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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3194　6 February 1951

FIELD REPORT (25 Div - LDI - No Number)　23 January 1951

PW is in good physical condition. He is of above average intelligence. PW is very cooperative. Information obtained from him is considered to be fairly reliable. From Sep 48 to Jun 50 he was employed in the Forestry Division of the ROK Government. Prior to this he was employed as a clerk from Jun 48 to Sep 48 in SEOUL. PW and 5 others constituting a reconnaissance patrol were resting in a house vicinity 2 kilometers south of OSAN when they were surprised by the enemy. Two were killed, 3 escaped and he was taken prisoner. Recommended for further interrogation.

a. Organizational breakdown, codes and number.

I NK Corps composed of 3rd, 8th and 47th Divisions. 8th Division has 3 regiments; each regiment has 3 Bns, each Bn consists of 3 Rifle Co’s, Mortar Co, HMG Co and Supply Plat. Each Bn has a Signal Plat and Med Plat attached. The code number for 8th Division is 415.

b. Original and present strengths:

Unit|Original Strength|Date|Present Strength|Date

8 Div|Est, 13,000 - 14,000||13,000|3 Dec 50

Regt|4,000|Unknown|Unknown|

Bn|Est, 1,000|Unknown|Unknown|

Co|Est, 200|Unknown|Est 100|21 Jan 50

Recn Co|Unknwon|Unknown||

1 Platoon|Unknown|Unknown|Unknown|

2 Platoon|Est 50|Unknown|Est 25|

Other than 2 KIA from his unit on 22 Jan 51 he does not know number of casualties from other weapons. His company normally operates away from main bodies of division and therefore he has not been in position to learn of, or witness any casualties suffered by other divisional units.

One infantry platoon has 4 PPsh, SMGs; 4 LMGs with estimated 300 rounds of ammunition per weapon; the platoon leader is armed with a pistol; the balance of the troops are armed with Russian rifles, 100 rounds of ammunition and 2 hand grenades per man.

4. UNIT ASSIGNMENT AND INTENTIONS:

The immediate mission of 2nd and 3d Plat’s Recon Co is to make surprise attacks on enemy division, regimental, battalion and other headquarters to obtain prisoners for interrogation; to observe enemy movements and to guide stragglers to their units.

5. DISPOSITIONS:

Disposition of units in operational area. Hq & Hq Reconnaissance Company of 8th Div was located vic 8 kilometers north of SUWON on 21 Jan 51. PW went to 8th Div Hq o/a 19 Jan. He indicated on the map that Div Hq was located vicinity CS2347.

1st Regt was located HAEJU about 1 month ago.

2nd Regt was located vic Div Hq o/a 19 Jan 51.

3rd Regt was located vic 8 kilometers south of YONGDONG-PO 12 Jan.

PW heard from friend that 47 NK Div located INCHON Area 21 Jan 51.

On or about 19 Jan PW heard from 3 CCF soldiers that 27 CCF Divisions were located unknown distance NW of SUWON. Heard o/a 19 Jan that unknown Div Hq was located unknown distance east of SUWON.

6. COMMUNICATIONS:

Signal equipment.

PW has not seen any radio equipment.

He saw telephones at Div Hq.

Methods of communications between all echelons. The Recon Co Hq has a telegraph transmitter used to communicate with other headquarters. The type, condition, make, etc of the set is unknown to PW. Runners are used by the Co to carry some of the messages.

7. TRANSPORTATION:

Oxcarts and trucks (Captured), number unknown, are used to transport supplies. PW has seen officers riding in Jeeps. Almost all vehicular movement is accomplished during hours of darkness utilizing secondary roads and trails in order to avoid detection from the air. UN air attacks do not cause large losses of transportation and transportation facilities.

CG 8th NK Div Rear Hq, LEE Hak Rae

C/S 8th NK Div Rear Hq, HAN Yong Su

9. ARMOR:

Information on use of armored units. PW heard from his platoon leader that MAO TSE TUNG had ordered the CCF in KOREA to use armored units and air units south of SUWON because terrain is favorable for employment of such units.

10. ARTILLERY:

PW has not seen any artillery in CCF or NKA units.

O/a Jan 13 PW crossed INJIN River with unknown unit who stated they were a reconnaissance unit from an artillery regiment. Designation of Arty regt unknown to PW.

PW has not seen any rockets among CCF or NKA units.

Currently morale is high among the troops in the Recon Co because the CO told the unit that mechanized units and aircraft will be employed south of SUWON. A current rumor is to the effect that they are waiting contact with UN forces pending arrival of friendly mechanized units from the rear areas.

12. CHRONOLOGY:

Sep 50 PW entered NKA 7th Div, 97th Regt, 4th Bn, 3rd Co, Mortar Plat at HAEJU. In action he was separated from his unit at SUNCHON due to UN air attack. O/a 30 Oct he was integrated into 8th NK Div at CHOSAN. He was sent to an NCO school, but failed to graduate as the school was inactivated prior to completion of the course. He was then assigned to the Recon Co of 8th Div. Unit arrived ANJU o/a 10 Dec. Unit arrived PYONGYANG o/a 13 Dec. Unit arrived KAESONG o/a 20 Dec thence to SEOUL arriving o/a 5 Jan 51. Unit arrived SUWON o/a 12 Jan. O/a 17 Unit retreated to vic 8 kilometers north of SUWON where it was located on 21 Jan 51.

13. FOOD AND AMMUNITION SUPPLIES:

Supplies are transported primarily by oxcarts and horse drawn carts with a limited amount transported by trucks. Generally the supplies are transported along secondary roads and trails. Location of supply and ammunition dumps unknown.

Food is procured locally quantity is not sufficient. Ammunition is generally in low supply. Ammunition is taken from rear area troops for issue to front line units.

Clothing is not sufficient. There has been no issue of clothing since leaving YALU River.

UN air powers does not have much effect on the movement of supplies as most movements are made during the hours of darkness.

14. REPLACEMENTS:

Does not know of replacements being assigned from other units.

Does not know what assignment policy is for wounded personnel after they recover from their wounds. States stragglers are to rejoin their assigned units. PW’s unit has received no replacements.

Does not know if CCF forces in KOREA will reinforce current military forces in KOREA with CCF troops now known to be in MANCHURIA.

15. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:

PW did not surrender.

PW has read a leaflet which stated that Communist CHINA is invading KOREA with the aim of making KOREA a colony of CHINA. PW does not know what to believe, enemy and friendly propaganda is entirely opposite to each other.

PW states majority of those in the NKA do not believe the leaflets, especially among those educated in North KOREA under the rule of the NK peoples government.

16. NKA TRAINING CENTERS:

Training for NKA is given at following locations: CHOSAN, ANJU, PYONGYANG, SARIWON, KAESONG, and SEOUL.

PW has not received any immunization or innoculations.

Does not know of use of drugs or narcotics prior to attack by troops.

For the AC of S, G-2: