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TSAI, Shun Chang 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 31 NO. 3162 1951-01-17
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3162 5 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1407) 23 January 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS
PW NAME: TSAI, Shun Chang (蔡順昌) (CCF)
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
ORGN: 4th Field Army, 13th Corps, 39th Army, 115th Div, 343rd Regt, 3rd Bn, 7th Co, 2nd Plat, 4th Sqd
DUTIES: Rifleman
EDUCATION: None
AGE: 23
OCCUPATION: Farmer
ADDRESS: KUEICHOU SHENG, ANSHUN HSIEN (貴川省 安順縣)
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 17 Jan 51 vic of SUWON (CS2417)
INTERROGATOR: TMO
INTERROGATED AT: HAYANG (DQ8347)

2. ASSESSMENT:
Information is limited but seems to be very reliable. PW deserted his unit to surrender.

3. T/O & E AND STRENGTH:
The 4th Field Army consisted of the 13th and 14th Army Groups.
The 13th Army Group composed of the 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 50th and 64th Armies.
Prior to intervention in KOREA, a tank unit of unknown strength was attached to the 13th Army Group.
The PW heard that the 4th Field Army was composed of a little over 300,000 troops.
The 39th Army was composed of the 115th, 116th and 117th Inf Divs.
An arty unit of unknown strength was attached to each army.
The 115th Div has the 343rd, 344th and 345th Regts. An Arty Regt was attached to each Div.
To each Regt Hqs the fol units were attached:
1 Arty Bn
1 Med Bn
1 Sig Co
Each Regt has 3 Bns.
To the Bn Hqs the fol units were attached:
1 Mortar Co
1 Medical Co
1 HMG Co
Three Rifle Companies plus 1 HMG Co, 1 Med Plat and 1 Mortar Co constituted a Bn.
A Rifle Co has 3 plats. The Rifle cos in the 1st Bn were designated 1 thru 3; 2nd Bn, 4 thru 6; and the 3rd Bn, 6 thru 9.
A plat is composed of 3 Rifle Sqds of about 11 men each.
Rifle Plat|Original|Present (16 Jan 51)
Personnel
EM|32|25
Officers|2|2
Total|34|27
Equipment & Ammo
LMGs|3 (2,500 rds ea)|3 (1,000 rds ea)
Jap M38 Rifles|11 (80 rds ea)|11 (50 rds ea)
Pistols (Jap M14)|3 (60 rds ea)|3
Grenades|3 (per man)|1 (1per man)
Remarks:
Only two thirds of the plat were armed. The remaining tps carried food and ammo for the plat.
Rifle Co
Personnel
EM|110|90
Officers|5|5
Total|115|95
Equipment & Ammo
LMGs|6 (2,500 rds ea)|6 (1,000 rds ea)
Jap M38 Rifles|70 (80 rds ea)|60 (50 rds ea)
MAUSER Machine Pistols|5 (50 rds ea)|5
HMG Company
Personnel
EM|140|100
Officers|5|5
Total|145|105
Equipment & Ammo
HMGs (M1891/30)|6 (2,500 rds ea)|4
Rifles (Jap M38)|8 (80 rds ea)|8
Remarks:
Most of the troops in the HMG Co were unarmed.
Mortar Company
Personnel
EM|140|100
Officers|5|5
Total|145|105
Present strength includes lease■ due to battle casualties since 15 Oct 50.
|Original|Present
Equipment & Ammo
81mm Mortars (US)|6 (70 rds ea)|5 (50 rds ea)
Rifles (Jap M38)|10 (80 rds ea)|10 (50 rds ea)
Remarks:
Most of the troops in the Mortar Co were unarmed and were utilized as ammo bearers.

4. UNIT LOCATION & ACTIVITIES:
The 39th Army Hqs o/a 17 Jan 51 was located at MT PUGAKSAN (within the city of SEOUL).
The Hqs is well dispersed in the mountain for passive air defense.
The (forward) 115th Div Hqs was, o/a 17 Jan 51, located 6 kms W of SUWON (CS2427), in an unknown mountain.
343rd Regt Hqs o/a 17 Jan 51, was located in an unknown mountain 8 kms S of SUWON (CS2427) and 2 kms W of the main highway extending S of SUWON (CS2427).
The 3rd Bn Hqs of the 343rd Regt, o/a 17 Jan 51, was located in a small village 8 kms S of SUWON and 3 kms W of the main highway.
The 7th, 8th and 9th Cos of the 3rd Bn, 343rd Regt o/a 17 Jan 51, observed occupying the farm houses between the Bn Hqs and a small unk village 2 kms E of the Bn Hqs.
About 15 trps were in each farm house in the vic on 19 Jan 51. There were no indications of an attack by the PW’s Bn. PW’s Bn at present cannot move from its position because of constant air attacks. A patrol of between 15 to 18 trps and NK women (No unk) are daily dispatched from the Bn to get info on US troop movement and deployment.
The women used by the PW’s Bn were attractive and dressed in such a manner that they were able to gain the confidence of US troops (method of obtaining info).
These women usually infiltrate US positions and return within 2 to 5 days, depending on their mission.
O/a 16 Jan 51, one female agent was reported to the PW’s Bn Hq as captured by US forces.
The PW heard that the 344th Regt was on the right (West) flank and 345th Regt was on the left (East) flank of his Regt.
The PW heard that his division is to withdraw to SUWON (CS2427) for some unk reason.

5. PERSONAL & UNIT HISTORY:
Conscripted Jan 46 at KUIJUSUN (貴州省) and asgd to the 71st CNA Army stationed at HUIAN SHENG (■■省).
The PW’s unit engaged the CCF at UINANSHUN, until Jun 47. In Jun 47, the PW’s unit was transferred to SSUPINGCHIEH (四平街). Jun 47 to Oct 49 the PW’s unit fought the CCF in the SUPIN Province. In Oct 49, the PW’s unit was defeated and the remaining elements were ordered to retreat to FORMOSA.
Enroute to FORMOSA, the PW was captured by the CCF at KWANSHI (廣西). The PW was held captive by the CCF for a period of 4 months and was integrated into the 39th Army, 115th Div.
10 Jun 50 the 115th Div departed KWANSHI for ANTUNG by rail and arrived o/a 15 Jul 50. At ANTUNG, the PW’s Div was stationed at HSINMINGCHIEH (奇明街).
Jul 50 to the middle of Sep 50 the 115th Division underwent tng in preparation for the intervention in Korea.
About the middle of Sep 50 the 115th Division crossed the YALU into SINUIJU (XE1839).
His division was the first CCF unit to cross the YALU into KOREA.
From SINUIJU (XE1839), the PW’s Div marched to KUSONG (XE9329). O/a 15 Oct 50, the Pw’s div went into combat in the KUSONG area.
Dec 50, the PW’s unit entered PYONGYANG. After staying in PYONGYANG for about 3 days, the div marched S to the 38th parallel.
From the 38th parallel, the Div marched through KAESONG (BT8505), SEOUL and SUWON (CS2427) until they arrived at a small village 3 Kms S of SUWON (CS2427) o/a 13 Jan 51.
17 Jan 50, PW deserted his unit to go to USAN (CS2814), to surrender to US trps. When the PW surrendered to US troops, he was unarmed.

6. PERSONALITIES:
WANG, Chang Hai (王章海); Plat Ldr, 343rd Regt, 3rd Bn, 7th Co, 2nd Plat.

7. MORALE:
Morale of the PW’s Bn was very low. The reasons are the lack of food, wpns, proper equip, and because 2/3 of the trps are former CNA troops.

8. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
a. Did you surrender voluntarily? If so, why?
a. PW deserted to surrender because his unit did not have sufficient food and clothing. He felt that if he surrendered he would at least have sufficient clothing and food.
b. Did you see any United Nations leaflets or hear any loudspeaker broadcasts?
a. Yes. PW was not able to read, consequently, he had his friend explain what was written. His friend told him that the leaflet said that he would be given sufficient food and clothing and would be treated well if he surrendered.
c. Can you describe what they said?
a. Same as 2 above.
d. What was your reaction to them?
a. PW upon learning the contents of the leaflet, planned to surrender.
e. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcasts?
a. Yes, PW and his friend planned to desert to surrender. PW’s friend was not able to desert because he was closely watched by his CO who knew that the was planning to desert.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

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