (海龍江省).
Upon arrival at HEI LUNG KIANG SHENG o/a 5 May 50, PW was assigned to 126th Div, 377th Regt. May 50 to Aug 50, PW worked on a state-controlled farm, supplying food to Div.
Aug 50 126th Div traveled to TUNGHWA SHENG (通化省) by rail (date arrival unk, trip took 4 days). Aug 50 to Oct 50, 126th Div received combat training in preparation for the intervention in KOREA. Upon completion of training, the 126th Div traveled by rail for 3 days until they arrived at CHIAN (輯安).
O/a 5 Nov 50, 126th Div crossed the YALU River into MANP’OJIN (BA7259). From MANP’OJIN Div marched south through the central part of N Korea until they arrived at the HAN River in the vic of CHUNCH’ON (DS8993) o/a 16 Jan 51 (places passed through, unknown).
O/a 16 Jan 51 PW Bn was ordered to goto YANGPYONG (CS6749) for the purpose of collecting food. 18 Jan 51, PW Bn arrived at YANGPYONG (CS6749).
21 Jan 51, PW and 6 others were ordered to go to IPO (CS0704) for the purpose of contacting 125th Div Hqs. Upon arrival at IPO (CS0704), PW’s group was unable to locate 125th Div Hqs. PW and another were left behind at IPO while the remainder of the group continued to look for the Div east of IPO.
PW and one other were captured by a US Tank Crew.
6. REPLACEMENT & REENFORCEMENTS:
PW heard 60th Army of the 3rd Field Army entered KOREA by way of ANTUNG into SINUIJU (XE1839), o/a 20 Nov 50. (Present location of Div unk).
Up to the date of capture, 126th Div had not received replacement. PW heard Div Cult Officer say replacements will begin coming to 126th Div in the near future from Northern MANCHURIA.
126th Div does not have an equipment replacement system. To replace their equipment through capture.
7. FOOD AND AMMO SUPPLEIS:
126th Div food supply was exhausted 15 days after crossing the YALU River. The division ate whatever they could find along their route.
21 Jan 51, 126th Div had only 3 days food supply.
Since arriving at its present location (40 Km NE of IPO) the div has been trying to collect as much food as possible from nearby villages and towns. Because of the lack of food the div at present is incapable of moving forward.
The Ammo supply of Div is not plentiful, but adequate. 126th Div has not received fresh ammo supplies other than that captured or taken off dead troops.
Morale in the PW unit was very low as compared to the time that they entered N KOREA.
The cause for low morale are:
Fear of aircraft
Fear of artillery
Lack of food
Long forced marches
Long exposure to open air
Increase of non-battle casualties.
1. Did you surrender voluntarily?
a. PW surrendered after being surrounded.
2. Did you see any United Nations leaflets, or hear any loudspeaker broadcasts?
a. Negative.
3. Can you describe what they said?
a. Negative.
4. What was your reaction to them?
a. Negative.
5. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcasts?
a. Negative.
10. SECURITY:
PW Div to prevent air attacks, march only at night. When marching, the entire (Regt, Div, etc) unit moves in a single file.
There is no set interval between the marching troops. The same is true for ground and tank attacks.
When marching, PW unit usually started at about 1630 hours, continuing until day break. Brief rests of between 5 to 10 minutes were taken every hour.
PW unit marched on roads most of the time. The only time they take to the hills is when they feel that they are too close to another friendly unit in the vic.
When marching, communications between the forward and rear elements were conducted either verbly or in written form delivered by horse-mounted messengers.
When resting on a road march, guards were not used for the security of the unit because prior to marching, a Recon unit is sent out to check on UN troop movements.
To prevent air attacks while in bivouac areas, PW unit usually chose the most vegetated portion of a hill or mountain.
In areas where the land was bare the troops were dispersed and fox holes were dug. Troops slept in fox holes.
When the bivouac area is located in the rear areas, sentries are posted on all high ground surrounding the bivouac area. There is no set number of sentries placed on each post. The usual number was between 10 to 20 troops for the Regt.
The fox holes in which troops sleep in bivouac areas are camouflaged with fresh vegetation.
11. ATTACK:
The bivouac area is generally the assembly area prior to an attack which is between 2 to 21/2 Km in the rear of the front line.
When moving out of the assembly area for an attack, the triangular formation is generally used with the Arty and Mortars bringing up the rear of the formation.
Prior to an attack scouts are dispatched to look for weak spots.
When advancing toward enemy positions, an interval of about 400 meters is generally kept between the advancing force and the enemy.
When attacking, a company area of responsibility is between 100 to 600 meters depending on the terrain and the strength of the enemy (Regt, Div, unknown).
When reaching the objective, a company at all times will keep an interval of between 300 to 400 meters from the enemy. Generally, the company if supported by other units will pursue the enemy until contact is broken. Reorganization is made only after contact with the enemy is broken temporarily.
When the attack fails and the troops are forced to disperse they are to report to the rear for reorganization.
Prisoners taken during combat are evacuated to the rear immediately.
Whenever they stop, the troops dig in.
A “Probing Attack” is an attack to feel the strength of the enemy or to throw him off balance.
A unit of company strength is used for probing attacks unless otherwise ordered by the Division Commander.
The probing forces in most cases return to the main body unless there is an opportunity for encircling the enemy. Close liaison is maintained with the main body, located from 30 to 300 meters in the rear of the probing force.
12. PATROLS:
Daylight patrols usually consist of about 18 men, half of whom are dressed as civilians. Those dressed as civilians usually carried pistols, and in some cases, were unarmed.
Upon reaching the enemy lines, the men dressed as civilians will infiltrate and the remainder will wait for their return at a designated area. The mission of the daylight patrol is to get information on troop movements, troop strength, defensive positions, supply dumps, etc.
The mission of night patrols is similar to that of the day patrol. The only difference is that more troops are employed.
Most of the plain clothes troops used on patrols are North Koreans.
In event of ambush, several men will be dispatched immediately to the rear with a report, while the main body will attempt to provide protective fire. When cut off, members of the patrol must attempt to return.
Up to the date of capture, the PW unit patrols have been operating very successfully without being detected.
13. DEFENSE:
Observation posts are set up on all hills surrounding the assembly area.
OP are not set up along the route of march.
OP are set up on all high ground in front of a defensive position.
In organizing a defensive position a long trench camouflaged with vegetation is dug.
A MG position is of the trench type, long enough to accommodate a sqd.
The OP is generally located to the rear of the defensive line on the highest ground.
The Cp is located halfway between the OP and defense line.
Shovels and picks are used for constructing defensive positions.
Vegetation of all types will be used at all times to conceal positions.
The reserve is located in the rear of the CP or OP.
Troops have strict orders not to fire on specific missions or maneuvers.
PW unit does not have anti-tank weapons except for the 14.5 AT Rifles and 2.5 rocket launchers which are ineffective against US tanks.
No AT mines were observed in the PW division.
PW division has not used Tank troops.
14. AMBUSH:
PW has no knowledge concerning ambush tactics.
Encirclement is usually done by probing forces who strike the enemy while the main body attempts to sweep around the flanks.
Encircling forces are to move quickly with the least noise and to attack at a given signal, which generally is a bugle call.
If possible no hole is to be left untouched while attempting an encirclement movement.
15. SUPPLY:
Whatever they could find along their route of march. Rations are procured from villages and towns, confiscated from the people. Since Jan 51, the PW Division has suffered from the lack of rations. The division is immobile because of the lack of rations.
Ammunition is adequate but not plentiful. There is no ammo replacement system. To replenish their supplies details are formed to collect ammo from the dead or those left behind by the retreating enemy.
While marching, each man carries about between 1 to 5 days rations depending on the amount of rations available.
Pack horses were used to haul food and ammo.
CCF have 1 set of clothing (inside white and outside brown) which when reversed provides perfect camouflage in snow. A quilted comforter is issued to each soldier, which proved inadequate.
New issues of clothing were not made. Civilian clothes are used by Recon units only.
16. COMMUNICATIONS:
Telephones. The CCF have sufficient telephone wire. Telephone lines left behind by retreating UN Forces were collected for future use.
Runners carrying written messages are employed between company and Bn. Between Bn, Regt and Division a mounted messenger is used. Telephones are also used to transmit messages between Bn, Regt and Div.
Bugles and whistles are used to signify the start of an attack or for communication purposes between companies.
PW has seen the CCF use flares during an attack but its usage is unknown.
Communication over a distance of 5 Kms is the most troublesome because messages are delivered by horse back and often fail to arrive on time.
17. TRAINING:
PW had 2 months of basic infantry training. There is no set period of training. PW did not fire live ammo during training.
No training conducted in KOREA.
18. MEDICAL:
50% of the 126th Division’s troops are sick. But of this 50%, 45% are cases of frozen feet and frost bite. The remaining 5% is due to unknown diseases. 30% of the total percentage of sick troops are incapable of fighting.
Treatment for frost bite and frozen feet is unknown because most of the patients if unable to walk were evacuated to the rear. (Those able to walk are considered fit for combat).
19. PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE:
When attacked by aircraft, troops squat and freeze until the attack is over.
20. DISCIPLINE:
Discipline is maintained by means of using informers among the troops. The PW stated that most of the troops feel it is of no use to desert the unit because of the language difficulty and because there is no place that they can take refuge.
The PW does not know of any desertion cases within his Division.
The attitude of the Koreans toward the CCF is not good because the CCF has been confiscating food from the people.
Koreans are used by the CCF as interpreters and plain-clothes Recon personnel.
For the AC of S, G-2:
HONG
